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Conservation conflicts occur when people clash over conservation objectives. They are 
damaging for biodiversity, livelihoods, and human well-being globally, and are often 
managed via interventions intended to change people’s behaviour. However, variation in 
intervention approaches across contexts remains underexplored. This thesis seeks to 
inform management by better understanding the roots of conflict, and the factors 
constraining the choice and efficacy of different interventions. Using an empirical literature 
review, I first identify five intervention types – ‘technical’, ‘cognitive’, ‘economic’, 
‘enforcement’ and ‘stakeholder’ – and how they associate with conflict frames, behaviours 
and geography. I then largely corroborate these results in an experimental survey with 
conservation professionals, which also uncovers how decision-makers’ characteristics, 
including disciplinary and demographic backgrounds, predict their intervention priorities. I 
then draw upon stakeholder interviews in Enduimet Wildlife Management Area in Tanzania, 
and grey literature to identify how multiple levels of conflict – covering human-elephant 
interactions, stakeholder interactions, and governance structures – constrain local 
management options. Next, using an experimental public goods game in Enduimet, I find 
that stakeholder perceptions of intervener trustworthiness predict levels of cooperation 
with conflict interventions. Lastly, by analysing conflict over trophy hunting via the social 
media platform Twitter, I reveal how this issue is polarised along similar political and value-
based dimensions as other environmental conflicts. Beyond advocating for behaviourally-
informed interventions, these findings have three key management implications: that the 
backgrounds of decision-makers mediate their priorities, that the backgrounds of 
interveners mediate responses to interventions, and that the socio-political and governance 




Conservation conflicts describe the situations in which different groups of people clash over 
conservation objectives. Such conflicts can often revolve around wildlife related impacts, 
such as crop-raiding, livestock depredation, and the associated retaliatory killing of wildlife. 
However, conflicts between people over conservation often also reflect much deeper socio-
political roots, such as those reflecting contests over land, perceived injustice, cultural 
practices, or ethics. Such clashes often result in negative consequences for human well-
being and threatened wildlife populations. As such, conservationists are interested in 
intervening to manage such conflicts globally, often by encouraging changes in human 
behaviour. However, although there is a much evidence to inform such interventions, there 
remain important gaps in our understanding, particularly with regards to why different 
interventions are prioritised across different contexts, how people respond to different 
interventions and how the socio-political context of conflicts might influence the 
effectiveness of different interventions.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to help inform conflict management by better understanding 
the roots of conflicts and the factors influencing both intervention decision-making and 
intervention effectiveness. I begin by describing how conflicts over conservation emerge 
and use a literature review to categorise interventions aiming to change behaviour in 
conflict into five types: ‘technical’ (e.g., fences), ‘economic’ (e.g., compensation), ‘cognitive’ 
(e.g., education), ‘enforcement’ (e.g., patrols), and ‘stakeholder’ (e.g., consultations). Next, 
analysing the conflict literature, and using a survey with conservation professionals, I find 
that different intervention priorities associate with whether a conflict is located in a highly 
developed or less highly developed country, whether there are illegal behaviours reported, 
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and the backgrounds of those making decisions (including their disciplinary and 
demographic background). I then introduce a case-study involving conflict over elephant 
conservation in northern Tanzania, and consider how different governance structures and 
actors from beyond the local context shape both the dynamics of local conflict over 
elephants, and the effectiveness of local interventions. Next, I report the results of an 
experimental game framed around elephant conflict interventions, which finds that people 
who think an intervening organisation is more trustworthy are more likely to cooperate 
with interventions. Lastly, I explore the factors affecting polarisation in wildlife conflicts and 
find that US-based Twitter users who support trophy hunting are more likely to be 
conservative than liberal, and more likely to use instrumental, rather than moralistic 
reasoning to support their positions.  
 
Taken together, these findings support a more behaviourally-informed approach to conflict 
management. In particular, they suggest that further consideration should be given to how 
conflict intervention decisions are made and how different interveners are received. 
Furthermore, these findings support assertions that building trust between communities 
and conservation organisations – through more effective communication, collaboration and 
by avoiding unrealistic promises – is important in improving social and wildlife-related 
outcomes. However, these findings warn that the effectiveness of local stakeholder-
engagement may be challenged wherever local conservation objectives and outcomes are 
heavily shaped by non-local actors and processes, and possibly where conflicts are highly 
polarized and value-based. In short, this thesis concludes that, whilst conflicts over 
conservation are socially created and socially resolved, both the choice of interventions and 
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When beginning this PhD, my plan was to better understand conservation conflicts by 
modelling them using game theory as a series of multiple-party dilemmas. I didn’t. 
Although I still draw upon the concepts of game theory in some of this work, my approach 
shifted after I encountered an altogether different dilemma: that conflict is inextricably 
linked to conservation and that interventions which successfully change contributing 
behaviours are rare. The aim of this PhD has since been to use a variety of methods to 
explore why this is the case, and what we should do about it. Many of these insights 
presented here have been informed through my experience with conflict in Enduimet 
Wildlife Management Area in northern Tanzania. But, these ideas have also been shaped by 
a range of other experience and insights: from reading about conflict in historical accounts, 
to witnessing conflict in real-time via Twitter accounts. Such a wide focus has inevitably led 
to a broad, interdisciplinary thesis, which draws upon an array of approaches, including 
literature reviews, interviews, surveys, experimental games, framing experiments and social 
media mining. As such, this thesis is disjointed at times, shedding narrow beams of light 
onto complex, wicked, problems. But, when taken together, hopefully these insights help 
somewhat towards informing more behaviourally-focussed and effective conflict 








Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Tembo zikipigana huumia nyasi 
(when elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers) 
– Swahili proverb 
 
Photo: Z. Baynham-Herd 
 
1.1 Problem statement 
Conflicts over wildlife conservation are widespread and are both socially and 
environmentally damaging (Redpath et al., 2013). Such conflicts negatively impact some of 
the world’s most impoverished people (Adams and Hutton, 2007; Barua et al., 2013), as 
well as the viability of some of the world’s most endangered species (Woodroffe et al., 
2005a). Conflicts are claimed to be increasing in frequency and intensity; supposedly due to 
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increased competition for diminishing space and resources (Balmford et al., 2001; Boitani et 
al., 2010). Consequently, there is much interest in understanding and managing 
conservation conflicts (Pooley et al., 2016; Redpath et al., 2013). Historically, much of the 
conservation literature has focused on so-called ‘human-wildlife conflicts’ (HWC) (Nyhus, 
2016; van Eeden et al., 2017). Within this framing, certain species (usually of conservation 
concern) exert direct or opportunity costs to the livelihoods and well-being of local people, 
who subsequently retaliate by often lethal means (Woodroffe et al., 2005a). However, 
although understanding particular human-wildlife interactions is key to understanding 
conservation outcomes (Evans and Adams, 2018), recently there have been calls to 
reconceptualise many of these issues as representing conflicts between people over wildlife 
(Peterson et al., 2010; Young et al., 2010). Under this interpretation, conservation conflicts 
occur wherever individuals or groups (stakeholders) clash over conservation objectives and 
where one party is perceived to assert its interests over the others (Redpath et al., 2013).  
 
Conservation conflicts may embody contests over a wide range of issues ranging from 
wildlife impacts (Pooley et al., 2016; Young et al., 2010), to protected areas (Soliku and 
Schraml, 2018), to invasive species (Estévez et al., 2015). They involve dynamic ecological, 
economic and socio-political elements, with relationships driven by the attitudes, 
perceptions, and power of different stakeholders (Arbieu et al., 2019; Mason et al., 2017; 
Pollard et al., 2019), and often fundamentally different ways that different actors perceive, 
value, and use the natural world (Dhee et al., 2019; Dickman, 2010; Peterson et al., 2010). 
Some conflicts may play-out at the level of the material dispute, whereas others involve 
underlying, deep-rooted contestations over politics, culture, or ethics (Madden and 
McQuinn, 2014). Some conflicts may appear to have only one ‘winning’ position, whereas 
others may have more potential for mutually beneficial outcomes (Redpath et al., 2013). 
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Conservation conflicts are therefore diverse, hard to define and measure, and are often 
interpreted and framed differently by authors, managers, and stakeholders involved in the 
conflict (Rechciński et al., 2019). This complexity has led to conservation conflicts being 
identified as intractable, ‘wicked’ problems (Mason et al., 2018).  
 
As a consequence of such realisations, academic interest in conservation conflict has risen 
sharply (Peterson et al., 2010) and much time, effort, and resources have been spent 
attempting to resolve or mitigate conflicts (Pooley et al., 2016; Redpath et al., 2013). 
Typically, interventions aim to change some kind of human behaviour, be that retaliatory 
killing (Inskip et al., 2016), livelihood practices (Bal et al., 2011), or active opposition to 
conservation (De Pourcq et al., 2017). To date, research into conservation conflicts has 
largely concentrated on attempting to predict (Cusack et al., 2018), prevent (Nyhus, 2016), 
or mitigate (Ravenelle and Nyhus, 2017) wildlife impacts. Another common approach has 
been to use interventions to try and increase the tolerance of people towards wildlife; 
either through direct incentives such as direct payments, indirect incentives such as 
community aid, or through education programmes (Inskip et al., 2016; Lindsey et al., 2013). 
To address underlying human-human conflicts, attempts have also been made to increase 
stakeholder engagement (Redpath et al., 2017), build trust (Young et al., 2016), and find 
mutually agreed upon solutions (Madden and McQuinn, 2015).  
 
Various frameworks have also been proposed in an attempt to inform conservation conflict 
interventions (Rechciński et al., 2019). These range from tracing human-wildlife (Dickman 
and Hazzah, 2015) or stakeholder interactions (Young et al., 2016b), to mapping conflicts 
using game-theory (Colyvan et al., 2011; Lin and Li, 2016) or competing land-use projections 
(Balmford et al., 2001), to analysing the socio-political context through ‘wicked problem’ 
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(Mason et al., 2018) and ‘social-identity’ approaches (Colvin et al., 2015). Whilst conflict 
managers may have varying motivations, commonly they attempt to solve problems and 
achieve socio-environmental outcomes, such as reducing the harmful features of conflicts 
(such as violence), fostering more collaborative conservation management, and promoting 
the adoption of more wildlife-friendly behaviours (Butler et al., 2015; Redpath et al., 2013).  
 
Better understanding conservation interventions is important to improve their 
effectiveness (Sutherland and Wordley, 2017). Accordingly, in many specific contexts the 
effectiveness of individual interventions have been assessed. Such studies range from 
identifying the outcomes of economic incentives on recreational hunting behaviours 
(MacMillan and Phillip, 2010), to measuring the effectiveness of awareness campaigns on 
reducing urban wildlife impacts (Baruch-Mordo et al., 2011) to assessing the outcomes of 
co-management efforts in resolving conflicts between groups of stakeholders (Butler et al., 
2015). Despite such contributions however, evidence-informed conflict management is still 
largely lacking (Eklund et al., 2017; van Eeden et al., 2018) and there is a dearth of general 
conservation theory to inform conflict interventions. In particular, conflict interventions 
would be improved by better understanding and targeting human behaviours (Nilsson et 
al., 2019; Veríssimo et al., 2019). 
 
Although there is a small but growing literature which attempts to explore the effectiveness 
of different interventions at a larger scale, these tend to be limited to one intervention type 
– e.g., compensation (Ravenelle and Nyhus, 2017) – one taxa – e.g., carnivores (Inskip and 
Zimmermann, 2009; van Eeden et al., 2017) – or one context – e.g., protected areas (Soliku 
and Schraml, 2018). Furthermore, whilst some studies have identified variation in how 
practitioners and researchers prioritise different interventions (Lute et al., 2018; Rastogi et 
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al., 2013; Shiffman and Hammerschlag, 2016), the reasons behind such differences in 
intervention priorities remain underexplored. Indeed, conflict intervention approaches 
across different contexts are rarely considered together, and many intervention-related 
assumptions remain untested (Pooley et al., 2016). The extent to which conflict 
interventions are planned in a logical, step-wise fashion to meet specified conservation 
objectives – a Theory of Change (Qiu et al., 2018) – has also not been evaluated. There is 
therefore a need to further explore the evidence and assumptions underpinning different 
interventions, and the factors that constrain the choice of intervention priorities across 
different contexts. 
 
Although there is an increasing understanding of the social roots of conflict (Mason et al., 
2018), the human-wildlife conflict frame is still pervasive in the published literature (Krafte 
Holland et al., 2018; Nyhus, 2016) and conservation policy (IUCN, 2018). Consequently, the 
factors which are assessed in relation to conflict interventions are still largely limited to 
human-wildlife interactions, such as levels of retaliatory killing (Dickman, 2010; van Eeden 
et al., 2017) or wildlife impacts (Ceauşu et al., 2019; Hill and Wallace, 2012). In contrast, the 
social factors which shape conflicts, such as human-wildlife narratives (Dhee et al., 2019; 
Pooley, 2016), negative stakeholder relations (De Pourcq et al., 2017), and wider 
governance and economic systems (Colvin et al., 2015; García-Frapolli et al., 2018), have 
been considered less in assessments of conflict interventions. In particular, the importance 
of both levels of stakeholder trust (Young et al., 2016a), political polarization (Persson et al., 
2015) and multi-level conflict dynamics (Madden and McQuinn, 2014) have been identified, 
but remain relatively untested with regards to their influence conflict behaviours and 
interventions. Hence, it is also important to better understand how such social factors 
might sustain conflict behaviours and constrain the effectiveness of interventions. 
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1.2 Aims and objectives 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to informing more effective conflict management by: 
- Better understanding the factors which sustain conflicts and associated behaviours 
- Identifying and testing the factors which influence intervention decisions 
- Identifying and testing the factors which constrain intervention effectiveness  
 
1.3 Research approach 
To address these aims, this thesis uses a mixed methods approach (Newing et al., 2010), 
combining both quantitative and qualitative research methods in a range of individual, but 
related, studies. Chapter 2 introduces the different ways conservation conflict is 
conceptualised and managed. Next, Chapter 3 uses a global empirical review of the 
conservation conflict literature to explore the different ways in which conflicts are framed, 
the behaviours they involve, and the different interventions recommended by authors. This 
analysis follows empirical review best practice (Haddaway et al., 2015) and recent examples 
in the conflict literature (Estévez et al., 2015; Peterson et al., 2010). As the results of this 
review raise questions around the factors which influence intervention decisions, Chapter 4 
then uses a framing experiment, in the form of a survey with conservation professionals, to 
test a variety of possible influences on conflict intervention recommendations. This study 
uses a full factorial design (Wattage et al., 2005), and follows similar framing experiments 
that have been used to investigate how different people respond to variations in 
environmental messaging (Anspach and Draguljić, 2019; Sapiains et al., 2016). 
 
Chapter 5 provides an historical overview of case-study location of Enduimet Wildlife 
Management Area (WMA) in northern Tanzania, which is an area rife with conservation 
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conflict (Homewood, 2017; Mariki, 2016). Chapter 6 draws upon qualitative research 
conducted in Enduimet and considers the behaviours and multiple levels at which conflict in 
Enduimet is produced, and how these may constrain the efficacy of different interventions. 
These research methods are guided by best-practice in conservation social science (Bennett 
et al., 2017; Drury et al., 2011; Newing et al., 2010). Chapter 7, reports the results of a novel 
experimental game played in Enduimet, which tests the role of trust in shaping cooperation 
with conflict interventions. This approach draws upon similar games used in conservation 
(Gatiso et al., 2018; Salk et al., 2017) and was developed during a research methods 
workshop focused specifically on conservation conflict games (Redpath et al., 2018). 
Chapter 8 uses a social media analysis to explore the nature of polarisation in the conflict 
around the trophy hunting of African megafauna (Hutton and Leader-Williams, 2003). Using 
Twitter data, Chapter 8 draws upon previous social media analysis methods (Barberá et al., 
2015; Toivonen et al., 2019), and considers the extent to which positions on trophy hunting 
are politically polarized, the nature of interactions, and the different value-based reasoning 
underpinning positions. Chapter 9 then synthesises these findings, presents their 











1.4 Thesis structure 
In addition to the introduction, this thesis is split into a further eight chapters. 
 
Chapter 2 interrogates the conceptual underpinning of conservation conflicts and their 
management. 
 
Chapter 3 uses an empirical literature review to identify how intervention 
recommendations associate with conflict geography, behaviours, and framing. This chapter 
has been published as: 
Baynham-Herd, Z., Redpath, S., Bunnefeld, N., Molony, T. & Keane, A. (2018). 
Conservation conflicts: Behavioural threats, frames, and intervention 
recommendations. Biological Conservation, 222, 180–188.  
 
Chapter 4 tests these findings using an experimental survey of conservation researchers 
and practitioners. This chapter has been published as: 
Baynham-Herd, Z., Redpath, S., Bunnefeld, N., & Keane, A. (2019). Intervention 
priorities in wildlife conflicts. Conservation Biology doi.org/10.1111/cobi.13372 
 
Chapter 5 introduces the case study location – Enduimet WMA – and its’ history. 
 
Chapter 6 explores the multi-level drivers of conservation conflict in Enduimet WMA and 
how these shape behaviours and constrain local conflict interventions. 
 
Chapter 7 uses an experiment public goods game to test the role of trust in shaping 
stakeholder support for conservation conflict interventions in Enduimet WMA. This chapter 
is under review at People and Nature as: 
Baynham-Herd, Z., Redpath, S., Bunnefeld, N., Molony, T. & Keane, A. (2018). Trust 
predicts cooperation with conservation interventions in an elephant conflict public 
goods game.  
 
Chapter 8 analyses US Twitter users to explore the factors – such as politics, values and 
networks – underpinning polarization within the conflict over African trophy hunting. 
 
Chapter 9 discusses the implications of the findings of this thesis for conservation conflict 





Exercising reflexivity is important as a researcher given the mediating role played by 
personal biases and experiences in all forms of knowledge creation (Berger, 2015; Harding, 
1992). This is particularly the case when make recommendations affecting other peoples’ 
lives and when undertaking social research (Pasgaard et al., 2017), such as the fieldwork I 
conducted in Tanzania. Hence, regarding my own positionality, I grew up in Britain, with an 
academic background rooted in the Natural Sciences (Zoology), and History and Philosophy 
of Science. Aware of the need to develop proficiency in qualitative research techniques, at 
the start of my PhD I undertook training in social research methods and ethics (with a focus 
on Africa), acquired additional social science supervision, and undertook Swahili language 
training. Consequently, I was able to communicate in a basic fashion with my research 
participants in Tanzania, but I also relied upon two local research assistants (Stephen 
Sankeni and Joseph Sankeni) to act as interpreters and facilitators. I travelled alone by local 
transport and emphasised my status as a student to demonstrate that I was not associated 
with any conservation organisation. However, both previous research and cultural 
experiences will have likely shaped the ways in which respondents perceived me, and how I 
interpreted my observations and interactions with them (Goldman, 2007; Jacobs-Huey, 
2002). Indeed, by engaging with other stakeholders within a conflict, and by researching it, 
to some extent I became a stakeholder myself (Redpath et al., 2013). In particular, at times 
I found myself acting as a channel of communication between community members and 
the conservation management area staff. Lastly, by attempting to gain generalisable 
insights for conflict management, my scientific approach could be characterised as one of a 
‘pragmatic positivist’ (Moon and Blackman, 2014), and as a conservation researcher, I 
identify as largely anthropocentric in my outlook (Holmes et al., 2017), instrumentalist, and 




Most of the research undertaken during the production of this thesis involved research 
with, or about, people. As well as securing ethical approval, ensuring that relevant ethical 
safeguards were in place was therefore hugely important (Ibbett and Brittain, 2019). For 
instance, across all of this research I have anonymised both my raw data and in-text 
quotations – this includes not reproducing any personal information which could be traced 
back to individuals (John et al., 2016). By providing information sheets and appropriate 
spoken translations, I also ensured each research participant was able to give their full and 
informed consent before participating in my research. In the Tanzanian setting in particular 
– in which there was the possibility for more unequal power dynamics – efforts were made 
to reiterate and emphasise to participants that they did not have to continue with any 
interview or study if they did not feel comfortable (Tindana et al., 2006). For transparency, 
my position as a student researcher (i.e. not a policy-maker or NGO staff worker) was 
emphasised to avoid raising any expectations of possible outcomes (from the perspective of 
research participants). I also made sure that I returned to the field-site to thank the 
communities who participated in my research and to provide an opportunity to share and 
receive feedback about the research. In the experimental survey (Chapter 4), to ensure that 
participants’ dignity and rights were upheld, ethical guidelines for social experimentation 
were followed (Humphreys, 2015), including offering participants the option to receive the 
full results (and premise of the study) before publication. With regards to the Twitter-based 
study (Chapter 8), although tweets may be public, and therefore in theory users have given 
their implicit consent for them to be analysed or used in other ways, in practice most users 
are unlikely to have given informed consent for their tweets to be used or reproduced in 
research (Townsend and Wallace, 2016). Hence, I did not reproduce any tweets which 
could be used to identify specific users.  
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Chapter 2: Conceptual background 
 
2.1 On the origin of conservation conflict 
“Lions plunder men’s steading, seizing on their cattle and sturdy sheep, until they too are 
killed, cut down by the sharp bronze in the men’s hands” (Iliad V: 548-50). 
 
As described by Woodroffe et al. (2005), from reading Homer’s Iliad it appears that conflict 
between humans and wild animals have occurred since antiquity. Indeed, a cursory 
exploration of the conservation literature reveals that such interactions are still widely 
prevalent (Pooley et al., 2016). By many authors, these interactions are described as 
examples of ‘human-wildlife conflict’ (Peterson et al., 2010). Such definitions are also 
prevalent in conservation policy. As the International Union for the Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN) task force on ‘Human-Wildlife Conflict’ states: “Human-wildlife conflict… typically 
involves situations in which a threatened species poses a direct threat to people and their 
livelihoods, resulting in retaliation against the species they blame for this.” (IUCN, 2018). 
Consequently, many conservation organisations and researchers task themselves with the 
objective of establishing ‘coexistence’ between people and wildlife – often through the use 
of technical interventions (e.g., livestock fencing) or economic instruments (e.g., insurance 
or compensation payments) (Nyhus, 2016; Treves and Karanth, 2003). By solving, or 
mitigating these conflicts, conservationists thus seek to achieve ‘win-win’s for people and 
wildlife (Redpath et al., 2013).  
 
It appears however, that humans are not actually in conflict with wild animals, at least in 
the traditional sense of the term (Peterson et al., 2010; Young et al., 2010). Indeed, a 
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conflict is commonly defined as “a difference in goal, perception or interest” (Coser, 1957; 
De Pourcq et al., 2017) and as such, they are considered to occur between at least two 
conscious antagonists. Hence, whilst researchers and stakeholders do ascribe varying levels 
of agency (Evans and Adams, 2018) and rights (Pooley and Redpath, 2018) to individual wild 
animals, what many authors refer to as ‘conflict’ – e.g., threats to human life, economic 
interests or recreation (Treves and Karanth, 2003) – might more accurately be described as 
wildlife impacts (Young et al., 2010), negative interactions (Karanth et al., 2017) or 
‘ecosystem disservices’ (Ceauşu et al., 2019). Under this conceptualisation, conflict occurs 
when people clash over conservation objectives and when one party exerts their interest 
over others (Redpath et al., 2013). In other words, people come into conflict over wildlife 
(Peterson et al., 2010; Young et al., 2010). Indeed, people disagree on whether wildlife 
should be killed, how much of it should exist, where it should exist, how it should exist, why 
it should exist and what, exactly, should exist (Young et al., 2010). Hence, at a deeper level, 
conflicts between people over conservation are shaped by narratives of what conservation 
is, and should, be and by both normative and political ways of seeing the world (Manfredo 
et al., 2017; Nesbitt and Weiner, 2001; Peet and Watts, 1996), which can lead to 
polarization (Hodgson et al., 2019; Veríssimo et al., 2015). These ultimate factors interact to 
produce the proximate human behaviours through which conflict is realised (Redpath et al., 
2013; Veríssimo et al., 2019). 
 
The roots of conservation conflicts are myriad, and are often entangled in complex 
histories. Conservation objectives themselves are themselves similarly diverse (Karp et al., 
2015). However, those that are enshrined in national-level policy and the workings of major 
conservation organisations, generally coalesce around preventing global extinctions of 
species (Salafsky et al., 2008). However, although such efforts to conserve species have 
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proliferated since the mid -19th century (Adams, 2013; Cowles, 2012), clashes over access to 
wildlife, and the preservation of certain animals or environments, have been documented 
throughout human history (Grove, 1995; Lambert, 2015). Furthermore, human-wildlife 
interactions, attitudes and narratives are similarly varied across different places and 
cultures, and are subject to change over time (Dhee et al., 2019; Pooley, 2016). 
Nonetheless, Redpath et al., (2015) identify six broad categories of human interests which 
can clash with conservation objectives, and thus lead to conflict: livelihoods, recreation, 
human health and safety, human well-being, development and infrastructure, and animal 
welfare. Significantly, these social roots of conflicts – sometimes referred to as ‘human-
dimensions’ (Treves, 2008) – show how conservation conflicts can encompass much more 
than simply disputes over wildlife impacts, but extend to any situation that involves a 
conservation objective being challenged, resisted or obstructed (De Pourcq et al., 2017; 
Holmes, 2007; Stern, 2008a). The defining feature of a conservation conflict is therefore a 
combination of behaviours: typically actors pursuing and threatening a given conservation 
objective (Redpath et al., 2013). Hence the umbrella of conflict extends from carnivore-
killings and illegal resource-use to debates in parliament or civil protest. This definition of 
conflict, which does not encompass all natural resource or environmental related conflicts, 
but just those involving conservation objectives (Salafsky et al., 2008), is that which is used 
throughout this thesis. 
 
The danger of such an all-encompassing definition is that it can become operationally 
useless. But, for conservation conflicts, the opposite is true. By acknowledging the social 
origin of all conservation conflicts, one can begin to explore the social dynamics and 
behaviours that produce and sustain them, and apply these lessons across different 
contexts. For example, it is known that conservation conflicts are also rooted in identities, 
24 
 
values, and politics (Madden and McQuinn, 2015), and although conflicts involve 
disagreements over objectives, they play-out through stakeholder interactions and 
perceptions of both other stakeholders and wildlife (Marshall et al., 2007). Conflicts can 
also involve disputes over information, management approaches, and decision-making 
processes (Young et al., 2010), and levels of power, collaboration, and trust between 
stakeholders also shape interactions between them (De Pourcq et al., 2017; Stern, 2008a). 
As conflicts are dynamic and can involve feedback loops, they can also be considered 
through the lens of ‘wicked’ problems (Mason et al., 2018). This understanding brings 
conflict managers to look less towards technological solutions, and more towards 
collaboration and stakeholder engagement (Redpath et al., 2017) – where stakeholders can 
be defined as any group or individual affecting, or is affected by, the achievement of an 
organisation’s objectives (Colvin et al., 2015).  
 
This approach to conceptualising conflict also necessarily shifts the focus from human-
animal interactions, to human-human interactions. It does so primarily to better capture 
the social dynamics which shape human-wildlife interactions conflict related behaviours 
(Redpath et al., 2013). However, it is important to note that in doing so, this approach does 
not preclude other ways of conceptualising resistance to conservation, such as through a 
political-ecology lens (García-Frapolli et al., 2018; Margulies and Karanth, 2018; Massé, 
2016; Peet and Watts, 1996). However, this approach does somewhat overlook other ways 
of considering multispecies interactions, such as those that consider socio-ecological 
‘assemblages’, ‘entanglements’ (Pooley, 2016; van Dooren et al., 2016) and other ‘more-
than-human’ conservation ethics, which do not necessarily prioritise conservation at the 




2.2 Conflict interventions  
Conservation conflict interventions are routinely developed, implemented, and assessed by 
conservation researchers and practitioners (Krafte Holland et al., 2018; Pooley et al., 2016; 
van Eeden et al., 2017). Although the aims of conservation conflict interventions may be 
multifaceted – and include combinations of biocentric, ecocentric, and anthropocentric 
rationales (Estévez et al., 2015; St John et al., 2018) – they typically target a species-related 
conservation objective (Salafsky et al., 2008). Whether trying to reduce retaliatory killing or 
improve stakeholder relations (von Essen and Hansen, 2015), conflict management 
invariably aims to influence human behaviour (Redpath et al., 2013) – even if this is 
achieved via changing animal behaviour. Accordingly, insights from the behavioural 
sciences can be used to inform and understand different types of behavioural interventions 
n(Nilsson et al., 2019; Reddy et al., 2017). Such intervention can be separated into technical 
(i.e., changing the external environment), cognitive (i.e., providing information) or 
structural interventions (i.e., changing regulations or economic pay-offs) (Heberlein, 
2012a). Structural interventions can include stakeholder-bases interventions, including 
mediation, trust-building and participatory decision making (Madden and McQuinn, 2014; 
Reed and Ceno, 2015; Young et al., 2016a). These behavioural interventions are the types 
of interventions considered throughout this thesis.  
 
Previous studies have made similar distinctions between different conflict intervention 
approaches (Dickman, 2010; Nyhus, 2016; Pooley et al., 2016; Young et al., 2013) and some 
have explored how different interventions are prioritised across different decision-makers 
(Lute et al., 2018; Shiffman and Hammerschlag, 2016) and contexts (Ravenelle and Nyhus, 
2017; Soliku and Schraml, 2018). In the wider conservation literature, there have been 
increasing explorations of the psychological processes underpinning conservation priorities  
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(Jarvis et al., 2016; Sandbrook et al., 2019) and decision-making (Papworth, 2017), and the 
influence of biases and predispositions (Sheil and Meijaard, 2010). Such psychological 
influences have also been considered with regards to conflict intervention priorities (Jacobs 
et al., 2014a; Lute et al., 2018), but remain underexplored.  
 
Efforts have also been made to assess the effectiveness of different conservation conflict 
interventions, but the object of measurement varies widely. For example, some 
interventions are assessed against the extent to which they reduce wildlife impacts (Hsiao 
et al., 2013; van Eeden et al., 2017), change attitudes (Holmes, 2003; Sakurai et al., 2015), 
change behaviours such as retaliatory killing (Inskip et al., 2014; Marino et al., 2016) or 
compliance (Solomon et al., 2015), or influence relations between stakeholders (Madden 
and McQuinn, 2014; Young et al., 2016a) and levels of co-management (Butler et al., 2015; 
Lundmark and Matti, 2015). Despite these contributions however, the evidence-base 
underpinning conservation conflict interventions is limited (van Eeden et al., 2018) and the 
application of behavioural science to conflict management is in its infancy (Veríssimo et al., 
2019). In particular, how the social factors which are known to shape environmental 
conflicts generally – such as stakeholder trust (Hafner et al., 2017), political orientation 
(Costa and Kahn, 2013; Sapiains et al., 2016), and wider governance systems (de Vente et 
al., 2016; Stringer et al., 2006) – also mediate conflict behaviours and effectiveness of 







Chapter 3: Behavioural threats, frames, and intervention 
recommendations 
 
This chapter has been published as:  
Baynham-Herd, Z., Redpath, S., Bunnefeld, N., Molony, T. & Keane, A. (2018). 
Conservation conflicts: Behavioural threats, frames, and intervention 
recommendations. Biological Conservation., 222, 180–188. 
 
3.1 Abstract 
Conservation conflicts are widespread and are damaging for biodiversity, livelihoods and 
human well-being. Conflict management often occurs through interventions targeting 
human behaviour. Conservation interventions are thought to be made more effective if 
underpinned by evidence and a Theory of Change – a logical argument outlining the steps 
required to achieve goals. However, for conservation conflicts, the evidence and logic 
supporting different types of interventions has received little attention. Using conflict-
related keywords, we reviewed trends in behavioural intervention recommendations across 
conflict contexts globally, as published in peer-reviewed literature. We developed 
typologies for conflict behaviours, intervention recommendations, and conflict frames and 
identified associations between them and other geographical variables using Pearson’s Chi-
squared tests of independence. Analysing 100 recent articles, we found that technical 
interventions (recommended in 38% of articles) are significantly associated with conflicts 
involving wildlife control and the human-wildlife conflict frame. Enforcement-based 
interventions (54% of articles) are significantly associated with conflicts over illegal 
resource use, while stakeholder-based interventions (37% of articles) are associated with 
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the human-human conflict frame and very highly developed countries. Only 10% of articles 
offered ‘strong’ evidence from the published scientific literature justifying 
recommendations, and only 15% outlined Theories of Change. We suggest that intervention 
recommendations are likely influenced by authors’ perceptions of the social basis of 
conflicts, and possibly also by disciplinary silos. 
 
3.2 Introduction 
Conservation conflicts are some of the most intractable problems facing conservation and 
are increasing in frequency and intensity globally (Young et al., 2010). These conflicts 
negatively impinge upon biodiversity, livelihoods and human well-being, and therefore 
considerable effort is put into their management (Redpath et al., 2015). Conflicts involve 
situations where multiple stakeholders with strongly held positions clash over conservation 
objectives, and when one party imposes their interests over another (Redpath et al., 2013). 
They are hard to define and are often interpreted differently by authors, managers, and 
stakeholders involved in the conflict. The language used to describe a given interpretation 
of a conflict can be considered as a ‘frame’ (Peterson et al., 2010), and in the conservation 
literature conflicts are framed in many different ways (Table 3.1). Commonly, authors 
frame conflicts as primarily occurring between wildlife and humans - ‘human-wildlife 
conflict’ – (Woodroffe et al., 2005b). Others, however, posit that underpinning human-
wildlife impacts such as crop-raiding are actually conflicts between different human 
interests, such as between conservation and agriculture (Peterson et al., 2010; Young et al., 
2010). Under this interpretation, the umbrella of conservation conflict extends far beyond 
wildlife impacts on humans and also involves other conflicts such as those over resource-
use, land-use or even animal welfare (Redpath et al., 2015). For example, in many cases 
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conservation rule-breaking, from illegal wildlife killing to resource use, has been identified 
as representing political protest or resistance to conservation (De Pourcq et al., 2017; 
Holmes, 2016).  
 
The ultimate drivers of many conservation conflicts may be rooted in larger societal issues, 
such as poverty and inequality (Czech, 2008; Vedeld et al., 2012), imbalances of power (Raik 
et al., 2008), and inappropriate governance processes (Lute and Gore, 2014) (Table 3.1). 
However, the majority of interventions aimed at reducing conservation conflicts focus on 
the proximate human behaviours which impinge upon conservation interests (Schultz, 
2011). These proximate behaviours are often referred to as behavioural ‘threats’ (Salafsky 
et al., 2008), and interventions commonly target their proximate drivers. For instance, the 
retaliatory killing of wildlife is often addressed by attempts to reduce wildlife impacts 
(Nyhus, 2016), deforestation by stronger enforcement (Duffy et al., 2014), and active 
opposition to conservation by efforts to improve stakeholder trust (Young et al., 2016) – 
though other social outcomes may also be targeted independently of conservation.  
 
Following Heberlein (2012), interventions aiming to change human behaviour can be 
categorised into ‘technical’, ‘cognitive’ and ‘structural’ fixes. Technical fixes attempt to 
change the external environment and commonly target wildlife impacts such as crop-
raiding and livestock depredation. These may include the erection of fences, provision of 
deterrents, the encouragement of wildlife-friendly products or the diversionary feeding of 
wildlife (Nyhus, 2016; Sutherland et al., 2017). These interventions operate under the 
assumption that retaliatory killing of wildlife, or active opposition to conservation, is 
directly related to human-wildlife impacts (Pooley et al., 2016). Cognitive fixes instead 
attempt to change behaviour through information dissemination. Examples include 
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conservation or livelihood education and conservation awareness campaigns (Baruch-
Mordo et al., 2011; Holmes, 2003). Structural interventions attempt to change the context 
itself. Examples include financial instruments (such as incentives, insurance or 
compensation) or alternative livelihoods to reduce the physical or opportunity costs 
incurred by wildlife or conservation-related resource restrictions, or to discourage certain 
resource use (Kremen et al., 2000; Ravenelle and Nyhus, 2017). Likewise, structural fixes 
include the creation or enforcement of new rules aiming to increase compliance or 
discourage certain behaviours such as illegal resource use (Agrawal et al., 2014; Arias, 
2015). Contrastingly, stakeholder engagement, mediation programmes, and conflict 
transformation efforts are structural fixes which target the social dimensions of conflicts. 
These operate under a range of rationales, from engendering greater support for 
conservation, to championing environmental justice (Madden and McQuinn, 2014; Redpath 
et al., 2017).  
 
Like other types of conservation, conflict interventions are expected to be more effective if 
they are informed by evidence – from scientific evidence (Sutherland et al., 2017) to local 
ecological knowledge (Sterling et al., 2017) – and underpinned by a valid Theory of Change 
(ToC) (Biggs et al., 2017; Margoluis et al., 2013), which describes the logical and ordered 
sequence of interventions, actions, perturbations and outcomes identified during the 
planning process (Qiu et al., 2018). However, the evidence underpinning interventions is 
often lacking (Eklund et al., 2017; Treves et al., 2016), and the extent to which 
recommended conflict interventions are supported by ToC has not been assessed. Nor has 





The purpose of this review is to contribute towards informed conservation conflict 
management by exploring, across a range of conflict contexts globally, behavioural 
intervention recommendations as presented in peer-reviewed academic journal articles. 
We aim to scrutinize how the types of behavioural intervention recommendations differ 
across these contexts and to inform researchers and decision-makers, particularly those 
acting at the local scale. To generate a sample of conservation conflict case-studies and 
intervention recommendations for comparison, we conducted a sampled literature review, 
and analysed 100 recent articles from the published conservation literature related to 
conflicts. To identify the prevailing intervention types, we first developed conflict typologies 
from directed content analysis and then highlighted the most common intervention types 
recommended by authors in different contexts. To further understand why certain types of 
intervention are recommended in certain contexts, we explored associations between the 
recommended interventions, different behavioural threats and conflict frames. We 
hypothesised that authors who frame conflicts as primarily occurring between humans, 
would be more likely to recommend stakeholder-based interventions. As some conflict 
interventions, such as compensation (Ravenelle and, 2017) and militarised enforcement 
(Duffy et al., 2014), appear to vary regionally, we also considered whether different types of 
interventions associate with other geographical factors, such as the development status of 
nations and the conservation status of species and areas. To identify any possible gaps in 
the intervention evidence-base, we assessed the extent to which intervention 
recommendations are supported by scientific evidence and ToC. Lastly, we also estimated 
the proportion of articles that focus on other forms of evidence (e.g. stakeholder 
knowledge), and explored whether intervention recommendations and framing could be 
analysed across academic disciplines. 
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Table 3.1. A non-exhaustive, and non-mutually exclusive list of different conflict drivers and 
associated frames presented in the literature, based upon our interpretation. 
Conflict drivers Otherwise framed as 
Wildlife impacts  
Livestock depredation or crop-raiding 
and/or human injury, with associated 
retaliatory killing or persecution of wildlife 
and/or active opposition to conservation 
efforts trying to prevent this. Similar 
conflicts surround proposed 
reintroductions, or predator management 
on recreational hunting estates. 
 
 
Human-wildlife conflict (HWC), 
(Woodroffe et al., 2005b) coexistence 
(Rust and Marker, 2014), human-wildlife 
relations/interactions (Pooley et al., 
2016) stakeholder conflict (Redpath et 
al., 2015) persecution (Whitfield et al., 
2004), pest-control (Delibes-Mateos et 
al., 2013) 
Resource-use and restrictions 
Unsustainable or illegal harvest of fauna 
and flora and associated efforts to 
prevent/reduce such harvest. This includes 
commercial activities (e.g. logging, 
fisheries, wildlife trade, recreational 
hunting) and non-commercial activities 
(e.g. subsistence hunting or foraging). 
 
Natural resource related conflict (NRRC) 
(De Pourcq et al., 2017), Illegal wildlife 
trade (Nijman, 2010), logging, poaching, 
unsustainable use, encroachment 
(Mackenzie et al., 2012) fisheries 
management (Marzano et al., 2013), 
common-pool resource conflict (Adams 
et al., 2003) 
Land-use decisions 
Protected areas, land-use change, 
relocations and/or associated loss of 
livelihoods, traditions identity. Associated 
behaviours may include ‘encroachment’ 
and local (or international) opposition to 
conservation regulations and organisations 
 
People-park conflict (Stern, 2008b), 
environmental justice, indigenous rights, 
land-use conflict (West et al., 2006) 
Conservation governance 
Lack of transparency in decision-making 
process, lack of trust, unequal power 
dynamics, ineffective governance  
 
Development and economics 
Conflicts between poverty and/or 
economic growth and conservation, 
commercial or state-sanctioned 
development in ‘green’ spaces or 
protected areas, and associated civic and 
organisational protest/opposition 
 
Clashing of values 
Animal-rights campaigns against lethal 
control, or trophy hunting. Also includes 
conflicts over different approaches, 
philosophies or ethics 
Stakeholder conflict (Young et al., 2016), 
conservation governance (Lute et al., 
2018; Peterson et al., 2005; Stern and 
Coleman, 2015), natural-resource 
management (Raik et al., 2008) 
 
Development conflict, Natural resource 
management, (Bockstael et al., 2016; 
Hopcraft et al., 2015), poverty traps 
(Vedeld et al., 2012), Environmental 
Kuznets Curve (Czech, 2008) 
 
 
Animal welfare (Crowley et al., 2017), 
human-human conflict (Redpath et al., 
2015), conservation values (Holmes et 
al., 2017), conflict over stakeholder 
participation (López-Bao et al., 2017) 
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3.3 Materials and methods 
To generate a sample of conservation conflict case-studies we conducted a search of peer-
reviewed conservation literature using ISI Web of Knowledge in October 2016. To facilitate 
reproducibility and transparency, we followed best-practise guidelines (Haddaway et al., 
2015) and applied carefully designed keyword search-strings to capture a wide variety of 
conflict contexts, including those not necessarily identified in the conservation conflict 
literature (Table 3.1).  
 
To focus on interventions, in our final search we included wildcard search terms for a series 
of active verbs. Using the English language only, we searched for the following combination 
of terms in the titles, abstracts or keywords of all articles in the ISI core collection: 
“conservation conflict*" OR ("conservation" AND "illegal") OR ("conservation" AND 
"conflict" AND ("stakeholder*" OR "human-wildlife")) AND either  - "prevent*" OR 
"mitigat*" OR "reduc*" OR "resolv*" OR "resolution*" OR "solv*" OR "solution*" OR 
"manag*" OR "interven*" OR "improv*". To avoid unconscious bias in the sample selection 
(Haddaway et al., 2015), we decided the temporal and spatial boundaries before the final 
search. We excluded publications before 2011 to focus on the most recent interventions. 
To aid comparison, reviews and book chapters were excluded to focus on primary case-
studies of roughly similar length. The final search yielded 897 results. 
 
To produce a representative sample for analysis, we used a random list generator to sort 
the sample into a randomly ordered list, from which we analysed articles sequentially. We 
excluded any publications (n=57) which did not describe contexts falling within the 
definition of conservation conflicts provided by Redpath et al., (2013), those which we 
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could not access, reviews, and those which did not make any intervention 
recommendations (Appendix 1). We continued analysing articles, following the random 
sequence until we had a total sample of 100 relevant articles. This total sample size 
(n=100), and proportion of articles reviewed (157/897), was comparable to previous similar 
studies (Estévez et al., 2015; Peterson et al., 2010; Redpath et al., 2015). Demonstrating 
representativeness, there was no significance difference in the proportions of key search 
terms between the analysed sample and non-analysed sample (Appendix 1, Table A1.1). 
 
To avoid selection bias (Haddaway et al., 2015) we developed our conflict and intervention 
typologies (Table 3.2) and our coding system prior to collecting and analysing our final 
sample. We used directed content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon 2005), whereby we first 
derived each typology from previous reviews, before refining each typology through 
analysing a large sample of conflict case-studies. This preliminary sample of case-studies 
(n=150) was drawn from the published literature using a similar search and sampling 
process described above (Appendix 1, Search 1). Following Heberlein (2012), we first 
categorised interventions into ‘technical’, ‘cognitive’ and ‘structural’ types. With reference 
to previous conservation conflict reviews (Dickman, 2010; Nyhus, 2016) and content 
analysis of the preliminary sample, we subdivided ‘structural’ further into ‘economic’, 
‘enforcement’ and ‘stakeholder’ types. Our typology of human behavioural threats was 
derived from existing literature (Salafsky et al., 2008) and content analysis of the 
preliminary sample to include: ‘wildlife control’, ‘resource-use’, ‘environment change’, 
‘indirect damage’ and ‘active opposition’. Likewise, from existing reviews we identified two 
key frames –‘human-wildlife conflict’ (HWC) and ‘human-human’ conflict (HHC) (Peterson 
et al., 2010; Redpath et al., 2015). We then derived an additional frame – ‘illegal resource 
use’ (IRU) – from content analysis of the preliminary sample.  
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Table 3.2. Our typology of conservation conflict intervention types, behavioural threats, 
and frames. 















































Wildlife control  
lethal (traps, shooting, pesticides, poison), 
non-lethal (translocation, deterrents, 
diversionary feeding, fertility/disease 
management)  
Habitat manipulation  
buffer crops, alternative food, barriers 
(fences, nets, enclosures) 
Livelihoods 
livestock /crop protection, guarding , modify 
crops, rotations, immunization  
People control 




husbandry techniques, crop cycles, sustainable 
yields  
Awareness 
wildlife attitudes and perceptions, 
conservation benefits 
Regulatory information 
species protection laws, quotas, access rights 
 
Remuneration 
compensation & insurance schemes (state, 
charitable, private)  
Incentives 
direct payments, payments for ecosystem 




alternative livelihoods  
Services  
education, healthcare, infrastructure 
 
Regulation creation 
protective status, land-use zoning, land rights, 
quotas, trade-bans, equipment/practice ban 
(e.g., poisons)  
Regulation enforcement 
increased patrols, trials, punishments, reduced 
corruption, legal processes 
 
(Lute et al., 2018; 
Nyhus, 2016; Pooley 
et al., 2016; 













al., 2011; Holmes, 







(Kremen et al., 2000; 
Ravenelle and 
Nyhus, 2017; 










(Agrawal et al., 2014; 
Arias, 2015; 
Challender et al., 


























































participatory planning, knowledge sharing, 
consultations, deliberations  
Conflict resolution 
trust building, transformation, third-parties  
Devolution  
community-based natural resource 





retaliatory killing, persecution of wildlife 
Non lethal 
Harassment, scarring of wildlife 
 
Illegal 
poaching, bush-meat, wildlife trade, 
encroachment 
Non-illegal 
unsustainable harvest (e.g., logging, fisheries) 
 
Land-use 
development, recreation, agriculture 
Ecosystem 
stewardship, management change 
 
Primary damage 
pollution, bycatch, collisions 
Secondary 
spread of disease or invasive-species, 
consumer demand  
 
Protest 
civic protest, lobbying, campaigns against 
conservation efforts 
Resistance 




Authors describe conflict as primarily occurring 
between humans and other animals. Often 
involves crop/livestock loss and associated 






Peterson et al., 2005; 








(Jensen et al., 2008; 
Carolina Marquez et 





Watson et al., 2013) 
 
 
(Bockstael et al., 






































Authors describe rule-breaking natural resource 
use (such as illegal wildlife trade, logging, bush 
meat, fisheries, encroachment), without 
reference to underlying relationships between 
different stakeholders. These behaviours are 
usually considered illegitimate 
 
Authors describe human disagreements 
between particular actors over conservation 
actions or decisions Conservation-related   rule-
breaking may be considered as acts of protest 
or resistance 
(Nijman, 2010; 






(De Pourcq et al., 





All data analysis was conducted by the lead author, but the typologies were created and 
refined in consultation with co-authors. In the final sample, each article was analysed at 
least twice to check for errors, with ambiguous articles marked and returned to. For all 
variables (besides framing), we used a binary coding system within larger non-mutually 
exclusive categories – e.g., articles could describe more than one threat or intervention 
type, but were categorised as one frame. The development status of nations (as designated 
by the Human Development Index) (UNDP, 2016), protected area presence, the 
conservation status of species (as designated by the IUCN Red List) (IUCN, 2017) was 
recorded, as was the identification of stakeholder groups, wildlife impacts and illegal 
activity. After categorising each article in our final sample (n=100), we calculated 
intervention recommendation proportions across variables, and identified associations 
between interventions, behavioural threats and frames, using Pearson’s Chi-Squared test 
for independence and a mosaic plot of Pearson’s residual values (using the “vcd” package) 




We recorded articles as demonstrating reasoning akin to a ToC if they identified the steps 
required for interventions to achieve a desired outcome. We assessed the level of 
published scientific evidence supporting recommendations using three categories. 'Strong' 
evidence included articles in which all, or nearly all, recommendations were supported 
either by reference to previous studies, and/or by experimental, correlative or comparative 
evidence from the study itself. 'Partial' evidence included articles in which over half of 
recommendations were supported by references or within-study evidence. 'Weak' evidence 
included articles in which less than half of recommendations were supported by references 
or within-study evidence. Following Estévez et al., (2015), we also explored author 
affiliations (region) and journal geographical scope, and attempted to categorise institution 
and journal types by disciplinary focus. However, during analysis we found that the 
interdisciplinary nature of many conservation-related journals and departments meant 
such a categorisation approach was ultimately unsatisfactory (Appendix 1, ‘Journals’).  
 
Lastly, following our initial analysis – in which we (unintentionally) overlooked non-scientific 
forms of knowledge – we later attempted to overcome this by estimating the proportion of 
articles in the whole sample which focused on stakeholder-based knowledge specifically. To 
do so, we conducted a keyword search (in article titles, abstracts and keywords) of the 
entire sample (n=897) for: “local knowledge”, “traditional knowledge”, “ecological 









Across the final sample (n=100), we categorised 30 articles as using the frame ‘human-
wildlife conflict’ (HWC), 41 as ‘illegal resource use’ (IRU), and 29 as ‘human-human conflict’ 
(HHC). Of these, we recorded 32 articles describing wildlife control, 59 resource use, 26 
environment change, 34 indirect damage and 33 active opposition. 48 articles included 
IUCN Red Listed species, 40 articles focused on very high development countries, 20 high 
development, 31 medium development, and 9 low development. 61 articles described 
protected areas, and 66 reported illegal behaviours (Appendix 1, Table A1.2). 88% of 
articles were published in journals with a global scope (Appendix 1, Table A1.10) and both 
study locations and author affiliations were spread across the worlds regions (Appendix 1, 
Figure A1.1). Across the sample ‘enforcement’ was the most commonly recommended 
intervention type, appearing in 54% of articles. ‘Economic’, was the next most popularly 
recommended intervention type (suggested in 47% of articles), followed by ‘cognitive’ 
(40%), ‘technical’ (38%) and ‘stakeholder’ (37%) (Figure 3.1).  
 
Technical interventions (such as fences, diversionary feeding or guarding tools) were over 
2.5 times more likely to be recommended (Odds ratio (OR) > 2.5) when authors reported 
behaviours related to wildlife control (such as retaliatory killing) (OR: 2.63, P < 0.001) 
(Figure 3.2) and when they used the HWC frame (OR: 2.59, P < 0.001) (Appendix 1, Table 
A1.3). Cognitive interventions – such as livelihood training and education awareness 
programmes – showed no clear associations with any conflict variables. Economic 
interventions – such as compensation payments or alternative livelihoods – did not 
associate with any threat, but were positively associated with high, mid and low 
development countries (OR, 1.94, P = 0.005), and were negatively associated with very high 
development countries (OR: 0.51, P = 0.005) (Appendix 1, Table A1.3). 
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Enforcement is also positively associated with high, mid and low development countries 
(OR: 1.73, P = 0.006) and negatively associated with very high development countries (OR: 
0.58, P = 0.006). In contrast, stakeholder interventions – such as participatory decision-
making or peace-building – are positively associated with the threats of active opposition 
(OR: 2.98, P < 0.001), environment change (OR: 2.17 P = 0.003), the human-human conflict 
frame (OR: 4.02 P < 0.001) and very high development countries (OR: 2.46, P <0.001). 
Stakeholder interventions are negatively associated with the resource use threat (OR: 0.53, 
P = 0.014), the illegal resource use frame (OR: 0.22, P < 0.001), IUCN Red-Listed species (OR: 
0.29, P < 0.001) and high, mid and low development countries (OR: 0.41, P < 0.001).  
 
Only 22% of articles recommended just one intervention type, and on average authors 
recommended 2.16 intervention types. No authors recommended interventions pertaining 
to all five of our intervention categories, and only enforcement and stakeholder types 
showed a significant (negative) association (P = 0.004) (Appendix 1, Table A1.7). Many of 
the conflict variables associated with different intervention types were also strongly 
associated with each other (Appendix 1, Table A1.6). The HWC frame was positively 
associated with articles describing wildlife control, wildlife impacts and IUCN Red-Listed 
species. The IRU frame was positively associated with articles describing resource use, 
indirect damage, illegal activity and high, mid and low development countries. In contrast, 
the HHC frame was positively associated with articles describing active opposition, 







Figure 3.1. Chord diagram showing the relationship between behavioural threats 
(top) and recommended intervention types (bottom). The width of each outer rim 
depicts the proportion of total articles describing each threat and intervention 
type. The direction and width of inner flows show the proportion of articles within 
each behavioural threat category that recommend each intervention type. ‘Env’ = 
Environment.   
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Figure 3.2: A mosaic plot depicting the association between intervention 
recommendations and behavioural threats, colour-coded by Pearson’s residual 
values, with blue cells indicating significantly more observations than would be 
expected under independence (positive association), red cells indicating fewer 
observations than would be expected (negative association). Box size is 
proportional to the observed frequencies of each cross-classification. ‘Control = 
Wildlife control, ‘Use’ = Resource Use, ‘Env’ = Environment change, ‘Indirect’ = 









15% of articles outlined the steps required for an intervention to reach a goal, but none of 
these were explicitly referred to as ToC. 10% of articles offered ‘strong’ scientific evidence 
to justify recommendations, 65% offered ‘partial’ scientific evidence and 25% offered 
‘weak’ scientific evidence. Articles offering ‘weak’ evidence tended to recommended less 
interventions, but this relationship is not significant (Appendix 1, Table A1.9).  Economic 
recommendations were positively associated with ToC (OR: 1.94, P= 0.006) and strong 
evidence (OR: 2.13, P = 0.004) and enforcement was positively associated with weak 
evidence (OR: 1.58, 0.037).  Only 16 (1.8%) articles out of the entire search sample (n=897) 
made explicit reference to stakeholder-based forms of knowledge in their titles, abstracts 
or keywords. 68% of first-author affiliations corresponded to same geographical region as 
the study conflict (Appendix 1, Figure A1.1). Of those that studied a conflict in a different 
region, 88% of first-author affiliations were based in Europe or North America.  
 
 
3.5 Discussion  
Globally, many different actors, from scientists, to practitioners to governments, design and 
implement interventions to tackle conservation conflicts, and these conflicts take many 
forms. From reviewing the published academic literature, we compare together for the first 
time a wider range of conservation conflict contexts and show that conflict intervention 
recommendations vary with regards to the behaviours they target, the way conflicts are 
framed, and the evidence and reasoning underpinning them.  
 
In contexts where there are conflicts over wildlife impacts (e.g. crop or livestock loss) and 
often the subsequent retaliatory killing of wildlife, we find that authors tend to recommend 
technical interventions. Such technical interventions (including wildlife fences and 
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diversionary feeding) aim to alter human behaviour by changing the external environment 
(Heberlein, 2012a). Like others (e.g., Pooley et al., 2016), we find that that those who 
recommended these interventions typically reason that the retaliatory killing of wildlife will 
reduce as the damage exerted by wildlife reduces. In contexts where there is illegal natural 
resource use, or indirect environmental damage, and in countries with lower levels of 
human development, we find enforcement-based interventions are favoured. As elsewhere 
(Keane et al., 2008) we identify that enforcement-based interventions are often 
recommended under the logic that the greater policing of natural resources and stricter 
regulations will reduce over-harvesting and illegal behaviour directly. Where there is 
undesirable environment change – such as agriculture or recreation expansion – or active 
opposition to conservation – such as protests, hostility or objections – and in more highly 
developed countries, we find that stakeholder-based interventions are favoured. These 
authors often perceive that social, sometimes non-material factors, sustain the conflict and 
hence stakeholder interventions commonly target emotions and aim to increase dialogue 
and trust, with the idea that shared, and agreed-upon problems and solutions can be met 
(Redpath et al., 2017; Young et al., 2016). However, as documented elsewhere (Peterson et 
al., 2005; Reed, 2008) in our sample, stakeholder-based interventions vary considerably in 
style and motivation. Some advocate for collaborative decision-making or more devolved 
governance (Dandy et al., 2014), whereas others focus on increasing decision-making 
transparency or on conducting stakeholder consultations (Elston et al., 2014). 
 
In terms of behavioural threats, we find that economic interventions are recommended less 
selectively, but they are more common in less developed countries. This result contrasts 
with that found for wildlife impact compensation (Ravenelle and Nyhus, 2017), but this 
might be because we also considered other economic mechanisms (like alternative 
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livelihoods), and other contexts such as natural resource where economic interventions are 
common (Agrawal et al., 2014). Economic interventions were generally best supported by 
evidence and reasoning, but no article considered whether it mattered which group or 
institution was conducting the recommended intervention, despite indications that 
perceptions of trust can play a key role in responses to conservation interventions (Stern 
and Coleman, 2015). Cognitive interventions associated with no variables, suggesting they 
may be deemed suitable across contexts. However, we found many cognitive interventions 
to be undeveloped in reasoning and unsupported by evidence. Given critiques of the 
information deficit model underpinning information-based interventions (Heberlein, 2012; 
Schultz, 2011),  we suggest they would benefit from further testing.  
 
Like similar reviews (Estévez et al., 2015; Peterson et al., 2010; Ravenelle and Nyhus, 2017), 
we were unable to include non-English-language articles or grey literature, which would 
likely have provided further insight. Our conclusions are also limited to recommendations 
about interventions which are unlikely to be accurate reflections of actually implemented 
interventions – as recommendations are likely less limited by resources or other 
constraints. Hence, comparing our findings with implemented interventions, including in 
regions such as South America which are underrepresented in our sample, would be useful 
future work. The rigour of the analysis could also have been improved by training multiple 
coders (e.g., Peterson et al., 2010), increasing the sample size and checking the quality of 
references used as evidence. Experiments could also be designed to test our findings; for 
example, a choice experiment with conflict mangers or researchers could test the effect of 




Our finding that framing seems to influence whether socially-focused interventions are 
recommended is significant because all conservation conflicts are ultimately rooted in 
social conflicts (Redpath et al., 2013). For instance, beyond wildlife impacts, cultural factors 
such as religion, or levels of opposition to conservation can determine levels of the 
retaliatory killing of wildlife (Dickman and Hazzah, 2015; Mariki et al., 2015). Likewise, 
illegal activities such as poaching or protected area encroachment often reflect protest, 
opposition or resistance to conservation (Holmes, 2007; Stern, 2008b). Reframing conflicts 
to better reflect their root cause is therefore crucial for successful conflict management 
(Peterson et al., 2010; Young et al., 2010). Our attempts at exploring the possible influence 
of disciplinary silos on both framing and intervention recommendations proved unfruitful. 
However, others have identified disciplinary silos in conservation (Margles et al., 2010), and 
that interventions recommended by conservation researchers may reflect their disciplinary 
training (Sandbrook et al., 2013). Hence, given these findings and the importance of 
framing identified here, we suggest it would be beneficial for researchers to think more 
broadly about conflicts in conservation, and look beyond the literature specifically related 
to their study context.  
 
Future work should examine the extent to which authors’ disciplinary background, beliefs, 
expertise or the nature of the conflict itself influence their intervention recommendations. 
For instance, does variation in ethical positions or rationales for conservation (Holmes et 
al., 2017) influence the types of intervention recommended? Do those that perceive illegal 
behaviour as being more or less legitimate (e.g., Sheil et al., 2016) differ in the extent to 
which they advocate enforcement over participatory approaches? Likewise, the reasons 
why enforcement and stakeholder-based interventions appear to differ depending upon 
the development status of countries needs to be explored. Does this trend just reflect the 
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increased presence of threatened species or protected areas, or does it represent 
perceptions of the strength of governance, or more problematic biases revolving around 
top-down conservation that prevail where conservationists have relatively more power 
(Duffy, 2014; Kashwan, 2017; Sandbrook, 2017)? Future work could also look at factors 
such as the broader socio-economic, cultural or governance context, as well as the 
involvement of particularly marginalised or minority communities in conflicts.  
 
We find that few authors provide ToC, authors rarely justify all intervention 
recommendations with published scientific evidence, and the adaptive approach was 
largely overlooked, despite the effectiveness of decision-making frameworks and adaptive 
management having been regularly advocated (e.g., Bunnefeld et al., 2017). The lack of 
causal-reasoning and scientific evidence is problematic as it suggests conservation 
interventions often borne out of intuition, group-think or convention rather than evidence 
(Eklund et al., 2017; Sutherland and Wordley, 2017), which might prevent otherwise 
successful interventions from being considered. One reason for the lack of ToC might be 
that only recently has a framework been developed to bridge different methodologies and 
guide their development for conservation (Qiu et al., 2018).  Step-wise reasoning (ideally 
underpinned  by behavioural theory) and the outlining of clear goals would also make it 
easier to assess the effectiveness of interventions (Agrawal et al., 2014), thus contributing 
to the possible evidence-gap that we have highlighted. However, other forms of 
knowledge, including local ecological knowledge (LEK), or expert/stakeholder experience 
can also inform interventions (Sterling et al., 2017). We identify that such knowledge forms 
may be underrepresented in the published literature, and argue that future work could 
explore this trend further, and identify how best to incorporate multiple knowledge forms 




Individuals or groups who actively participate in conservation-related rule-breaking, such as 
protected area infringement, may as much be in conflict with conservation as those who 
poison livestock-raiding predators, or those who lobby against conservation regulations in 
parliament. Behavioural interventions recommended to tackle such conflicts vary with the 
types of behaviours targeted, the conflict frames adopted by authors, and by the evidence 
and reasoning underpinning them. Technical intervention recommendations are associated 
most with conflicts involving wildlife control (such as retaliatory killing) and those framed as 
‘human-wildlife conflict’. Enforcement-based recommendations are associated most with 
conflicts involving (often illegal) natural resource use, and those in less developed 
countries. In contrast, stakeholder-based intervention recommendations are associated 
most with conflicts framed as ‘human-human conflicts’ and more highly developed 
countries. We suggest that effective interventions should be informed by robust and 
appropriate evidence, and underpinned by carefully considered ToC. We highlight that 
other factors appear to influence intervention recommendations which might potentially 
lead to poor decisions being made. Lastly, we recommend that future studies should make 
the theoretical and evidential basis of their recommendations clearer and research should 










- Researchers should seek to recognise and transcend the barriers which categorise 
different conflicts, so that any entrenched silos do not lead to potentially successful 
solutions being overlooked.  
- Researchers should further explore how the framing of conservation conflicts is 
generated and how it influences intervention suggestions.  
- Those recommending conflict interventions should more clearly outline the social 
and environmental goals targeted, and the steps and behaviour change required to 
reach these goals. 
- Those recommending conflict interventions should justify recommendations with 
greater evidence, including scientific and stakeholder-based knowledge.  
- Researchers should aim to contribute to this evidence-base by testing the 












Chapter 4: Predicting intervention priorities in wildlife conflicts 
 
This chapter has been published as:  
Baynham‐Herd, Z., Redpath, S., Bunnefeld, N. and Keane, A., (2019). Predicting 
intervention priorities for wildlife conflicts. Conservation Biology. 
 
4.1 Abstract 
There is growing interest in developing effective interventions to manage socially and 
environmentally damaging conservation conflicts. There are a variety of intervention 
strategies that can be applied in various contexts, but the reasons one type of intervention 
is chosen over another remain underexplored. We surveyed conservation researchers and 
practitioners (n=427) to explore how the characteristics of conflicts and the characteristics 
of decision makers influence recommendations to alleviate conservation conflict. Using a 
full-factorial design, we experimentally manipulated 3 aspects of the descriptions of 8 
different wildlife conflict scenarios (development status of the conflict country, conflict 
framing, and legality of killing wild animals), and recorded which of 5 intervention types 
(wildlife impact reduction, awareness, enforcement, economic incentives or stakeholder 
engagement) respondents prioritized. We also recorded information on respondents’ 
demographic and disciplinary backgrounds. Stakeholder-based interventions were 
recommended most often in the survey and in written feedback. However, when we fitted 
multinomial mixed logit models with fully completed scenario responses (n=411), 
recommendations were influenced by small changes in the details of conflict and differed 
according to respondent characteristics. Enforcement and awareness interventions were 
prioritized relatively more for conflicts in more highly developed nations and by 
respondents with more natural-science backgrounds and relatively less experience with 
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conflict. Contrastingly, economic interventions were prioritized more when wildlife killing 
was described as illegal. Age, gender, and development status of the respondent’s home 
country also predicted some intervention decisions. Further interrogating the influences 
shaping conservation decision making will further the development of evidence-informed 




Conservation conflicts are damaging for both people and wildlife and as such, there is much 
interest in designing and implementing interventions to resolve or mitigate them (Redpath 
et al., 2013). Although conservation conflicts can involve clashes over any conservation 
objective (Redpath et al., 2015), conflicts centering on the impacts of wildlife on livelihoods 
are particularly widespread (Pooley et al., 2016). In these situations – which are often 
framed as human-wildlife conflict or coexistence problems – interventions commonly aim 
to mitigate the negative impacts of wildlife, reduce wildlife killings or improve the 
relationships among stakeholders (Chapter 3). 
 
The geographical distribution of interventions (Ravenelle and Nyhus, 2017) and their 
effectiveness (Eklund et al., 2017; van Eeden et al., 2018) have been explored and variation 
in how practitioners and researchers prioritise interventions (Rastogi et al., 2013; Shiffman 
and Hammerschlag, 2016) identified. For instance, how conflicts are framed by authors, 
whether they involve illegal behaviours and the development status of the countries in 
which they are located, has been hypothesized to influence intervention decisions (Chapter 
3; Soliku & Schraml 2018). Moreover, it appears researchers and practitioners from 
different disciplinary backgrounds and regions tend to recommend different solutions (Lute 
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et al., 2018). However, the underlying reasons accounting for this variation in intervention 
priorities has been less explored, in part because much previous work in this area has been 
observational, making it harder to unpick potential relationships. Moreover, as intervention 
strategies used in conflicts can often be contested or controversial (Duffy et al., 2019; 
López-Bao et al., 2017), it is important to understand the factors driving support for such 
different approaches.  
 
One pathway to better understanding how decisions are made in conflicts is through 
exploring the social and psychological mechanisms underpinning conservation decision 
making (Papworth, 2017). For instance, subtle changes in the way problems are framed 
often change how people suggest solving them (Sapiains et al., 2016). Such subtleties may 
be particularly important when people are making quick decisions with limited information. 
This is because under such circumstances people are thought to rely more on intuition and 
pattern matching compared with when they are making slower, more analytical decisions, 
based on multiple sources of information (Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2011). Furthermore, like 
all people (Schultz, 2011), the priorities of conservation professionals differ (Sandbrook et 
al., 2019) and are likely shaped by predispositions, cognitive biases, and values (Kiik, 2018; 
Sheil and Meijaard, 2010). However, how such factors may influence conflict intervention 
decision-making remains underexplored.  
 
We sought to test how particular characteristics of conflicts and of decision-makers 
influence conflict intervention priorities. To do this we conducted an experimental survey 
of international conservation researchers and practitioners (n=427), in which we presented 
participants with eight different conflict scenarios, and asked them to prioritise one (out of 
five) intervention types to manage the conflict in each scenario. Drawing on similar 
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strategies used in choice (Keane et al., 2016) and framing experiments (Sapiains et al., 
2016), by offering limited information per scenario, we aimed to identify possible 
predispositions and tacit influences on decisions. Using a full-factorial design, we 
experimentally manipulated three factors hypothesized to influence conflict decisions: the 
framing of the conflict as being between people and wildlife or between groups of people, 
whether behaviours were reported as illegal, and the development status of the country 
where the conflict occurs. We experimentally manipulated these three factors –  rather 
than other relevant factors such as taxa or types of impacts – because their potential 
influence has been highlighted in a previous review (Chapter 3) but not yet tested.  
 
We then used multinomial mixed logit regressions to test whether these manipulations and 
the characteristics of participants predicted intervention recommendations. These related 
to respondents’ disciplinary and disciplinary background, and experience with conflicts on 
the ground and in the literature – which we hypothesised influences how respondents 















We designed and carried out a short (5-10 minute) online survey using the platform 
Qualtrics (qualtrics.com). We used an online survey, rather than a written survey, to allow 
for greater flexibility over survey design (including randomization of the specific sub-set of 
scenarios presented to participants), to reduce the risk of biased responding (of socially 
undesirable answers) (Gnambs and Kaspar, 2014), and to enable the survey to be 
disseminated internationally. The survey included an information sheet, a series of 
demographic questions, and then it presented participants with eight different conflict 
scenarios in turn (Appendix 2, Information sheet). Each scenario related to a real-world 
conflict described in the literature and involved one particular species of conservation 
concern, and some kind of human activity that was threatening the species.  
 
The number of scenarios was constrained by survey-length, and the cases selected had to 
appear in the conflict literature, have species’ ranges that encompassed at least one very 
highly developed country and one less highly developed country, and reflect a mix of 
herbivorous and carnivorous, marine and terrestrial mammals, and non-mammals (Table 
4.1). For each scenario, participants were asked to select one of five different intervention 
types, which they deemed of highest priority in that scenario. Following Chapter 3, we 
included five different conflict interventions types: wildlife impact reduction, awareness or 
training programs, enforcement, economic incentives or compensation, and stakeholder 
engagement. Scenarios (<100 words) and intervention options (<15 words) were described 





Table 4.1: Description of the 8 wildlife conflict scenarios presented in surveys, and each of 
the two possible countries that each scenario was described as being located in. 
Conflict scenario  Country References 
American manatee (Trichechus manatus) 
Conflict between commercial fishing 
interests and manatee conservation, with 
manatees drowning in fishing nets and 






Martínez et al., 
2012; Mason et al., 
2018; Solomon et 
al., 2004) 
 
Gray wolf (Canis lupus) 
Conflict between rural livestock herding 
and conservation interests, with wolves 





al., 2016; Pimenta 
et al., 2017; 
Werhahn et al., 
2017) 
 
Saltwater crocodile (Crocodylus porosus) 
Conflict between human safety and 
conservation interests, with crocodile-
related injury and retaliatory killing 
 
Australia  
Papua New Guinea  
(Fukuda et al., 
2015) 
Geese (e.g., Anser anser, Alopochen aegyptiaca) 
Conflict between agriculture and 
conservation interests, with crop-raiding 




(Tombre et al., 
2013) 
Sea eagle (Haliaeetus albicilla) 
Conflict between rural livestock farming 
and conservation interests, with livestock 




(Marquiss et al., 
2004) 
Vulture (e.g., Gyps fulvus, Gyps africanus) 
Conflict between rural livelihoods and 
conservation interests, with livestock 
depredation, perceived spread of disease 




(Margalida et al., 
2014; Ogada et al., 
2016) 
Sea otter (Enhydra lutris) 
Conflict between fishing and conservation 
interests with competition for catch and 




(Carswell et al., 
2015; Echeverri et 
al., 2017) 
Asiatic black bear (Ursus thibetanus) 
Conflict between agriculture and human 
safety and conservation interests with 
crop-raiding, attacks and retaliatory killing 
Japan 
Vietnam 
(Can et al., 2014; 






Figure 4.1: An example of two different versions of the same scenario which were 
presented to different participants, from two of eight different question blocks. In 
this case the location and framing, and the illegality of wildlife killing differs 
between the two scenarios. 
 
 
Between participants, a full-factorial design was used to systematically vary three aspects 
of scenario descriptions: whether they were framed as human-human or human-wildlife 
conflict, whether wildlife killing was described as illegal, and the country the conflict was 
located in (Figure 4.1). Each scenario was adapted from existing literature and different 
pairs of countries were chosen on the basis of maximizing the variation in development 
status (as determined by the Human Development Index  [HDI] [UNDP 2016]), whilst 
keeping within a given species’ range (IUCN, 2017). The final combination of scenarios was 
chosen to ensure a geographical spread across world regions (Table 4.1). For the ‘geese’ 
and ‘vulture’ scenarios, the precise species was not named because the conflicts related to 




In each survey, we randomly varied the set of questions (A-H) seen by each participant 
using the question block randomization feature on Qualtrics. We also included questions on 
characteristics of the participants, including their disciplinary background, career role and 
position, nationality, gender, age, and familiarity with conflicts in the literature and on the 
ground. Last, we included a section for participants to give open-ended written feedback on 




We first conducted a pilot study at the Scottish Conservation Conflict Research Group 
(https://www.conservationconflicts.info/) meeting in June 2018. After adapting the survey 
design, we recruited research participants at the 2018 European Congress for Conservation 
Biology in Finland – which was attended by international delegates with varying experience 
in conflicts and backgrounds. To include a wider range of responses, we conducted a 
literature search in ISI Web of Knowledge to identify authors who had recently published 
studies related to conflicts, and emailed each corresponding author (n=335) asking this 
person to complete the survey and invited people to share the survey on Twitter and via 
relevant mailing lists. Participants were invited to share their email address (to receive 
results) but participant anonymity was preserved. This study received ethical approval from 







Table 4.2: Variables used in multinomial mixed logit models of the likelihood of different 
intervention types being prioritized across a series of conflict scenarios presented to 411 
conservation professionals in a survey, including variables related to experimental 














Scenarios =  HHC (1644), 








Scenarios: Illegal (1644), legal 
(1644) 
1,2 




Mean= 0.75, SD = 0.17, 




A-H Survey Scenarios:  A (360), B (520), C 
(568), D (336), E, (368), F 
(320), G (408), H (408) 
1,2 






Mean= 75.9, SD = 23.64, 










Mean= 62.16, SD = 26.84, 
Range = 0 (no experience) -







Mean= 66.07, SD = 22.73, 
Range = 0 (no knowledge) -
100 (main specialism) 
2 
Age  Survey Mean= 37.92, SD = 10.99, 




 Survey Mean= 0.84, SD = 0.12, 
Range = 0.42-0.95 
2 













Survey Researcher (321) 
Practitioner/Other (84)  
- 
b UNDP = United Nations Development Program  
 
Analyses  
We carried out statistical analysis using the statistical programing software ‘R’ (R 
Development Core Team, 2016) and the package ‘mlogit’. To analyse how different 
predictors influenced the choices between the five intervention categories, we used 
multinomial logit linear regressions, with random-parameters to model the correlation 
between multiple responses (n=8) from each individual. We used the stakeholder 
intervention type as the reference intervention in reported models, but each other 
intervention type was used as a reference level in other models for comparison (Appendix 
2, Table A2.3). 
 
Due to some missing responses, models with more variables had slightly reduced sample 
sizes. Explanatory-variable collinearity was checked using Spearman’s rho for numerical 
variables and 1-way analysis of variance for categorical variables. Because age was 
associated with both position (F2,400 = 183.90, p< 0.01) and ‘Gender’ (F1,407 = 35.42, P < 0.01) 
only the numerical variable age was included in models. Because role was associated with 
ground experience (F1,356 = 7.081, P < 0.01), only the numerical variable ground experience 





We analysed the data collected from open-ended questions using the software package 
‘NVivo’. Using a directed content analysis approach (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005), we first 
grouped responses according to whether they addressed pre-determined themes (each 
intervention type, development status, legality, framing, and taxa). Next, using an inductive 
approach, we added new themes and sub-themes encompassing other commonly 
discussed subject areas which emerged during analysis (e.g., intervention combinations). 
We then calculated the frequency of respondents whose feedback was recorded in each 
given category and reflected on the content of the prevailing themes with regards to our 




We received 634 responses. For analysis, we omitted those who identified as ‘not working 
in conservation’ (n=14) and insufficiently competed responses (<97% completed) leaving a 
sample of 427. For our models, we only including responses with all scenarios eight 
answered (n=411). Participants came from 52 countries (Appendix 2, Table A2.1) and from 
across different career stages and ages (Table 4.2), with 84 respondents identifying as 
‘practitioners’ or ‘other’ and 321 as ‘researchers’. 
 
Across the analysed sample (411 participants, 3,288 decisions), the stakeholder 
intervention type was the most popular but most people varied their priorities across 
scenarios. Stakeholder interventions were chosen 27% of the time, followed by awareness 
(25%), economic (20%), wildlife impact reductions (19%) and enforcement (9%). We found 
that 92% of participants chose at least two of the five intervention type, and 85% chose at 
least three. Of those who did not deviate from one intervention type (n=33), 85% chose 
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stakeholder only, 6% enforcement only, 3% awareness, 3% wildlife impacts, and 3% 
economic only.  
 
Intervention priorities varied dramatically across different conflict taxa. We found that 56% 
of participants recommended awareness interventions in the vulture conflict scenarios, but 
only 8% of participants did so for the wolf conflicts. Likewise, 49% of respondents 
suggested economic interventions in the wolf conflicts, compared with 1% for crocodile 
conflicts. Enforcement was most popular in the manatee conflicts (25%) and least in the 
geese conflicts (2%). Stakeholder interventions were most popular for sea otter conflicts 
(39%) and least for wolf conflicts (18%). Impacts-based interventions were favoured most in 
bear conflicts (49%) and least in the vulture conflicts (4%) However, intervention decisions 
varied across the two locations in each scenario (Figure 4.2).  
 
Intervention prioritisations were predicted by the development status of the conflict 
location and whether illegal activity was reported, but not by the conflict framing variable 
(Figure 4.3). These effects were consisted across multinomial mixed logit regression models 
which controlled for the multiple responses per individual, respondent’s question blocks 
and the independent effect of each scenario (Model Set 1, n=411), and those that also 
included the characteristic of respondents (Model Set 2, n=341). Below, for each predictor 





Figure 4.2: Proportion of each intervention type (impacts, awareness, enforcement, 
economic, stakeholder) prioritized by conservation professionals, across the 2 







Figure 4.3: Results from a multinomial mixed logit regression model (model set 1, 
reference level stakeholder) showing the predicted probability of choosing each 
intervention type (a) increase awareness, (b) enforce laws, (c) provide economic 
incentive, (d) engage stakeholders, (e) reduce impacts) across the different 
combinations of the experimentally-manipulated scenarios presented to survey 
respondents (see Table 4.2), (whiskers, 95% CI; HWC, human-wildlife conflict; HHC, 
human-human conflict; high, very highly developed nation; less, high, medium, or 













The higher the HDI of the conflict location the more enforcement and awareness were 
prioritised. As HDI increased, the likelihood of choosing enforcement was greater than the 
likelihood of choosing economic interventions (p < 0.01, odds ratio 1.43, 95% CI 1.13-1.79), 
impacts (p < 0.01, Odds Ratio 1.33, 0.95 CI: 1.08-1.67), or stakeholder interventions (p < 
0.05, Odds Ratio 1.31, 0.95 CI: 1.06-1.63). Similarly, the likelihood of choosing awareness 
was greater than the likelihood of choosing economic interventions (p < 0.01, Odds Ratio 
1.26, 0.95 CI: 1.07-1.47) or impacts (p < 0.05, Odds Ratio 1.18, 0.95 CI: 1.02-1.36). When 
wildlife killing was described as illegal, the likelihood of choosing economic interventions 
was greater than the likelihood of choosing awareness (p < 0.01, Odds Ratio 1.52, 0.95 CI: 
1.12-2.08), impacts (p < 0.05, Odds Ratio 1.49, 0.95 CI: 1.07-2.07), or stakeholder 
interventions (p <0.05, Odds Ratio 1.45, 0.95 CI: 1.05-1.99) (Table 4.2, Figure 4.4). 
 
The characteristics of respondents also predicted intervention priorities. The more 
respondents’ disciplinary backgrounds were weighted toward natural science over social 
science, the more likely they chose enforcement and awareness. Specifically, as weighting 
towards natural science increased, the likelihood of choosing enforcement was greater 
than the likelihood of choosing stakeholder (p < 0.01, Odds Ratio, 1.47, 0.95 CI: 1.21-1.78) 
or economic interventions (p < 0.01 Odds Ratio, 1.33 0.95 CI: 1.09-1.64), and the likelihood 
of choosing awareness was greater than the likelihood of choosing stakeholder (p < 0.01, 
Odds Ratio, 1.36, 0.95 CI: 1.18-1.56), economic (p < 0.01, Odds Ratio, 1.38, 0.95 CI: 1.18-






Figure 4.4: Results from a multinomial mixed logit regression model (model 2) (see 
Table 4.2), showing estimated conditional effects of each predictor variable on the 
likelihood of a respondent choosing each, of the 4, other intervention types 
compared with the likelihood of them choosing stakeholder-based interventions 
(HDI, human development index; HWC, human-wildlife conflict frame; HHC, 
human-human conflict frame; discipline, disciplinary background; literature, 
knowledge of the literature). Odds ratios (solid) (converted model coefficient 
estimates) show the expected change in likelihood of a choice when each 
continuous variable increases by a unit of 1 or when each factor variable changes 
level from a baseline (open). Whiskers represent 95% CI. Variables with whiskers 
that do not cross 0 are those predicted by the model to associate with intervention 
decisions (effect size is distinguishable from 0). The larger the odds ratios the 
greater the predicted strength of association. 
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As experience with conflicts on the ground increased, the likelihood of choosing awareness 
reduced. Specifically, as experience increased, the likelihood of choosing awareness was 
lower than the likelihood of choosing enforcement (p < 0.01, Odds Ratio, 0.72, 0.95 CI: 
0.58-0.91), stakeholder (p < 0.01, Odds Ratio, 0.78, 0.95 CI: 0.66-0.91), or impacts 
interventions (p < 0.05, Odds Ratio, 0.80, 0.95 CI: 0.68-0.95). As the HDI of participants’ 
home nation increased, the likelihood of choosing stakeholder interventions was greater 
than the likelihood of choosing awareness (p < 0.01, Odds Ratio, 1.41, 0.95 CI: 1.21-1.61), 
enforcement (p < 0.01, Odds Ratio, 1.35, 0.95 CI: 1.11-1.67), or, to a lesser extent, impacts 
interventions (p < 0.05, Odds Ratio, 1.18, 0.95 CI: 1.01-1.37), and the likelihood of  choosing 
economic interventions was greater than the likelihood of choosing awareness (p < 0.01, 
Odds Ratio, 1.25, 0.95 CI: 1.06-1.47). 
 
As respondent age increased the likelihood of choosing both enforcement and awareness 
reduced. As age increased, the likelihood of choosing enforcement was lower than the 
likelihood of choosing stakeholder (p < 0.01, Odds Ratio, 0.63, 0.95 CI: 0.52-0.76), or 
economic (p < 0.01, Odds Ratio, 0.63, 0.95 CI: 0.51-0.77), or to a lesser extent, impacts 
interventions (p < 0.01, Odds Ratio, 0.76, 0.95 CI: 0.63-0.93), and the likelihood of choosing 
awareness was lower than the likelihood of choosing economic (p < 0.01, Odds Ratio, 0.75, 
0.95 CI: 0.67-0.90) or stakeholder interventions (p < 0.01, Odds Ratio, 0.77, 0.95 CI: 0.68-
0.88). Male respondents were more likely than females to prioritise enforcement than 
stakeholder interventions (p <0.01, Odds Ratio, 1.42, 0.95 CI: 1.05, 1.93), but less likely to 
prioritise awareness (p < 0.05, Odds Ratio, 0.64, 0.95 CI: 0.49-0.84), or impacts (p < 0.05, 
Odds Ratio, 0.62, 0.95 CI: 0.43-0.91). In most models, the variation between individual 
respondents was largest with regards to enforcement (Appendix 2, Table A2.4) and 
generally the models explained a high proportion of the total variation (Model Set 2, mean 




Respondents’ also highlighted the importance of local contextual and multi-faceted 
interventions (often including stakeholder engagement as a starting point). Of the 166 
respondents who gave written feedback, 43% described the need, or benefit, of 
combinations of interventions.  In total 30% of respondents asked for more context or 
described contextual factors that would influence their decisions. However, only 7% 
mentioned the geographical location or development level of the conflict country, only 2% 
referenced the legality of behaviours and only 4% commented on the conflicts framing. 
Moreover, 7% requested information about the species (such as habitat and conservation 
status). Other interventions which were suggested included hunting (2%), lethal control 
(2%), and other forms of non-lethal technical interventions (3%). In total, 23% of 
respondents outlined the need to prioritise stakeholder-based interventions first, to either 
increase buy-in (6%), better understand a conflict (7%) (including drawing upon community 





The results of the experimental survey suggest that particular characteristics of wildlife 
conflicts and the characteristics of decision-makers influence intervention 
recommendations. Although it is known that people with different backgrounds and 
experiences favour different approaches for conservation generally (Sandbrook et al., 2019) 
and for conflicts specifically  (Lute et al., 2018), our results shed further light on these 
differences and highlight the possible processes and factors influencing how 




Our results illuminate the importance of contextual cues on conservation decision-making. 
Relatively simple changes to the objective description of a conflict, such as the conflict 
location or whether a behaviour is described as illegal, had large effects on intervention 
priorities. Likewise, contexts which appear comparable in terms of the general problem – 
wildlife impacts and retaliatory killing – and which differed only in terms of taxa, types of 
competing human interests and types of wildlife impacts, promoted different solutions. 
Impact reduction efforts for instance are widely prioritised for crop-raiding bears, but are 
largely overlooked for fish-eating otters or lamb-raiding eagles. Such contextual effects 
could be generated by numerous mechanisms. For instance, they might represent a form of 
cognitive bias, reflecting fast, intuitive thinking (Papworth, 2017) and the priming effects of 
specific words (Bargh, 2006). Alternatively, they might reflect respondents’ values, 
assumptions and conceptualisations related to their understanding of specific species, 
countries, or conflict contexts (Game et al., 2013). For some respondents, their knowledge 
and experience (both on the ground and through literature) base might inform more 
deliberative, reflective decisions (Papworth, 2017). Although our study does not illuminate 
which processes are dominant here, managers generally rely more heavily on experience 
and intuition than published scientific evidence (Walsh et al., 2015). 
 
Beyond highlighting the general importance of context, we also identify specific 
associations between conflict characteristics and intervention decisions. Our finding that 
enforcement and awareness were favoured more for scenarios situated in more highly 
developed countries, and by respondents from less highly developed countries was 
unexpected. In a previous review, enforcement appeared to be more commonly 
recommended by authors for conflicts in less highly developed nations, and awareness 
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showed no associations (Chapter 3). However, that study was observational and therefore 
could not account for the additional variation between conflict situations as we did here. 
Instead, we propose three reasons to account for why enforcement (though generally 
prioritised the least) was favoured in more developed countries: the possible widespread 
appreciation of the critiques of militarised and enforcement-based conservation in the 
Global South (Duffy et al., 2019; Mabele, 2017), perceptions that wildlife-related killings are 
less legitimate in more highly developed countries (Dickman et al., 2015; Sheil et al., 2016) 
or the understanding that successful enforcement is contingent upon effective governance 
(Sundström, 2015). However, enforcement was infrequently discussed in the written 
feedback. Hence further investigations would be needed to ascertain to what extent 
different practical and ethical reasons - such as cultural relativism (Dickman et al., 2015) – 
may account for this effect.  
 
That economic interventions appeared to be more commonly suggested in less highly 
developed countries, stands in contrast with the finding that conflict-related compensation 
is more common in highly developed countries (Ravenelle and Nyhus, 2017). However, it is 
possible that the lack of incentives and compensation schemes in less highly developed 
nations might be a result of the greater structural challenges in providing them rather than 
varying priorities (DeMotts and Hoon, 2012), despite the apparently healthy appetite for 
them among researchers and practitioners identified here. Survey feedback also hinted at 
the idea, common in the conservation literature (Salerno et al., 2016), that the material 
costs of conflicts may be relatively greater in less highly developed nations – such as where 
food insecurity, or dependence on forest resources is high. However, the non-material 
impacts of conflicts are also clearly significant in the Global South (Barua et al., 2013) and 
the social roots of conservation conflicts are likely to be just as strong between less and 
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highly developed countries (Young et al., 2013). Moreover, given that conservation rule 
breaking everywhere is frequently associated with acts of resistance and not just material 
incentives (Holmes, 2007) we also suggest a need for further investigation into the reasons 
why economic interventions were prioritised more when wildlife killing was described as 
illegal. This is particularly important given that conservation payments can also lead to 
reductions in previously unrewarded positive conservation behaviours (Fisher, 2012). The 
lack of the importance of the conflict-framing variable was unexpected, suggesting either 
different conflict frames are less important than predicted (Chapter 3), or at least less 
salient than the other factors tested. Further work should explore the extent to which 
conservation researchers and practitioners might be influenced by perceptions and 
assumptions made about countries in different stages of development, which are often out-
of-date or inaccurate (Rosling and Zhang, 2011). 
 
Our finding that respondent characteristics – such as disciplinary background, age and 
conflict experience – predict their intervention decisions highlights the importance of socio-
demographic influences on conservation decision making (Papworth, 2017). This supports 
previous findings that conflict management priorities differ across regions and respondents’ 
backgrounds (Lute et al., 2018). We suggest that further work should explore whether 
disciplinary backgrounds and experience of conflicts on the ground shape the way decision-
makers conceptualise conflicts – such as the emphasis placed on social relations (Sandbrook 
et al., 2013). 
 
Although we cannot provide as clear explanations to account for the apparent effects of 
age, gender, and development status of respondents’ home nation, these factors have also 
been shown to predict conservation priorities more generally. For instance age, gender, and 
72 
 
regional origin all predict respondent’ general conservation rationale and support for 
market-based conservation (Sandbrook et al., 2019), and gender can predict local 
management preferences (Keane et al., 2016) and attitudes to particular taxa (Suryawanshi 
et al., 2014). We also cannot say from our data whether prioritisations were also influenced 
by the factors not experimentally manipulated: such as taxa, previous knowledge, actual 
prevalence or likelihood of each described conflict, impact severity or conservation status. 
Likewise, although we instructed respondents to ignore the issue of resources, it is possible 
that perceived differences in management costs (Iacona et al., 2018) may have tacitly 
influenced decisions. Similarly, although our sample size is appropriate, our conclusions are 
limited to generalisations about largely Anglo-European sample, which reflects the Anglo-
European bias in conservation conflict research (Chapter 3; van Eeden et al. 2018), but 
doesn’t represent other voices in conservation decision making (Sandbrook et al., 2019). 
We could also have included ‘no intervention’ as an additional option within our scenarios. 
Indeed the question of when it is best not to actually intervene in conservation conflicts is 
something certainly worth exploring further.   
 
These results have important implications for wildlife conflict management. First, if context-
contingent intervention priorities, such as those identified here, are informed by reasoned 
thinking and evidence, they may produce effective outcomes (Sutherland and Wordley, 
2017). If however, such decisions are more shaped by unknown biases and predispositions, 
they may not (Papworth, 2017). Hence, decision-makers could benefit both from further 
personal retrospection (identifying their own biases and assumptions) and from further 
studies which test prevailing assumptions in conflict management (van Eeden et al., 2018). 
Second, given that the characteristics of decision-makers also shape intervention priorities, 
increasing the diversity of those involved in conflict decision-making would not only be 
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ethical but may improve decisions (Green et al., 2015). For instance, increased female 
(Leisher et al., 2016), community (Mishra et al., 2017) and interdisciplinary (Bennett et al., 
2017) participation, in decision-making has been found to improve a range of conservation 
outcomes. Furthermore, whilst different conservation managers and stakeholders are 
unlikely to always agree – for both practical and value-based reasons (Rust, 2017; St John et 
al., 2018) –  better understanding other’s positions and increasing dialogue helps fostering 
more effective collaboration (Game et al., 2013; Lute et al., 2018). Third, both the survey 
results and feedback were consistent with recent scholarship (Redpath et al., 2017) that 
highlights participatory and stakeholder-first conflict interventions as best practice and 
advocates for multi-pronged (Hazzah et al., 2014) and adaptive management strategies  
(Bunnefeld et al. 2017). Education and awareness programs were often cited in feedback as 
being necessary additions to any interventions. However, given the failures of many 
awareness-based conservation programs (Schultz, 2011), a further exploration into why and 
where conservation decision-makers deem them most appropriate is important. 
Approaches that are specifically aimed at particular audiences, such as social-marketing 
(Salazar et al., 2018) may be more effective than simple information provision or – often-
problematic – enforcement (Duffy et al., 2019). However, how different interventions 










4.6 Recommendations  
- Decision-makers should further consider the assumptions underpinning 
intervention choices in different contexts whether these are supported by 
evidence. 
- Where intervention is appropriate, conflict managers should consider stakeholder-
engagement as the first step in a multi-pronged intervention approach. 
- Researchers should further test the efficacy of behavioural informed approaches, 
such as social marketing, alongside traditional education or incentive-based 
interventions. 
- Researchers should explore whether the decision-making process may benefit from 









Chapter 5: Case study: Enduimet Wildlife Management Area 
 
5.1 Conflict geography 
Enduimet Wildlife Management Area (WMA) was established in 2007 as a community-
based conservation initiative under the Tanzania Wildlife Policy of 1998 (Nelson, 2007). The 
area is part of the Amboseli-Kilimanjaro ecosystem, sandwiched between Amboseli (North), 
Kilimanjaro (East) and Arusha (South) national parks (Figure 5.1). Enduimet is home to a 
number of large mammal populations, including African elephant (Loxodonta africana), and 
on the northwest boundary of the WMA is a designated wildlife corridor (Henson et al., 
2009). The vegetation type is dominated by seasonal grasslands, woodland, bareland and 
cultivated areas (Figure 5.2). Although people and livestock move freely across the area, the 
WMA is separated into 11 village settlement zones (formally 9), a photo safari zone, a game 
hunting zone, a wildlife corridor, a cultural tourism zone, and 5 tourism establishment 
zones, according to the Resource Zone Management Plan (Figure 5.3) (Bluwstein et al., 
2016). All the villages are predominantly inhabited by the Maasai people and are agro-
pastoralist, but the environment and associated mix of livelihood activities varies across the 
area (Homewood et al., 2009) (Figure 5.4). Economically, most Enduimet residents are very 
poor, with per capita income averaging US$0.16 per day (Homewood, 2017). Local wildlife 
generates modest tourism revenues (from photo safaris and hunting) which, like those of 
other WMAs, are split equally between all villages and fund the provision of public services. 
However, direct financial benefits provided by the WMA to individuals remain small, 
estimated at only US$0.6 capita per year (Homewood et al., 2015). Like other WMAs, 
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Enduimet is a government-backed initiative, which was formally created through the 
formation of a an Authorised Association, which is a community-based organisation (CBO), 
under the support of village councils and international NGOs (Wright, 2017). Under national 
policy, all relationships with tourism operators are managed via the WMA, making it 
untenable for individual villages pursue independent tourism ventures (Wright, 2017). 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Enduimet Wildlife Management Area northern Tanzania, (highlighted in 
green), bordering Amboseli National Park (Kenya) (north), Kilimanjaro National Park 
(east) and Arusha National Park (south). Reproduced from protectedplanet.net 








Figure 5.2: Enduimet WMA land-cover and land-use map, reproduced with permission from 
Enduimet WMA.  
 
 







Figure 5.4: Cultivated fields in the settlement zone on the outskirts of Ol Molog village, 
(August 2016). Author.  
 
The Authorised Association (AA) is comprised of a general assembly of three elected 
community representatives from each village (33 in total), elected every three years (Figure 
5.5), supported by a board of trustees (including one member from each village selected by 
the AA community representatives), and village, ward and district officials (such as 
chairpersons and executive officers and district land officers) (Moyo et al. 2016). The 
general assembly authorise investments and oversee the running of the WMA but only the 
village representatives on the assembly hold voting rights to make these decisions. The 
village, ward and district officials are just meant to provide legal and technical assistance 
the village representatives (Wright, 2017). The AA also oversee the WMA management 
team, which is comprised of locally employed community members based at the WMA 
headquarters in Enduimet, who manage the financial, administrative, and anti-poaching 
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operations, which are undertaken by the WMA rangers: referred to in WMA terminology as 




Figure 5.5: Enduimet Authorised Association election (including public speeches from 
candidates) in TingaTinga village (May 2017). Author.  
 
Although the WMA was democratically endorsed by each member village, its creation was, 
and maintenance is, largely driven by international wildlife NGOs (Homewood, 2017; 
Sachedina, 2010). Today, Honeyguide, the acting NGO, provides funding for ranger stations 
and equipment used to deter wildlife from farms, awareness-raising activities and the anti-
poaching teams (Homewood, 2017). One trophy hunting operator, the Northern Hunting 
Company, and two photo-tourism operators, Shu'mata Lodge, and Kambi ya Tembo (Elerai 
Tented Lodge) currently are established in Enduimet (Wright, 2017), with one other 
investor, Hoopoe Tours (Noombopong Lodge), having withdrawn in 2008 (Sulle et al., 
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2011). Although any proposed changes to the Resource Zone Management Plan require the 
majority approval from member village councils, the final say on any changes rests with the 
Director of Wildlife at the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Tourism, 1998; Wright, 2017). 
 
5.2 Conflict history 
 






5.2.1 Colonial conservation  
Understanding contemporary conservation conflicts requires understanding their history 
(Lambert, 2015; Pooley, 2016). The history of conservation in Tanzania can largely be 
characterised by a series of land zoning policies by colonial and post-colonial 
administrations (Anderson and Giblin, 2006; Igoe and Brockington, 2006; Neumann, 1992). 
In the scientific literature, the area comprising modern-day northern Tanzania (including 
Enduimet) and southern Kenya was described during the onset of colonial rule in 1885 by 
British explorers as ‘Masai Land’, an area “with a wealth of scenery scarcely surpassed by 
some of the favourite tourist resorts of Europe”, [with] “park-like country enlivened by 
groups of game… great herds of cattle, or flocks of sheep” [inhabited by] “the Apollos of 
Africa”, [whose] “intelligence is above that of the average African” [and whose] “social 
habits are much what we find among other races of their stage of civilisation” (Thomson, 
1885). Such imperial, supremacist, and romanticised ways of seeing both Africa and the 
Maasai people paved the way towards the colonial conservation policies which ultimately 
subjugated them (Neumann, 1995), and which came to dictate numerous enforced 
relationships between people, wildlife, and spaces in northern Tanzania (Bluwstein, 2018), 
and elsewhere in eastern and southern Africa (Rust and Taylor, 2016).  
 
From the late 19th century German colonial administrators restricted access to certain lands 
and access to wildlife by creating the first game and forests reserves, in what was then 
German East Africa (Gissibl, 2016; Goldstein, 2015). Chief among the reasons for 
demarcating game reserves was a combination of the desire to protect wild stocks of game 
for colonial trophy hunting, and to control tsetse fly (sleeping sickness) outbreaks 
(Prendergast and Adams, 2003). However, the disruption of indigenous methods of tsetse 
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fly and wildlife management as well as the induction of the rinderpest virus contributed to 
the catastrophic epidemics of the 1890s, which caused both human and livestock 
depopulation (Bluwstein, 2018). In part as a consequence of this rapid depopulation, 
colonial settlers arrived in the area with an artificially enhanced image of vast untouched 
wildernesses (Neumann, 2001). Following the First World War, Britain took control of what 
then became Tanganyika and extended the game reserve network, whilst allocating the 
most fertile lands to colonial settlers (Bluwstein, 2018). Indeed, throughout colonial Africa, 
strictly protected game reserves became the mainstay of British colonial conservation, 
which gave hunting rights almost exclusively to settlers and, in effect, sought to re-create 
larger and more ‘pristine’ versions of the Victorian country estates back-home (Adams and 
Hutton, 2007; MacKenzie, 1988).  
 
Hunting was not the only motivation for conservation however. Even by the early 20st 
century, conservation advocates were acutely aware of role played by over-exploitation in 
the recent extinction of numerous species, from the great auk (Pinguinus impennis) 
(Cowles, 2012) , to the quagga (Equus quagga quagga) (Adams, 2013). Across the British 
Empire, colonial administrators had long been actively attempting ecological engineering to 
alleviate environment destruction and ‘improve’ landscapes (Grove, 1995), and back in the 
metropole, rapid industrialisation had left people lamenting human expansion and 
romanticising lost wilderness (Thomas, 1983). Likely as a consequence of all of these 
motivations, from 1928, conservation advocates in England, connected to the Society for 
the Preservation of the Flora and Fauna of the Empire (SPFFE) (now Flora and Fauna 
International) pushed for the creation of national parks around Ngorogoro Crater, Mount 
Meru, and Kilimanjaro (Neumann, 1992). By 1937, the British-administered Tanganyika 
government agreed to create the Serengeti Park, which was gazetted in 1940 and formally 
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declared in 1951 (Shetler, 2007). One of the prominent defenders of the Serengeti (from 
truncation) in 1960, former director general of The United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and co-founder of IUCN, Sir Julian Huxley declared 
Africa’s parks as a “world asset” offering any visitor “a priceless enrichment of experience 
and a unique glimpse of the world of nature as it was before the coming of man. They must 
be at all costs preserved” (Schwarzenbach, 2011:14). 
 
Even from the outset, colonial administrators feared that such parks could threatened 
political stability in the region and that they would “pay no regard to native interests” and 
would infringe upon people’s rights (Neumann, 1992). These fears were realised when 
violent confrontations followed between park authorities and predominantly Maasai 
communities (who had been largely ousted from the park). According to the District 
Commissioner at the time, the “Maasai were openly denying the Park laws, and the political 
situation has consequently become explosive”, with rhino routinely speared in protest 
(Neumann, 1992). Similar conflicts rooted in colonial land-conflict legacies still play out in 
northern Tanzania today (Mariki et al., 2015; Vedeld et al., 2012) and elsewhere in the East 
African rangelands (Evans and Adams, 2016; Fox, 2018).  
 
5.2.2 Post-colonial conservation  
Post-independence, conservation activities and the gazetting of land continued, but these 
activities took new directions. From the first decades of independence in 1961, a steady 
process of centralising control over wildlife proceeded and was built around the ‘fortress 
discourse’ which emphasised the need to enclose conservation areas, evict previous users, 
and police these areas against the illegal hunting of wildlife (Adams and Hulme, 2001; 
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Benjaminsen and Bryceson, 2012). In his 1961 ‘Arusha Manifesto’, the first president of 
Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, outlined his vision, declaring that “in accepting the trusteeship of 
my wildlife we solemnly declare that we will do everything in our power to make sure that 
our children’s grand-children will be able to enjoy this rich and precious inheritance” 
(Nyerere et al., 1961). Under Nyerere (who was a staunch advocate for the environment), 
the majority of Tanzanian national parks, and species protection policies were established. 
However, these policies were also heavily influenced by international actors. Mount Meru, 
the national park bordering what later became Enduimet WMA, was established by land 
purchases made by World Wildlife Fund in 1960 (Adams, 2013). Indeed, the same figures 
who led the WWF in this endeavour – the so called ‘London Preparatory Group’ for their 
English, aristocratic and largely male make-up – even helped Nyerere draft his ‘Arusha 
Manifesto’ (Schwarzenbach, 2011). Illuminating their vision for conservation, Sir Peter 
Scott, co-founder of the WWF, began his 1963 WWF ‘Strategy for Conservation’ address by 
declaring: “The principal pioneers in conservation were Americans. The first National Park 
was established in the United States and it was here that the value to mankind of wild 
nature and wilderness as a source of spiritual refreshment was first recognised” (Scott, 
1963).  
 
Tanzania enacted its first comprehensive wildlife conservation laws in the 1970s, which 
maintained conservation as primarily a top-down, rather than participatory, enterprise. In 
particular, in 1974 Wildlife Conservation Act was passed. Under this law all wildlife 
resources belonged to the government. The management of wildlife –  still referred to as 
‘game’ – was controlled by the Division of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, 
who were empowered to declare any land a game-controlled area and enforce access 
restrictions, which often did not attend to the interests of local community members or 
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subsistence hunters (Mkumbukwa, 2008). From the early 1980s however, local 
communities were given greater consideration. For instance, 1981 saw the first Maasai 
representative to be included in the management of the Ngorogoro Game Controlled Area  
(which was founded in 1962), and 1982 the Environmental Legislation Management was 
established which aimed to reduce conflicts over protected area management by increasing 
community participation (Mkumbukwa, 2008).  
 
In the 1990s, following global calls for more participatory ‘community-based conservation’ 
(Adams, 2013), Tanzania embarked upon a process of creating Wildlife Management Areas 
(WMAs) (Wright, 2017). This community-conservation discourse also reflected the ‘win-win’ 
logic underpinned by a widely endorsed perception of the complimentary relationship 
between development and environmental conservation (Homewood, 2017), calls for more 
‘people-friendly’ conservation, the adoption of neoliberal economic policies across 
Tanzania and globally, and the demand for landscape-scale conservation by NGOs 
(Benjaminsen and Bryceson, 2012). These ideas were enshrined in the 1998 Wildlife Policy 
of Tanzania (Mkumbukwa, 2008). Since then, 19 WMAs have been established in Tanzania, 
covering 7% of the total land area of the country, with 19 more planned (Lee and Bond, 
2018). Although such a process was originally celebrated as characterising the shift towards 
a decentralised, ‘bottom-up’ conservation approach, critical scholars argue that in reality 
the spread of WMAs represents a huge shift towards the centralised governance of 
Tanzania’s rural populations (Wright, 2017). Indeed, these WMAs are associated with the 
creation of ‘environmentalities’ – modes of governance aiming to influence individuals and 
groups to protect and manage the material environment (Fletcher, 2010) – which in this 
case aim to transform agro-pastoral lands into conservation ‘territories’ (Bluwstein, 2017). 
Rather than be focussed primarily on the interest of the communities themselves, these 
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projects are seen as helping bolster the wider national-park network and the ‘heartlands’ 
(African Wildlife Foundation, [AWF]) or ‘ecoregions’ (WWF) aspirations of NGOs 
(Benjaminsen and Bryceson, 2012). Furthermore, where once crop-raiding elephant 
populations were controlled by colonial administrators and then game wardens even up 
until the 1990s, the shift towards community-based conservation was accompanied by the 
strict protection of elephants in northern Tanzania (Bluwstein, 2018). Lastly, during this 
same period the regional environment experienced both climatic change – notably, higher 
temperatures particularly in the dry season (Altmann et al., 2002) – and land-use change – 
notably, from increased agriculture (Msoffe et al., 2011). 
 
 5.2.3 Contemporary conflict 
Following the trend towards community-based conservation, in 1997 a WMA was proposed 
for Enduimet by the national government and backed by the international conservation 
NGO, African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) (Benjaminsen and Bryceson, 2012). The original 
plan for Enduimet WMA comprised of nine villages and was conceived in stakeholder 
workshops held in 1997 (Nelson, 2007). At this time, wildlife surveys had recorded locally 
recovering elephant populations amid widespread illegal hunting of wildlife (Nelson, 2007). 
Nonetheless, a community-based organisation (CBO) did not form in Enduimet until 2002 
after the release of the WMA regulations. During this time and in the following years, the 
land-zoning plan was contested, namely by Sinya village, who owned the land most 
abundant with wildlife and who already had developed working relationships with local 
safari operators (Nelson, 2007). Due to the benefit sharing structure of the WMAs, Sinya 
stood to lose tourism income as a result of the WMA and consequently Sinya’s leaders 
initially refused to participate when the process was launched in 2004 (Nelson, 2007). Anti-
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WMA sentiments were also already present in other villages due to fears over land-
grabbing restrictions on resource-use (Benjaminsen and Bryceson, 2012). This opposition 
was demonstrated by the defacing of WMA beacons placed to demarcate the boundaries of 
the WMA and call made by community members to withdraw from the WMA (Nelson, 
2007).  
 
Conflict in Enduimet has not just played out between villages and the WMA. Since the late 
1990s villages in Enduimet have been embroiled in sometimes violent conflict with a 
succession of tourism operators (Homewood et al., 2009; Honey, 2008). In 2005 a 
Tanzanian court awarded rights to a hunting company to operate in Enduimet, which was 
considered by Sinya village to be an affront on their efforts to replace all trophy-hunting 
with photographic tourism on their land, as the hunting operator was perceived to be 
corrupt and negatively affecting wildlife population (Wright, 2016). As a consequence of the 
court-battle, the photographic tourism company relocated to a neighbouring village, 
leading to lost revenue for Sinya (Benjaminsen and Bryceson, 2012). However, after 
opposing the hunting operator for numerous years, Sinya then agreed to join the WMA in 
2009, in part to more effectively resist trophy hunting. These ambitions were realised in 
2011 when the previously contentious hunting area in Sinya was replaced with a 
photographic tourism zone (Wright, 2016). At this same time, the member villages of the 
WMA were negotiating a new land-zoning plan and were successful in their efforts to 
remove the inhibiting (and largely ignored) grazing restrictions of the previous plan (Wright, 
2017). During this time Sinya was also split into three separate villages (Figure 5.3). 
 
In Enduimet some of the photographic tourism operators are also sources of conflict. 
Wright (2017), reports that in 2007 a German photographic tourism operator, Shu’mata 
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camps, allegedly appropriated land in suspicious circumstances, leading to years of 
community resentment and hostility. Wright cites how the community claimed ill-
treatment at the hands of the camp, broken promises, a lack of transparency over the initial 
agreement, and the refusal to enter re-negotiations. This community-led battle mobilised 
some influential elites to support the case, which culminated in an eviction noticed made 
by the CBO in 2014 and a consequent ongoing court battle (Wright, 2016, 2017).  
 
As elsewhere in the East African rangelands (Evans and Adams, 2016), in Enduimet, there 
have been numerous concurrent conflicts between different groups of stakeholders. 
Indeed, the retaliatory killing of elephants has been attributed as being associated to 
opposition to the WMA (Mariki et al., 2015), as well as to widespread crop-raiding and 
elephant-incurred human injury or death (Figure 5.7) (Salerno et al., 2016; Wilfred, 2010). 
Some authors have identified grievances over the lack of promised compensation or 
material benefits, and resource-use restrictions (Homewood, 2017). Others have 
highlighted conflict arising from the WMA governance and decision-making process, which 
is perceived by some as not transparent and unrepresentative (Bluwstein et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, the negative impacts of elephants on well-being and food security are also 
thought to disproportionally affect women in Enduimet, who are also those with the least 
political voice to exert their interests (ESPA, 2017; Mariki, 2016). The original participatory 
mapping consultations with communities, which helped derive the land-use plan, have also 
been problematized as producing multiple different ‘final’ version of the plan, leading to 
confusion, misunderstanding, and conflict (Homewood, 2017). Indeed, representatives 
from two different NGOs – African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) and the International 
Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) – both led separate and parallel 
processes of participatory mapping, using different mapping techniques and producing 
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different outputs (Homewood, 2017). Moreover, the appropriateness of these outputs have 
been questioned given that they were derived from small numbers of local individuals, 
chosen ad hoc without warning or experience of the process and were meant to represent 
the wider population of 50,000 people (Homewood, 2017). 
 
 
Figure 5.7: The roadside in the arid seasonal grassland and woodland around TingaTinga 
village, where I was told by a village official that a woman was killed by an elephant the 
previous year (August 2016). Author. 
 
At times, conflict over conservation in the area surrounding Enduimet has been reported to 
have turned violent. Just beyond the border of the WMA in the nearby village of Engare 
Nairobi, Mariki et al. (2015) report that one night in 2009, a large crowd of villages 
surrounded a herd of elephants, and using torches, fire, noises and motorcycles they 
chased them towards, and over a cliff, killing six of them. The WMA rangers are also armed 
and one particular unit are equipped with specially trained dogs to help chase down and 
90 
 
catch those suspected of illegally killing wildlife, with arrests commonly made (Honeyguide, 
2017). There have been reports of hostility between some rangers, tourism operators and 
community members, and the use of physical protests such as roadblocks (Homewood, 
2017; Mariki et al., 2015; Wright, 2017). Lastly, beyond the historical legacies of colonial 
conservation, and local contestations, a number of authors have identified wider 
governance systems which act to produce conflict in Enduimet. These include neoliberal 
policies which are intended to achieve a combination of tourism and conservation via 
market incentives (Bluwstein, 2018), national conservation governance regimes which act 
to recentralise state control over conservation (Wright, 2017), and the conservation 
narrative of ‘wilderness’ which can help promote the exclusion of people from conservation 













Chapter 6: Wicked elephants: unpicking multi-level wildlife 
conflicts 
 
6.1 Abstract  
Conservation conflicts are both socially and environmentally damaging and occur when 
people clash over conservation objectives. They are shaped by various socio-ecological 
drivers which are thought to operate at multiple levels, from local human-wildlife 
interactions to national policy debates. However, explorations of conservation conflicts 
rarely consider how interactions across multiple levels produce conflicts and associated 
behaviours, and how these factors constrain the efficacy of different management 
interventions. We address this gap by assessing the multiple levels at which conflict over 
elephant conservation is produced in a Community Wildlife Management Area (WMA) in 
Tanzania, and by identifying implications for management. We undertake a mix of 
structured and unstructured interviews with stakeholders and an appraisal of relevant 
policy documents, grey literature, and WMA-related reports. We find that beyond human-
elephant, and stakeholder interactions, conflict-related behaviours are shaped by wider 
market governance structures related to national policies, conservation markets, and the 
objectives of NGOs. We find that current interventions largely target behaviour at the level 
of human-elephant interactions through enforcement and technical fixes, combined with 
efforts to realign local stakeholder interests with conservation objectives through eco-
tourism. We suggest that in such wildlife conflicts, stakeholder engagement and trust-
building approaches could help manage the social conflict between local stakeholders. 
However, we suggest that the efficacy of collaborative local decision-making may be 




6.2 Introduction  
Conservation conflicts are widespread and are both socially and environmentally damaging 
(Redpath et al., 2013). Conflicts can revolve around any conservation objective, but those 
involving negative human-wildlife impacts (Pooley et al., 2016) are particularly prevalent. 
Wildlife conflicts are hard to define and are often interpreted and framed differently by 
authors, managers, and stakeholders (Chapter 3). One approach explores human-wildlife 
interactions, such as crop-raiding and retaliatory killing, through concepts such as ‘human-
wildlife conflict’, ‘tolerance’ and ‘coexistence’ (Lute et al., 2018; Treves et al., 2009). In this 
framing, wildlife conflict is produced through range overlap, resource competition, and 
behavioural patterns. Associated interventions focus around separating wildlife from 
humans, mitigating the cost of wildlife damage, changing attitudes towards wildlife, 
changing livelihood practices, or increasing enforcement to prevent illegal killings (Nyhus, 
2016; van Eeden et al., 2017). Other authors conceptualise conflicts though the lens of 
impairment and competing human objectives – one of which  is related to conservation 
(Redpath et al., 2013). This human-human conflict approach focuses on how conflict is 
produced through differences in stakeholder objectives, interests, and values and plays-out 
through particular behaviours and interactions between stakeholders (Hodgson et al., 2019; 
Young et al., 2010). Here, stakeholders are considered as “any group or individual who can 
affect or is affected by the achievement of an organisation’s objectives” (Colvin et al., 2015), 
and such conflicts are seen as ‘wicked problems’ involving complexity, uncertainty, and 
feedback loops (Mason et al., 2018). Suggested interventions tend to be stakeholder-based, 
with greater emphasis placed on consultations, mediation, participation, trust-building, or 





Like other socioecological problems (Ostrom, 2009; Sayre, 2005), conservation conflicts can 
also be conceptualised as being produced across geographically different scales (García-
Frapolli et al., 2018; Kronenburg García, 2017; Rechciński et al., 2019) and from wider 
governance structures related to the state, the market, and civil society (Bixler et al., 2015; 
Hansson-Forman et al., 2018). Here governance is defined as “the practice of decision-
making occurring jointly between government and civil society through collaborative and 
deliberative methods” (Colvin et al., 2015). How local conservation objectives are set and 
enforced will depend upon the interactions and power differences between policymakers, 
institutions, and actors (Sterling et al., 2017), but also the mode of governance in action – 
ranging from centralised, decentralised, public-private, interactive, and self-governance 
(Hansson-Forman et al., 2018). For instance, elected national governments typically set 
conservation objectives in line with international agreements and global goals – such as the 
Convention of Biological Diversity (Hansson-Forman et al., 2018). However, on the ground 
these may be shaped somewhat by conservation organisations who may be more 
concerned with regional conservation objectives, and local ‘place-based’ stakeholders 
(Sterling et al., 2017) who may be more considered with wildlife impacts, their livelihoods, 
and maintaining their culture (Ceaușu et al., 2018; Young et al., 2010). Local conflicts over 
conservation objectives are also shaped by market forces (Margulies and Karanth, 2018), 
prevailing conservation narratives (Benjaminsen and Svarstad, 2010; Masse, 2016; Nesbitt 
and Weiner, 2001), and coupled conflicts such as those revolving around class, race, or 
politics (Hodgson et al., 2019; Pellis et al., 2018). Indeed, viewed through a political-ecology 
lens, conservation conflicts can been seen as products of particular ways of governing 
people’s interactions with each other and their environment (Fletcher, 2017)  – including 





In the conservation conflict management literature this complexity and issue of scale has 
been embraced in the calls for wicked problem thinking and holistic, adaptive, conflict 
management (Bunnefeld et al., 2017; Mason et al., 2018). Moreover, multi-level 
stakeholder engagement has been assessed in other areas of environmental governance 
(Hellström, 2001; Newig and Fritsch, 2009; White et al., 2018) and in conservation 
specifically (Bixler et al., 2015; Westholm, 2018), and new systems-based conservation 
approaches, such as ‘convivial conservation’ (Büscher and Fletcher, 2019) have been 
advanced. However, despite a wide literature documenting the socio-political contexts of 
environmental management (Adams, 2015; Colvin et al., 2015), conservation conflicts still 
tend to be analysed at only one level – such as the human-wildlife or stakeholder level 
(García-Frapolli et al., 2018) – and analyses of how such multi-level conflict dynamics 
influence the efficacy of different conflict management options in wildlife conflicts are still 
in their nascent phase (Hansson-Forman et al., 2018; Lischka et al., 2018; Redpath et al., 
2017).  
 
The purpose of this article is to further explore the relationship between multi-level wildlife 
conflicts and their management for a case-study around elephant conservation in northern 
Tanzania, and to try to draw out practical recommendations for conservation researchers 
and practitioners. Using a mixed-methods approach we examine how conflict is produced 
at three different levels and assess the implications of these factors for different conflict 
interventions types. Combining conservation conflict frameworks (Madden and McQuinn, 
2014; Rechciński et al., 2019) with the environmental governance literature (Hansson-
Forman et al., 2018; Newig and Fritsch, 2009), these three levels relate to human-wildlife 




Enduimet Wildlife Management Area (WMA) (Figure 5.1) was established in 2007 as a 
community-based conservation initiative. The area which is mainly home to Maasai agro-
pastoralists is part of the Amboseli-Kilimanjaro ecosystem, sandwiched between Amboseli, 
Kilimanjaro, and Arusha national parks. Enduimet is home to a number of large mammal 
populations, including African elephant (Loxodonta africana), and it borders a designated 
wildlife corridor (Henson et al., 2009). The WMA is separated into 11 village zones, a 
photographic tourism zone and a hunting zone. Wildlife tourism generates modest tourism 
revenues which, like other WMAs, is split equally between all villages, and is estimated at 
only USD$0.5 per capita per year (Homewood, 2017), providing some funds for public 
services. Like other WMAs, Enduimet was established through the formation of the 
Authorised Association (a community-based organisation) under the support of village 
councils (Wright, 2017). However its creation and maintenance have been criticised as 
being largely driven by international wildlife NGOs (Mariki et al., 2015; Sachedina, 2010). 
Today, Honeyguide, the acting NGO sponsor, provides funding for an anti-poaching team, 
ranger stations, the equipment used to deter wildlife from farms, and for awareness-raising 
activities at the local level. One trophy hunting operator, the Northern Hunting Company, 
and two photo-tourism operators, Shu'mata Lodge, Kambi ya Tembo (Elerai Tented Lodge), 
currently are established Enduimet (Wright, 2017), with one other investor, Hoopoe Tours, 
having withdrawn in 2008 (Sulle et al., 2011). 
 
As elsewhere in the East African rangelands (Evans and Adams, 2016), conflicts between 
local communities and elephant conservation in Enduimet are rife and damaging. Negative 
human-elephant interactions revolve around crop-raiding, human injury, and retaliatory 
killing (Salerno et al., 2016; Wilfred, 2010). Conflicts between stakeholders – which 
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disproportionally affect women (Mariki, 2016) – revolve around contests over land zoning, 
tensions between villages over tourism income distribution, grievances over unpaid 
compensation, and conflict arising from the WMA decision-making process (Homewood, 
2017). Numerous tourism operators in Enduimet (both past and present) have been 
reported as being involved in some sort of tension (ranging from disagreements, protests 
and legal battles) with individual villages and/or the WMA Authorised Association (Sulle et 
al., 2011; Wright, 2017). Furthermore, wider governance structures are thought to produce 
conflict in Enduimet, including national policies intended to achieve a combination of 
tourism and conservation via market incentives (Bluwstein, 2018), national conservation 
regimes which recentralise conservation (Wright, 2017), and exclusion of people from 
conservation areas, promoted by the narrative of wilderness (Bluwstein, 2018). Conflict 
with conservation, both in Enduimet WMA and across Tanzania, is also shaped by historical 
legacies of local opposition to exclusionary colonial and post-colonial conservation policies 




Primary data collection 
We conducted a mixture of structured and unstructured interviews with a variety of 
stakeholders in Enduimet WMA over the course of two research trips between July and 
September 2016, and April and June 2017. We interviewed key informants from institutions 
and organisations in the local area including: village and district officials (n=11), WMA staff 




Table 6.1: The different levels at which wildlife conflicts are described as being produced, 
with the interacting factors that produce them at each level, and examples from the wider 
literature and Enduimet Wildlife Management Area (WMA) specifically.  











(Kansky et al., 2016; Lute et 
al., 2018; Nyhus, 2016; 
Pooley et al., 2016; Treves 
et al., 2009; van Eeden et 
al., 2017) 
 











(Evans and Adams, 2016; 
Madden and McQuinn, 
2014; Mason et al., 2018; 
Redpath et al., 2013; Young 




Homewood, 2017; Mariki, 
2016; Sulle et al., 2011; 
Wright, 2017) 
Governance structures 
State, Market, Civil 
Society, Policies, 
Institutions, Power, 
Narratives (at local, 
national levels) 
 
(García-Frapolli et al., 2018; 
Hansson-Forman et al., 
2018; Kronenburg García, 
2017; Margulies, 2019; 
Colvin et al., 2015) 
 
(Benjaminsen and 
Bryceson, 2012; Bluwstein, 
2018; Wright, 2017) 
 
These interviews were largely unstructured and opportunistic and varied from formal 
meetings (30 minutes to two hours), to longer, casual discussions during other activities 
(such as when walking, attending village ceremonies or joining ranger patrols). The 
interview discussion points included an overview of the WMA, problems and conflicts in the 
WMA, and interventions implemented or suggested. Where necessary, interviews were 
conducted and translated through a research assistant, and most where transcribed in situ. 
Where permitted, formal interviews were recorded and later transcribed. Casual 
discussions were recorded using notes. 
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To try and capture a wider range of (non-elite) experiences and perspectives, we also 
carried out non-random, opportunistic semi-structured individual (n=60) and small group 
(n=10) interviews with community members from different sociodemographic backgrounds 
and genders across the nine villages in Enduimet WMA (Box 6.1). These were conducted 
wherever convenient, in homes, public spaces, eateries, markets and out herding, and most 
were translated and transcribed from Swahili and Maa to English at source with the help of 
two research assistants. For these informal interviews, which were typically around 20 
minutes in duration but were sometimes longer, we did not follow a prescribed sampling 
technique besides attempting to cover the widest possible range of ages, occupations, and 
household locations, and maintaining a balanced split across genders and villages. The total 
number of interviews was dictated by time available in the field rather than reaching 
saturation (Saunders et al., 2018). The interviews referenced in this chapter are described 
and coded in Table 6.2. 
 




Table 6.2: List of interviews, interviewees and relevant contextual information. Short interviews = <15 minutes, Medium = 15-30 minutes, Long = 30-60 minutes, 








Language Recorded Context Date 
1 Middle 
Elder 
Male Agriculturalist  Semi-
structured 




Male WMA official Structured Individual Extended English & 
Swahili 
















Group Medium Maa No Opportunistic, eatery  August 
2016 













Group Extended Maa, Swahili, 
English 
No Opportunistic, herding May 
2017 
5 Moran Male Pastoralist Semi-
structured 







Informal Group Short Swahili No Opportunistic, village centre, 





Male Village official Semi-
structured 
Individual Medium Maa No Formal meeting, residential August 
2016 
8 Middle Female Housekeeper Semi-
structured 
Individual Medium Maa No Opportunistic, residential August 
2016 
9 Middle Female Agriculturalist Semi-
structured 
















Group Extended English & 
Swahili 






Male NGO official Semi-
Structured 
Individual Medium Swahili No Formal meeting, workplace August 
2016 
12 Middle Male NGO official  Semi-
Structured 




Male WMA ranger Semi-
structured, 
informal 








Village leaders Feedback 
session 
Group Medium Swahili, 
English 








Individual Medium Swahili No Opportunistic, residential August 
2016 
16 Middle Female Hotel owner Semi-
structured 










Group Medium Swahili, 
English 




Male Village official Semi-
structured 
Individual Long Swahili, 
English, 
Partially Formal meeting, residential August 
2016 
19 Middle Male Schoolteacher Semi-
structured 
Individual Medium English Yes Formal meeting, school August 
2016 
20 Middle Female Schoolteacher Semi-
structured 




21 Middle Male Schoolteacher Unstructure
d 






Male Village leader Semi-
structured 




Male Village Leader Semi-
structured 








Individual Long English Partially Formal meeting, tourism camp August 
2016 




Individual Long English Partially Formal meeting, tourism camp August 
2016 






Individual Medium Maa No Opportunistic, residential August 
2016 
28 Middle Female Hotel owner Semi-
structured 




Male Village official Semi-
structured 
Individual  Medium Swahili, 
English 




Male Village elder Semi-
structured 
Individual Medium Maa No Opportunistic, residential August 
2016 
31 Middle Female Business owner Semi-
structured 















Male Agriculturalist  Semi-
structured 





34 Middle Male Village official Semi-
structured 
Individual Medium Swahili, 
English 












Group Short Swahili No Opportunistic, village centre May 
2017 
36 Middle Female Housekeeper Semi-
structured 
Individual Medium Maa No Opportunistic, residential August 
2016 
37 Junior Female Business owner Semi-
structured 
Individual Medium Swahili No Opportunistic, workplace July 2016 
38 Senior Female Elder Semi-
structured 



















Village leaders Feedback 
session 
Group Long Maa, Swahili, 
English 









WMA officials Informal Individual 
and Group 





We also conducted a structured survey with 212 randomly selected male community 
members from three villages (of mixed age and occupations), who were participants in an 
adjoining study (Chapter 7). In that experimental study we only recruited males as cultural 
norms prevented gender mixing (Smith 2015) and rather than split the experiment across 
male and female-only samples (Keane et al. 2016), we opted to maximise predictive power 
and the sample size of one group – males – who were also much more easily recruited (via 
mobile phones). In this survey, we asked participants questions related to their perceptions 
of the WMA and elephants. Survey questions related to elephant tolerance were adapted 
from Kansky et al., (2016) (Appendix 4, Survey sheet). Due to male-sample survey bias, 
whilst staying in the villages we actively sought additional formal and informal interviews 
and casual discussions with female community members from a range of backgrounds.  
Following data analysis, we then revisited the WMA to hold mixed-gender feedback 
sessions – involving results presentation and group discussions – with both community 
members and leaders (in three villages), WMA officials and NGO staff in January 2019.   
 
Ethics statement 
This study received ethical approval from the University of Edinburgh, School of 
GeoSciences Ethics Panel. Ethical best-practice guidelines for conservation social science 
were followed (John et al., 2016). All research participants were required to give their 
informed consent orally before participating in either interviews or the survey. For 
interviews this was achieved via introductory statements and translations where necessary. 
For the survey an information sheet (Appendix 4) was provided – and administered orally. 
For interviews, a voice recorder was only used for key-informant interviews when informed 
consent was given. To protect respondents’ identities we did not collect names and have 
anonymised both the raw data and in-text quotations – which includes not reproducing any 
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personal information which could be traced back to individuals (St John et al., 2016). 
Further, we have presented the list of interviewees (Table 6.2) such that the specific timing 
of interviews, location (such as village) and individuals cannot be identified. Given there 
was the possibility for unequal power dynamics – efforts were made to reiterate and 
emphasise to participants that they did not have to continue with any interview or study if 
they did not feel comfortable (Tindana et al., 2006). For transparency, the lead authors’ 
position as a student researcher (i.e. not a policy-maker or NGO staff worker) was 
emphasised to avoid raising any expectations of possible outcomes (from the perspective of 
research participants). The lead author also returned to the field-site to thank the 
communities who participated in this research and to share and receive feedback. 
 
Secondary data collection 
To identify the conservation narratives used by the organisations involved in the 
governance of the WMA, in September 2018, we conducted a directed content analysis 
(Hsieh and Shannon, 2005) of the web pages and published reports related to Enduimet of 
the NGOs Honeyguide, African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) and The Nature Conservancy 
(TNC), as well as the Tanzanian Tourist Board, the Tanzanian Wildlife Research Institute 
(TAWIRI). For this analysis, we sought to identify any text which we interpreted as 
reproducing conservation narratives identified previously in the literature (Benjaminsen 
and Svarstad, 2010; Bluwstein, 2017; Igoe, 2010; Nesbitt and Weiner, 2001), including 
relating to ‘coexistence’, ‘wilderness’, ‘pristine nature’, or conservation-development ‘win-
wins’. We also reviewed Tanzanian WMA and wildlife-related policy documents and 
undertook an online literature search using Google Scholar to locate additional grey 





We analysed the data from interviews using the software package ‘NVivo’. Again, using a 
directed content analysis approach (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005), we first grouped responses 
according to three pre-determined themes – human-elephant interactions, stakeholder 
interactions and governance structures (Table 6.1). We derived these main themes using a 
grounded theory approach during an analysis of the published conflict literature. We also 
recorded any conflict intervention types that were described as being implemented or 
suggested by respondents. To analyse the survey data relating to perceptions of the WMA 
and elephant tolerance, we calculated the frequency of respondents who gave answers in 




Residents of Enduimet reported high direct economic and well-being costs incurred from 
living alongside elephants. Across the 212 male community members in our survey 96% 
participated in agriculture, and of these, 98% claimed to have experienced some form of 
elephant crop-raiding in the last year (median: 10 crop bags lost, IQ range: 8), 83% claimed 
to experience some or high fear of elephants, 13% had experience elephant-caused injury 
within their families, and 3% reported an elephant-caused death within their families. In 
interviews, we were frequently informed of the high material costs associated with living 
near elephants. For example, one middle elder explained: “I tried to bring myself out of 
poverty by planting crops, but the elephants came and destroyed everything” (Interview 1). 
Attributing a high degree of agency to individual elephants, one WMA official recounted the 
particular ‘tactics’ employed by certain elephants to avoid detection or overcome crop-
protection measures, stating “elephants are very technical – they learn new tricks each day” 
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(Interview 2). One group of young men of the ‘Moran’ age-set (who are the traditional 
guardians of the village) saw their role as defending farms against marauding elephants and 
other wildlife (Interview 3). These respondents, and other Moran (Interviews 3-6), reported 
that that they no longer had the agency to protect their village from elephants. Indeed, we 
were told about (Interviews 7-9), and then shown (Interview 4), a bull elephant that had 
remained in the outskirts of the village after allegedly killing two villagers and two cows in 
recent weeks.  
 
We also found clear variation between individuals and villages over how many elephants 
residents were willing to accept in Enduimet. From our survey of 212 male community 
members, we found that 39% of respondents were willing for the elephant population size 
to stay the same, 34% were willing to accept only a reduced population, 15% were not 
willing to accept any elephants and 13% were willing for the population to increase. During 
the survey, justifications given to support these answers ranged from preserving elephants 
for future generations of Tanzanians, to maintaining local tourism and removing elephants 
to reduce their devastating effects on their livelihoods. This variation seemed to differ 
across villages, with respondents who were willing for larger elephant populations coming 
almost exclusively from one village (Figure 6.1). Respondents also showed variation in when 
they considered lethal control of an elephant by the WMA to be acceptable (Figure 6.2) – 
although for over half of the respondents (53%) lethal control was only acceptable in 




Figure 6.1: The hypothetical elephant population size respondents were willing to 
accept (n=212) 
 
Figure 6.2: The hypothetical situation perceived by respondents as appropriate for 























































Village 1 Village 2 Village 3
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We found that both the WMA rangers and villagers intervene to reduce elephant impacts, 
but that these mitigation techniques are insufficient. From our survey, 77% of respondents 
reported that during the harvest season they spend three or more nights a week guarding 
village crops (median: 7 nights, IQ range: 4). Residents of all three villages attempt this by 
deterring elephant with loud noises, chilli bombs, and electric torches. These materials are 
supplied to each village by the NGO Honeyguide as part of their ‘human-elephant conflict 
toolkit’ (Interviews 10-13) and 52% of respondents reported the provision of such 
equipment, but only 13% of these respondents reporting that this equipment was sufficient 
to deter elephants. A nightly ranger team also responds to villagers’ phone calls and 
messages about crop-raiding elephants (Interviews 10-13), and 45% of respondents 
reported such activities in their area, but of these only 18% reported that the patrols were 
sufficient to deter elephants. Suggestions for feasible interventions given by respondents 
included compensation, fencing, the creation of elephant-only waterholes, a new wildlife-
only zone away from villages, and a reduction in the elephant population. In one meeting, 
both male and female village leaders (Interview 14) pointed to the seemingly successful 
zoning and compensation schemes across the border in Kenya to ask why these could not 
be rolled out in Enduimet – a sentiment also mirrored by other community members 
(Interviews 15-17). Furthermore, we learned that in each village the NGO Honeyguide had 
also previously screened an education wildlife-related film, which 56% of our survey 
respondents recalled watching.  
 
Stakeholder interactions 
From our key informant and semi-structured interviews with stakeholders we identify 
numerous different stakeholder groups (including agriculturalists, tourism operators, NGO 
staff, WMA staff and local government) each with different interests in the conservation of 
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Enduimet’s elephants. However, whilst 71% of survey respondents described the WMA as 
‘very legitimate’ when asked directly, interviews provided a more critical picture, citing 
conflict over land, higher than expected costs, low transparency and unmet promises. One 
village official (Interview 18) explained that for those reliant on agriculture, elephant crop-
raiding poses a severe threat to their income and food security. Three different 
schoolteachers (Interviews 19-21) described how children’s fear of elephants impacts their 
education, but that the WMA income also helps pay for some children’s school fees as well 
as other social services. Whilst we did not find any respondents who thought negatively of 
tourism per se, we did experience negative sentiment towards particular operators and the 
WMA regulations. Two village leaders felt aggrieved that since the creation of the WMA 
they had to share tourism-income generated from their land with each of the other villages, 
which previously had no tourism operations (Interviews 22-23). One tourism operator 
(Interview 24) outlined how livestock grazing in the wildlife zones was bad for their 
business and the WMA overall, whereas another highlighted conflict between the 
pastoralists and wildlife, and with the hunting industry (Interview 25). The local wildlife 
NGO Honeyguide described how their objective was in providing services to help establish a 
self-sustaining community-led model for Enduimet and other WMAs (Interview 26). One 
agriculturalist identified the WMA as an entity separate from the community, with a 
specific wildlife-focused agenda as “the herders of elephants” (Interview 27). A female 
business owner shared similar sentiments, identifying the WMA as “the people who protect 
the forest and wildlife to not cut down any trees and not kill any wild animals” (Interview 
28). Among residents, the different perceived principle beneficiaries of the WMA ranged 
from the tourism operators (Interview 29), to the WMA staff themselves (Interview 30), the 
NGO, (interview 31) to the government (Interview 32), to community members themselves 
(Interview 33). One WMA official summed up these differences by stating that there are 
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four broad perceptions of the WMA within the community – those who (claim) that they do 
not to know about the WMA, those who see benefits in school fees and income it provides, 
those who see it as only for the benefit of wild animals, and those who some advantages of 
the WMA, but who may “blame it without fully understanding it” (Interview 2). 
 
Conflicting interests and perceptions manifest themselves in ongoing negative interactions 
between stakeholders. One tourism operator (Interview 24) recounted a history of hostility 
with a neighbouring village, situated around access to grazing lands. One village official 
(Interview 34) described how aggrieved residents perceive the WMA to have been 
unfaithful by not providing the compensation for crop-damage they had promised and by 
not coming to protect their crops when they said they would. One agriculturalist described 
how the WMA “does not feel our pain” (Interview 35). One mother (from a pastoral 
household) stated “I don’t want to talk about the WMA. I hate the WMA” (Interview 36, 
Enduimet, August 2016). A female business owner found that the WMA was perceived by 
some to focus more on wildlife than people: “the WMA is an organisation for wildlife. I just 
know they usually go around town and look for anyone who attacks animals and wildlife 
and punish them for laws they have broken, but I have never seen people who have been 
hurt by wildlife followed up seriously” (Interview 37). Some residents, such as one female 
community elder, felt like the promised benefits of the WMA initially failed to come to 
fruition or that the true costs were not explained: “we just received the WMA but we did 
not know the impact of [the] WMA. Before, if we knew the impact, we would [have] not 
accepted it here” (Interview 38). Similarly, a farmer, stated, “the WMA has been saying 
there will be benefits of wild animals and it has been 10 years now and people [have] just 
been taking GPS and photos of wild animals but nothing has changed. So where and how 
will these people get help for the destruction?” (Interview 39). Beyond a one-off mobile 
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cinema, occasional village meetings and workshops (organised by Honeyguide), we were 
not told specifically about other stakeholder-based conflict-management interventions, 
such as trust-building, mediation or participatory decision-making offered by the WMA or 
Honeyguide. Lastly, during one feedback workshops, residents in one village jointly 
lamented a perceived reduction in the amount of community consultation over recent 
years (Interview 40).  
 
Governance structures 
From our interviews and from appraising relevant grey literature and online materials, we 
find that stakeholder conflict within Enduimet is also produced the interactions of national 
policy, conservation NGOs and the WMA – and competing aims, narratives and structures.  
 
At the national level the Tanzanian Wildlife Conservation Act (2009) aims: “to protect and 
conserve and administer areas… to enable Tanzania to effectively contribute and benefit 
from international efforts and measures to protect and enhance global bio-diversity”.  
Specifically regarding WMAs, a subsequent objective is to “enhance the conservation of 
wildlife and its habitats outside wildlife protected areas” (United Republic of Tanzania, 
2009). Similarly the conservation aims of NGOs operating in Enduimet are both national 
and international in scope. Honeyguide describe how “between 2009- 2014, Tanzania lost 
60% of its elephant population to poaching”(Honeyguide, 2018). Likewise, another NGO 
which is involved in projects across the region, The Nature Conservancy, presents Enduimet 
as part of a wider conservation plan, as “an important elephant corridor that sits between 
Amboseli National Park in southern Kenya and Kilimanjaro National Park in northern 
Tanzania” (The Nature Conservancy, 2018). Furthermore, Enduimet was initially presented 
in a similar fashion by another big international NGO, the African Wildlife Foundation 
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(AWF,) as part of their ‘Africa Heartlands’ project (Africa Wildlife Foundation, 2018). 
Another cross-border conservation project, ‘Connekt’, associated with the NGO Oikos, has 
also begun to operate in the area (The Citizen, 2019). By contrast, those in the Enduimet 
WMA and local village administrations understandably have a much more local 
conservation outlook. Indeed, from the perspective of the NGO (Interview 26) and the 
WMA staff (Interviews 41), the strategy for Enduimet long-term is in creating a self-
sustaining income and impact reduction model, financed completely by the WMA through 
eco-tourism and student research visits 
 
In line with these different aims, within Enduimet WMA there exists competing governance 
structures. For instance, although the governance structure of the WMA includes elected 
village representatives in the WMA Authorized Association (Community Based 
Organisation), in reality national-level Wildlife Management Areas Regulations (2012) 
dictate the WMA formation process and procedures. These regulations include, among 
other things, rules relating to the application for hunting quotas, income distribution, NGO 
partnerships and commercial partnerships. These WMA-specific regulations also 
compliment the national-level policy on the management of elephants (with regards to 
hunting, self-defence or problem animal control)(United Republic of Tanzania, 2012). 
Although in principle residents in Enduimet agree to the WMA regulations, they do not set 
the rules regarding their interactions with elephants. This reality seems not to be lost on 
one senior female elder who declared that “the WMA are the responsible organisation [for 
elephant caused fatality] because if responsibility was given to the village even the young 
boys could kill the animals, but the WMA does not let them do this” (Interview 38). Again, 
although the village councils can vote on changes to the land-zone plan, the final decision 
rests with the Director of Wildlife at the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (United 
113 
 
Republic of Tanzania, 2012). By contrast, the operating NGO Honeyguide plays an 
influential role in the running and strategic planning of the WMA and derives its funding 
internationally from a mix of small, institutional and high-net worth donors, including The 
African Wildlife Foundation, The Nature Conservancy and USAID (Honeyguide, 2017).  
 
Across these different institutions, different conservation narratives are also projected. For 
the government establishing Wildlife Management Areas was “for the purposes of effecting 
community based conservation” (United Republic of Tanzania, 2009). In interviews, such 
narratives of community conservation were espoused by those administrating the WMA 
(Interview 41). By contrast, within the online marketing materials for tourism in Enduimet 
we also find the reproductions of much more wilderness-based conservation narratives. As 
the WMA website describes “Untamed, [west Kilimanjaro] remains comparatively 
unchanged since man and beast first set foot into its interior. For centuries the Maasai have 
co-existed in the area.” (Enduimet WMA, 2018). From our interviews with tourist operators 
we saw how these narratives play-out in practice, with some tourists reportedly perceiving 
that too many livestock in the wildlife area or signs of development “disrupts their 
wilderness experience” (Interview 24). Finally, in their online materials Honeyguide 
characterises the conflict as revolving around how “human populations grow, natural areas 
are reduced, and human-wildlife conflict increases” (Honeyguide, 2018). These narratives 
are similar to those presented online by other NGOs, such as The Nature Conservancy who 
describe conflict arising from “grazing cattle and insatiable goats”, “human encroachment” 






In Enduimet WMA we find that although most management effort is focused at the local 
level, such as in trying to reduce elephant impacts or change attitudes, much of the conflict 
is shaped by processes at larger scales. These include the interactions of different 
stakeholders with varying interests, regional conservation governance structures, national 
policy and locally-acting NGOs. These interacting levels of conflict production, behaviours 
and interventions are visualised in Figure 6.3. 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Different levels at which elephant conflict is produced in Enduimet WMA 
and examples of the interacting factors and behaviours within each level that 
produce and manage conflicts – with implemented and recommended 





Our finding that elephant-related conflicts and behaviours at the local level are in part 
produced by wider governance structures is to be expected given the inherently political 
underpinning of environmental management (Adams, 2015; Colvin et al., 2015) and 
previous findings in both Enduimet (Bluwstein, 2017) and elsewhere in East Africa (Evans 
and Adams, 2016; Fletcher, 2017; Kamau, 2018). For instance, changes in agrarian 
economies and land-use on a wider scale have been found to shape human-wildlife 
interactions and conflict at a local scale (Margulies and Karanth, 2018; Roucouz et al. 2017). 
In Tanzania, market demand for eco-tourism, trophy hunting (Wright 2016), and 
accumulation of wilderness areas (Bluwstein, 2018) have all been presented as drivers in 
the creation of WMAs and the continuation of conflict within them (Benjaminsen and 
Bryceson, 2012). As we and others find, the negative interactions between people and 
elephants, and between stakeholders in Enduimet are produced by the implementation of 
the WMA governance structure, which was devised nationally and imposed locally through 
both local and international institutions (Bluwstein et al., 2016; Moyo et al., 2016). Indeed, 
the formation of Enduimet was not a local policy solution to a local problem.  
 
As Wright (2017) finds, particular elite actors in and around Enduimet, from tourism 
operators, to NGOs and politicians, have played pivotal role in dictating how this conflict 
plays-out. Hence, under the governance mode framework proposed by Hansson-Forman et 
al., (2018), elephant conflict in Enduimet WMA is produced through a mix of centralised 
state governance and public-private governance, with little local self-governance and 
through interactions between policy, institutions and actors at local, regional and national 
levels. Although Tanzanian state-governance structures have mediated human-wildlife 
interactions since colonial times (Anderson and Giblin, 2006; Bluwstein, 2018; Neumann, 
1992), this particular governance structure is new in aiming to mitigate conflicts through a 
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tourism-driven, market-based conservation economy and sustainable development agenda 
(Homewood, 2017). But as this study confirms, this apparent win-win narrative – embodied 
the NGO and WMA online reports and communications – has not yet materialised. 
Moreover, we also find that other conservation related narratives found in the external 
communications of the WMA and NGO (which focus around wilderness, policing and 
human-wildlife conflict), differ to those described by the WMA and NGO staff working on 
the ground (who focused more around community support, trade-offs, human-human 
conflict and service provision). These discrepancies may somewhat be explained by the 
disjuncture between conservation organisations needing to appeal to international donors 
through particular narratives, whilst solving problems on the ground which may not always 
align with these narratives (Igoe, 2010; Nesbitt and Weiner, 2001)    
 
Beyond wider governance structures, we also find that conflict around elephants in 
Enduimet is produced through differences in local stakeholder interests, perceptions, and 
resulting behaviours – again corroborating previous findings in Enduimet (Homewood, 
2017; Mariki et al., 2015; Wright, 2017) and East Africa (Evans and Adams, 2016). Like 
elsewhere in Tanzania, we find that it is not just a lack of technical fixes that is continuing 
the conflict, but also broken promises (Mabele, 2017), perceived lack of care, lost control 
over village lands, and reduced autonomy (Goldman, 2011; Mariki et al., 2015). These 
insights add to findings describing conflicts in Enduimet over land-allocation for tourism 
operators (Wright, 2016), those rooted in confusion over the original land-zoning plan 
(Homewood, 2017), and those stemming from non-participatory and non-transparent 
decision-making processes (Bluwstein et al., 2016). Indeed, such factors have been 
considered inevitable given the potentially unattainable promises made during the creation 




Despite the influential roles of both governance and stakeholder interactions, it is also clear 
that negative perceptions of both elephants and the WMA are also produced directly via 
negative interactions with elephants. Like other findings in Enduimet (Salerno et al., 2016; 
Wilfred, 2010) and in similar contexts in East Africa (Kamau, 2018), we identify significant 
economic and well-being impacts resulting from living alongside elephants. A robust 
assessment of these interactions would require more comprehensive measures of factors 
such as tolerance, retaliatory killings, and wildlife impacts (e.g., Pozo et al. 2017) and would 
test the independent relationships between them (Kansky et al., 2016). However, we are 
confident in concluding that stakeholder conflict over elephants – and the associated killing 
of wildlife – in Enduimet is likely shaped by these negative interactions, even if not 
everyone incurs the direct costs. Indeed, such relationships between impacts, behaviours 
and conflicts have been widely identified in many other similar contexts (Young et al., 2010; 
Evans and Adams 2008).  
 
These finding have important implications for conflict management and contribute to the 
growing literature highlighting the existence of multi-levels in conservation conflicts 
(Ceaușu et al., 2018; Lischka et al., 2018; Rechciński et al., 2019). Firstly, given that conflict 
over elephants are likely (at least in part) to be shaped by negative human-elephant 
impacts, we suggest that interventions to mitigate those impacts locally are appropriate, 
but currently insufficient. Indeed, the strategies adopted by the NGO and WMA 
organisation who provide interventions in Enduimet, revolving around livelihood protection 
and deterrence, have been found to be effective in reducing wildlife impacts and increasing 
tolerance in other contexts (Kansky et al., 2016; van Eeden et al., 2017). Likewise, making 
good on the promise of compensation for crop-damage, and increasing the transparency of 
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decision-making might increase trust and reduce hostility towards the WMA (Mabele, 2017; 
Young et al., 2016a) – particularly as in this context grievances around unfulfilled promises 
are especially pertinent (Homewood, 2017). Similarly, placing a higher focus on protecting 
people from elephants, not just elephants from people, might help alleviate tensions (ESPA, 
2017). Market-based mechanisms for incentivising local protection of problematic species 
can be successful (Lindsey et al., 2014; Nelson et al., 2013). Indeed, Tanzanian WMAs have 
been shown to have had a positive impact on wildlife numbers (Lee and Bond, 2018). 
However, the high level of tax on tourism-derived income remains prohibitive (Sulle and 
Banka, 2017), and as we and others find, these mainly technical and financial interventions 
struggle to alleviate the social and governmental roots of elephant conflict (Brehony et al., 
2018). Mapping out the different interacting drivers, behaviours and levels of conflict (such 
as attempted here in Figure 6.3) might also help inform where best to target behaviourally-
informed interventions. These could also include social marketing approaches (Veríssimo et 
al., 2019), such as promoting wildlife guardians (Hazzah et al., 2014), and timely ‘nudges’ 
(Reddy et al., 2017; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) such as SMS-based elephant warning 
systems (Sarkar et al., 2016). 
 
Given the sustained social conflict, more stakeholder-engagement (Redpath et al., 2017), 
mediation (Reed and Ceno, 2015) and participatory decision-making (De Vente et al., 2016; 
Fletcher, 2017) might also prove effective. However, in any situation where national-level 
policy conservation interacts with local interests, stakeholder-engagement approaches are 
known to be subject to the nature of within-state democratic institutions and governance 
structures (Hansson-Forman et al., 2018; Newig and Fritsch, 2009). In Enduimet, the WMA 
structure provides potential space for deliberative and participatory decision-making in the 
form of the Authorized Association representing village councils. However, in Enduimet this 
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process clearly is not working seamlessly, given the history of physical protests, non-
compliance, court battles, and general levels of resentment towards the WMA (Homewood, 
2017; Wright, 2017). In large group feedback meetings with village leaders and community 
members, Enduimet residents themselves identified the need for more community-WMA 
meetings and communication. Indeed, such consultations, more effective collaborative 
decision making, and even professional mediation (de Vente et al., 2016), might help 
resolve these conflicts (prior to legal battles). These process may enable member villages to 
restructure some of the WMA systems, such as revenue sharing and access restrictions, and 
introduce adaptive management plans (ESPA, 2017), which have proved effective in other 
contexts (Nuno et al., 2014). However, any locally-agreed solutions may be constrained by 
not only local governance capacity (Balint and Mashinya, 2006), but variations in external 
markets, such as for wildlife tourism and hunting (Wright, 2016), and the preferences of 
donors and NGOs who co-fund operations within the WMA. For instance, even if local 
stakeholders in Enduimet came to an agreement on the population size or management of 
elephants, this agreement may not reconcile with the conservation objectives or narratives 
of those outside of Enduimet (including donors and NGOs) (Sterling et al., 2017), and with 
international political agreements (Reed and Ceno, 2015). Local decisions may therefore 
not go unchallenged (López-Bao et al., 2017). This is important because the ability for local 
stakeholders to influence local environmental governance is essential for effective 
participatory decision-making (De Vente et al., 2016; von Essen and Hansen, 2015). 
Moreover, elsewhere the role of NGOs in maintaining, or exacerbating conflict elsewhere 
has been well documented (Hodgson et al., 2018; Veríssimo et al., 2015). Indeed, in some 
instances it is possible that non-intervention is more appropriate. Furthermore we suggest 
the role of narratives presented in donor-facing NGO communications in shaping conflicts 
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deserves further exploration, as does the potential for interventions to target at actors 
outside of the local context (such as donors, advocates or policy-makers). 
 
In short, we suggest that in Enduimet, and likely in many places globally, conflict 
management and behaviour change is attempted more via efforts to realign stakeholder 
interest with conservation objectives through incentives and wildlife impact mitigation, and 
less via efforts to realign conservation objectives with stakeholder interests through 
collaborative governance. Hence, alongside the type of local decision-making process (De 
Vente et al., 2016; Sterling et al., 2017), the wider governance mode (Colvin et al., 2015; 
Hansson-Forman et al., 2018) is likely to constrain both the nature and efficacy of 




- Researchers should consider the multi-level drivers which shape conflict 
behaviours. 
- Both researchers and decision-makers should explore how influences from outside 
the local context may constrain local management possibilities. 
- Conflict managers could consider how, and when, management decision-making 
could be made more participatory. 
- Researchers could better incorporate behavioural insights into intervention design 





Chapter 7: Intervener trustworthiness predicts cooperation with 
conservation interventions in an elephant conflict public goods 
game 
 
This chapter has been submitted to People and Nature, as:  
Baynham-Herd, Z., Redpath, S., Bunnefeld, N., Molony, T. & Keane, A. Intervener 
trustworthiness predicts cooperation with conservation interventions in an 
elephant conflict public goods game.  
 
7.1 Abstract 
Conservation conflicts exist in complex socio-ecological systems and are damaging for both 
people and wildlife. Accordingly, there is much interest in designing interventions to 
manage them more effectively, change behaviour, and achieve better ecological and social 
outcomes. Conflict management is influenced by levels of stakeholder trust in both natural 
resource managers and organisations, which in turn is shaped by perceptions of their 
trustworthiness. However, experimental studies of how the different facets of 
trustworthiness shape behavioural responses to management interventions are rare in 
conflict settings, and are important in providing evidence to inform interventions. Here, we 
develop an experimental, framed public goods game to test how support for otherwise 
identical elephant conflict interventions varies with perceptions of the trustworthiness of 
two different intervening groups – a community group or a conservation organisation – and 
compare game behaviour to pre- and post-game interviews. Results from three agro-
pastoral communities (n= 212 participants) in northern Tanzania show that participants 
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cooperate more with interveners they perceive to be more trustworthy. Results also 
suggest that different aspects of trustworthiness matter differentially – with perceptions of 
interveners’ integrity and benevolence more strongly predicting cooperation than 
perceptions of their ability. The findings suggest that trust-building, and greater 
consideration of who is best placed to intervene in conflicts, may help improve natural 
resource management, increase stakeholder support for interventions, and more 
effectively change conflict-related behaviours. This study also further demonstrates how 
experimental games offer opportunities to test responses to management interventions 




Conservation conflicts are damaging for biodiversity, livelihoods and human well-being 
globally (Pooley et al., 2016; Redpath et al., 2013). Accordingly, there is much interest in 
developing more effective interventions to address them and more effectively change 
human behaviour (Chapter 3). Conservation conflicts can occur wherever conservation and 
other human objectives clash (Redpath et al., 2013), and although they often revolve 
around wildlife impacts or resource-use restrictions, they exist within complex socio-
ecological systems (Mason et al. 2018), which are shaped by evolving ecological processes 
and stakeholder relations (Elston et al., 2014; Mason et al., 2017). Consequently, different 
stakeholders respond differently to different actors and interveners within conservation 
conflicts (Marshall et al., 2007; Mishra et al., 2017) and one important factor known to 
mediate these relationships is trust (Sharp and Curtis, 2014; Stern, 2008b; Young et al., 
2016a). In particular, levels of stakeholder trust – in other resource users, managers and 
institutions – have been shown to influence many aspects of conservation management, 
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from cooperation (Davenport et al., 2007; Raymond, 2006; Rudolph and Riley, 2014; Smith 
et al., 2013) and compliance (Hamm et al., 2016; Rudolph and Riley, 2017; Schroeder et al., 
2017) to support for interventions and resolution (Cvetkovich and Winter, 2003; Sjölander-
Lindqvist et al., 2015; Young et al., 2016b). These conservation-specific examples 
complement a rich wider literature demonstrating the importance of trust in shaping 
cooperation with interveners and institutions (e.g., Siegrist 2000; Hough et al. 2010; Pirson 
& Malhotra 2010; Terpstra 2011). 
 
Conceptualisations of trust vary by approach and context (Colquitt et al., 2007; Thielmann 
and Hilbig, 2015). However, a widely accepted definition in conservation (Riley et al., 2018; 
Young et al., 2016a) describes trust as a product of social relationships whereby actors 
“accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviours of 
others” (Rousseau et al. 1998:395). This definition draws specific attention to the role of 
trustworthiness, which is itself defined in terms of an actor’s beliefs about others (Sharp et 
al., 2013). Trustworthiness encompasses perceptions of an actor’s ability to carry out an 
action, their benevolence (i.e., their intention to act in the interest of the trustor) and their 
integrity (i.e., their adherence to an acceptable set of principles) (Mayer et al., 1995). 
Alongside risk, these perceptions of trustworthiness are thought to shape levels of trust in 
both individuals (interpersonal trust) and organisations (organisational trust) (Davenport et 
al., 2007; Pirson and Malhotra, 2010; Riley et al., 2018). In an additional framework, Stern & 
Coleman (2015) identify four forms of trust: dispositional trust (i.e., the general tendency to 
trust others), rational trust (i.e., trust based on calculated decision-making), affinitive trust 
(i.e., trust based on relationships between trustor and trustee) and procedural trust (i.e., 




These trust-related concepts have been operationalised and explored widely in natural 
resource management research (Hamm, 2017; Sharp and Curtis, 2014). For instance, 
regarding trustworthiness specifically, perceptions of a resource managers’ ability are 
considered formative in assessments of rational trust, whereas perceptions of their 
integrity and benevolence tend to inform assessments of affinitive trust (Stern and 
Coleman, 2015). Likewise, trustworthiness is considered an important determinant of 
perceptions of procedural justice, which alongside perceptions of competence, is thought 
to dictate levels of organisational trust (Riley et al., 2018; Rudolph and Riley, 2017). In one 
study, perceptions of the trustworthiness of fishery management (including perceptions of 
deception) predicted rates of compliance (Shirley and Gore, 2019), and in another, trust in a 
state wildlife agency was more strongly predicted by perceptions of procedural fairness 
than technical competence (Riley et al., 2018). Hence it appears likely that the different 
components of trustworthiness influence trust and conflict-related behaviours 
differentially. However, experimental evidence testing the relationship between 
trustworthiness and behavioural responses to interventions remains rare in wildlife 
conservation settings. Such studies are important for testing behavioural theory and 
management assumptions whilst providing much needed evidence to inform conservation 
interventions (Pollard et al., 2019; St. John et al., 2014; Sutherland and Wordley, 2017). 
 
The purpose of this study is to experimentally test the importance of three components of 
trustworthiness – ability, benevolence and integrity (Stern and Coleman, 2015) – in shaping 
stakeholder support for conflict-reducing interventions in a conservation context. To do so, 
we use a novel experimental public goods game, framed around elephant conflict 
interventions, in a Tanzanian Community Wildlife Management Area (WMA). We test 
whether cooperation with interventions is linked to the identity of the intervening group 
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(organisation), and perceptions of their trustworthiness measured using Likert-type 
questions in pre-game surveys. These results are then contextualised using post-game 
individual and group debrief interviews to help inform conflict intervention best practice. 
By drawing upon classic games in behavioural economics (Cookson, 2000; Hasson et al., 
2010) and recent games in conservation research (Redpath et al. 2018), we also 
demonstrate a novel means to study conflict interventions.  
 
Study Area 
We conducted our study across three villages in Enduimet Wildlife Management Area 
(WMA), northern Tanzania (Figure x.1) – part of the Amboseli-Kilimanjaro ecosystem where 
conflicts between local communities and elephant (Loxodonta africana) conservation are 
rife and damaging (Bluwstein et al., 2016; Homewood, 2017). Here, communities derive 
some material benefits from conservation-related income, and a local conservation 
organisation works with the government to administer the WMA (Wright, 2017). Conflict 
interventions range from WMA officers using vehicles to deter wildlife, to them distributing 
torches and firecrackers to local young men of the ‘Moran’ age-set – who in Maasai culture 
are the traditional defenders of villages from both people and wildlife. Moran frequently 
form small groups to guard village crops from elephants and other herbivores at night, but 
crop-raiding is still common. Compensation payments have been promised for wildlife-
related damage or human deaths, but none have been delivered (Homewood, 2017) and 
there is a history of distrust and resentment towards tourism operators and the WMA 







To ease game and participant organisation in the rural field setting and maximise statistical 
power, our experimental public goods game employed a within-subject design (n=212) with 
four players assembled around a physical board. Following classic public-good games 
(Cookson 2000), players were instructed that the total amount of tokens they each 
amassed during each game would determine their earnings. In each of five rounds, 
participants were endowed with five crop-tokens, and one additional token that they could 
choose to a) contribute towards elephant-guarding (at a personal cost in income, but to a 
group benefit in reduced crop-loss) or, to b) keep for themselves (personal benefit, group 
cost). The two treatments differed only in the description of the group providing the 
elephant guarding: government-led WMA or community-led Moran (Supporting 
Information, Game design). Although per-round there was a 50% chance each player 
incurred crop-raiding, the damage incurred (i.e. number of tokens lost) decreased in 
proportion to the total elephant-guarding contribution (Equation 1). 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 1: 𝐶 = 𝑃(5 − 𝑁) 
C = Expected loss from crop-raiding 
P = Probability of crop-raid (0.5) 
N = Number of cooperators (represented as number of guarders) 
 
For any one player, the expected personal benefit from cooperating – public marginal per 
capita return (MPCRpublic) (Hasson et al., 2010) – was half a token, which was less than the 
expected personal benefit of not cooperating (MPCRprivate), which was one token. Both were 
less than the total group benefit of any one player’s cooperation (𝑛 × 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑅𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐) which 
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was two tokens. Hence, the game satisfies the conditions for a social dilemma (Equation 2), 
since for rational individuals, it pays less to cooperate (Table 7.1). 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 2: 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑅𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 < 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 < 𝑛 × 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑅𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐    
n= Number of players 
Each group played the game twice (with the order of the treatment rotated). Players were 
allowed to communicate, but not in regards to their decisions, which were made 
anonymously, and which were never disclosed (Aswani et al., 2013). Players were 
compensated 5,000Tsh (approximately 2.20USD) for participating, and received an 
additional 100Tsh per token amassed (max 6,000Tsh).  The games themselves were often 
were played in a relaxed manner within the local meeting hall in each village (Figure 7.1). 
Due to the fact that laughter was common throughout the game and that a few participants 
likened the game to a local game played in their youth, we are confident that the exercise 
was understood by most players to be what we presented it as – game, rather than a test. 
 
Figure 7.1: Players receiving instructions from a research assistant in a village meeting room 




Between April and June 2017, male participants from three villages in Enduimet WMA were 
recruited from randomly ordered lists of inhabitants known to be present in each village, 
created in consultation with village chairpersons (Appendix 5, Participant recruitment). As 
cultural norms prevented gender mixing (Smith, 2015), rather than split the experiment 
across male and female-only samples (e.g., Keane et al. 2016), we opted to maximise the 
sample size within one group – males – who were also more dominant in wildlife guarding 
(Homewood et al., 2009) and more easily recruited (via mobile phones). We thereby 
maximised statistical power to detect effects within this group at the cost of possibly richer 
information and greater generalisability. Participants were interviewed before and after 
each game with an orally-administered pre-game survey and a structured post-game 
debrief interview. 
 
The individual pre-game survey included a range of socio-demographic questions including 
age, education, wealth and occupation. Three components of trustworthiness – ability, 
integrity and benevolence – were each measured using 4-point Likert-type questions. We 
also recorded self-reported levels of wildlife damage, fear of elephants, and four measures 
of elephant tolerance. Post-game structured debrief interviews with groups (20 groups, 80 
participants) and individuals (n=132) explored participant understanding and the factors 





Table 7.1: Game pay-off table showing that each player (in groups of four) were given five tokens representing crops, and one token representing 
resources which they could choose to a) contribute towards elephant guarding (at a personal cost in income but group benefit in reduced crop loss), 
or to b) keep for themselves (personal benefit, group cost). For any one player, regardless of what others do, the individual pay-off from cooperation 
was half a token (realised by reduced crop loss risk), but the cost of cooperation was one token (MPCR = 0.5). Accordingly a Nash equilibrium is 
formed at no cooperation, which is less than the Pareto Optimum (full cooperation) 
No. other 
cooperators 




























0 6 0.5 -1 -4 -2 3 15 0 -5 -2.5 3.5 14 
1 6 0.5 -1 -3 -1.5 3.5 16 0 -4 -2 4 15 
2 6 0.5 -1 -2 -1 4 17 0 -3 -1.5 4.5 16 




We conducted our analyses in ‘R’ (R Development Core Team, 2016) using the statistical 
package ‘lme4’. As individual levels of cooperation did not vary substantially between 
rounds (Appendix 4, Figure A4.1) we summed the cooperation score for each player over 
the five rounds of each treatment. To test whether cooperation differed between 
intervening groups, a priori predictors of cooperation and socio-demographic variables, we 
ran a series of generalised linear mixed effect models with binomial errors (Table 7.2). 
Unique identifiers for groups (n=53) and participants (n=212) were modelled with 
independent random intercepts reflecting the grouping structure within the data. The three 
items of trustworthiness (Cronbach’s alpha 0.77, 0.95 CI: 0.73-0.80), and four items of 
tolerance (Cronbach’s alpha 0.65, 0.95 CI: 0.57-0.71), were each aggregated by summation 
using their weighted factor scores generated from factor analysis with the ‘R’ packages 
‘nFactors’ and ‘psych’ (Appendix 4, Data analysis). To identify the frequency of prevailing 
reasoning themes in the post-game interviews, we used directed content analysis (Hsieh 











Table 7.2: List of explanatory variables included in each model (inclusion marked by ‘x’), the 
source of data, and descriptive summaries. 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Levels Source Descriptive 
summary (n) 
Model 





































0.725, SD = 1.69), 
WMA (Mean= -
0.725, SD = 1.60), 
Range = -1-1 
 x    
Trustworthiness: 
Ability 
 Survey, 4-point Likert 
scale, (numeric) 
Moran (Mean= 
2.94, SD = 1.09), 
WMA (Mean= 
2.26, SD = 0.96), 
Range = 1-4 
  x x x 
Trustworthiness: 
Benevolence 
 Survey, 4-point Likert 
scale, (numeric) 
Moran (Mean= 
3.21, SD = 1.12), 
WMA (Mean 
2.08, SD = 1.03), 
Range = 1-4 
  x x x 
Trustworthiness: 
Integrity 
 Survey, 4-point Likert 
scale, (numeric) 
Moran (Mean= 
2.95, SD = 1.17), 
WMA (Mean= 
2.46, SD = 1.19), 
Range = 1-4 
  x x x 
Agriculturalist  Survey, self-reported 
proportion of 
livelihood that is 
agriculture, 
converted to 1-5 
scale (numeric) 
Mean: 3.07, 
Range = 1-5, SD = 
1.13 







Scores) from 4 
survey questions 
(Kansky and Knight, 
2014) (numeric) 
Mean= 0.00, 
Range = -1-1, SD = 
1.52 
   x x 
Crop loss  Survey,  self-
reported annual 
crops loss to 
elephants (number 
of bags) (numeric) 
Mean= 16.87, 
Range: 1-90, SD = 
0.87  









None (n= 36), 
Some (n=97), 
Frequent (n=79) 










Survey, by traditional 








    x 
 Wealth Very Poor, 
Poor, Not 
Poor, Rich 
As determined by 
village leaders with 
reference to 
livestock, houses, 
and other assets 
(Keane et al., 2016) 
(factor) 














    x 
Village 1, 2, 3 Survey, (factor) Village 1 (n=80), 
Village 2 (n=68), 
Village 3, (n=64) 









In the framed public goods game, the proportion of participants cooperating was 
consistently higher in the local group treatment (“Moran”) than the Wildlife Management 
Area (“WMA”) treatment. In the absence of other covariates, treatment was a significant 
predictor of cooperation, and the odds that participants cooperate with the Moran were 
60% greater than for the WMA (p < 0.01, odds ratio 0.41, 0.95 CI: 0.32-0.54) (Model 1).  
 
Levels of cooperation corresponded closely to perceptions of the trustworthiness of each 
group. When our aggregate trustworthiness score was included alongside treatment 
(Model 2), the effect size of treatment was no longer distinguishable from zero – suggesting 
that the effect of treatment is mediated by perceived levels of trustworthiness (Appendix 4,  
Figures A4.4-A4.4). When aggregate trustworthiness was replaced as a predictor in the 
model by the three component measures (Model 3), benevolence and integrity were found 
to be significant predictors of cooperation, but ability was not. Integrity was the stronger 
predictor of cooperation (odds ratio 1.88, 0.95 CI: 1.55-2.28), with an odds ratio 25% 
greater than for benevolence (odds ratio 1.50, 0.95 CI: 1.20-1.87). 
 
To explore the robustness of this finding, we ran further models which included a range of a 
priori predictors of cooperation and socio-demographic variables (Table 7.2). Assessments 
of the intervener’s benevolence and integrity continued to be the strongest positive 
predictors of cooperation. Elephant tolerance, experience of crop loss, and elephant fear, 
did not predict cooperation. The extent to which participants self-identified as agriculturist 
(livelihood) positively predicted cooperation in Model 4, but this effect was removed when 
other socio-demographic variables (age, village, education) were included in Model 5 
(Figure 7.2). No interaction effects were observed for any variable with treatment. In Model 
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5, the variables which predicted cooperation levels included: benevolence (odds ratio, 1.63, 
0.95 CI: 1.31-2.03), integrity (odds ratio, 1.78, 0.95 CI: 1.46-2.18) and education (primary) 
(odds ratio, 3.48, 0.95 CI: 0.54-22.10; positive associations) and order (WMA first) (odds 
ratio 0.29, 0.95 CI: 0.12-0.71) and wealth (rich) (odds ratio 0.14, 0.95 CI: 0.02-0.80; negative 
associations) (Figure x.1). These results suggest that, accounting for every other variable, 
the estimated probability of cooperation increases 1.78 times per unit increase in integrity-
related trustworthiness, which is 9% greater than the 1.63 increase in likelihood of 
cooperation per unit increase of benevolence-related trustworthiness. 
 
In post-game individual debriefs (n=132), respondents most often justified their game 
decision by referring to the perceived effectiveness of the intervening group (55% of 
respondents), compared to perceived benevolence (17%), integrity (17%), general benefits 
of cooperation (20%), wildlife conservation (2%) and game strategy (2%). Reasoning related 
to the effectiveness of the WMA, and the Moran as guarders was given in equal measure, 
but benevolence- (13% more people) and integrity-based reasoning (6% more people) was 




Figure 7.2: Results from a generalised linear mixed effects model (Model 5), 
showing the estimated conditional effects of each predictor variable on 
cooperation within games. Filled dots represent model coefficient estimates 
converted to odds ratios, which show the expected change in likelihood of 
cooperation when each continuous variable increases by a unit of one, or when 
each factor variable changes level from a baseline (unfilled dots). Whiskers 
represent standard errors (95% CI), and variables with whiskers that do not cross 
zero are those predicted by the model to associate with cooperation (effect size is 






Figure 7.3: The proportion of participants in individual post-game debriefs (n=132), 
who justified in-game cooperation with reasoning related to: the ability, 
benevolence or integrity of themselves or the intervening groups (bar colour), the 




This study of agro-pastoralists in Tanzania affirms that the perceived trustworthiness of the 
group delivering a conservation conflict intervention predicts levels of stakeholder 





Our finding that trustworthiness predicts cooperation was unsurprising given previous 
findings and the nature of public-goods games. Indeed, in both public goods games (Bouma 
et al., 2008) and natural resource management (Davenport et al., 2007), cooperation is 
known to vary with levels of trust held between participants. Trust is also known to heavily 
shape stakeholder responses to wildlife management efforts, including where these efforts 
are contested (Riley et al., 2018; Schroeder et al., 2017; Young et al., 2016a). However, in 
some cases, higher trust actually leads to reduced engagement with interveners, as 
individuals have confidence that the interveners will act competently, and in their interest, 
without their involvement (Smith et al., 2013; Terpstra, 2011). In such situations, individuals 
are exercising vulnerability (and thus displaying organisational trust) (Pirson and Malhotra, 
2010; Riley et al., 2018) by not engaging. By contrast, in our game, participants exercised 
vulnerability (regarding expected earnings) by cooperating. Furthermore, through 
triangulation with debrief interviews, we are confident that greater cooperation in the 
games did reflect more confidence in the competence and intentions of each intervening 
group.  
 
What was unexpected however, was our finding that perceptions of integrity and 
benevolence were stronger predictors of cooperation than ability. From previous studies, 
(Riley et al., 2018; Rudolph and Riley, 2017) it is clear that beyond rational outcome-based 
assessments, perceptions of intervener integrity and benevolence are also important in 
dictating behavioural responses to wildlife interventions, but the relative importance of 
each construct is less clear. For instance, perceptions of managers’ trustworthiness 
(including perceived levels of deception) have been shown to influence stakeholder 
compliance (Shirley and Gore, 2019) and cooperation or support for interventions (Hamm, 
2017; Ordoñez-Gauger et al., 2018). In, some quantitative (Hamm et al. 2016), and 
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qualitative (Wald et al., 2018) studies of the different measures of trustworthiness, the 
relative importance of each construct has been found to be equally important. However, in 
other related studies, perceptions of procedural justice – which are in turn shaped by 
perceptions of trustworthiness, notably benevolence, (Rudolph and Riley, 2017) – have 
overshadowed perceptions of managers’ technical competence in predicting levels of 
cooperation or engagement with management interventions (Rudolph and Riley, 2014; 
Smith et al., 2013). Hence, both our results and those from the wider literature suggest that 
the relative importance of different trustworthiness-constructs on responses to conflict 
interventions may be context-dependent. 
 
From our interviews, and from previous studies in the region, there appear to be numerous 
factors which are likely to shape the (often negative) perceptions of the trustworthiness of 
the local conservation managers studied here. In this study location (Homewood, 2017), 
and across Tanzania, trust in conservation has been depleted by community displacement, 
resource restrictions, and broken promises (Bluwstein et al., 2016; Davis and Goldman, 
2019; Moyo et al., 2016; Wright, 2017). Elsewhere, interpersonal trust in natural resource 
managers has been found to be shaped by perceptions of their responsiveness, honesty, 
and dedication (Davenport et al., 2007). In our interviews, respondents commonly 
identified a lack of transparency, compassion and accountability within the WMA. Such 
experiences might explain the greater importance placed on perceptions of benevolence 
and integrity, which inform affinitive-trust based assessments (Stern and Coleman, 2015). 
Nonetheless, conceivably our analysis failed to capture the effect of ability – perhaps due to 
the relatively lower variation observed for this component. Indeed, in debrief interviews 
interveners’ ability was by far the justification most commonly used by participants to 
explain their game behaviours. However, we cannot ascertain to what extent post-game 
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justifications reflect post-hoc rationalisations or actual drivers of game behaviour. Likewise, 
extrapolations from our male-only sample are limited given that intervention preferences 
(Keane et al., 2016), wildlife risk perceptions (Gore and Kahler, 2012) and institutional trust 
(Xiao and McCright, 2015) have previously been shown to differ between genders, and that, 
where wildlife-related gender roles are pronounced, there is significant influence and 
interplay between genders on wildlife-related behaviours (Lowassa et al., 2012). Hence, 
rather than confidently identifying which trustworthiness constructs generally matter more, 
this study highlights that they likely matter differentially.    
 
Our experimental approach offers a novel avenue for exploring the facets of trust in 
conservation conflict interventions. Previous studies (Hamm et al., 2016; Smith et al., 2013; 
Wald et al., 2018) have gained rich insights into stakeholder cooperation or support using 
surveys or interviews, whereas here we measured behaviour within a stylised game. Games 
enable experimental manipulation, but unrealistic incentives can lead to poor external 
validity (i.e., low correspondence to real-world behaviour) (Redpath et al., 2018). Here, this 
pitfall is minimised as our conclusions rest on relative, not absolute, differences in 
cooperation between groups. Likewise, although within-game behaviour can be influenced 
by other factors (e.g., group dynamics, or game-order, or game-understanding) (Aswani et 
al., 2013; Cookson, 2000), here the lack of variation in cooperation across rounds 
demonstrates consistency in decision-making throughout the game, and our mixed-effects 
model accounted for between-group variation. Moreover, when using experimental games 
to study behaviour it is good practice to draw upon qualitative data to validate and 
contextualise the experimental results (Redpath et al., 2018). Previous analyses of 
trustworthiness have used multiple measures of each component, which is more reliable 
than relying on single measures as we did here (Hamm & Hoffman 2016). However, 
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triangulation between pre-game interviews, game behaviour and post-game debriefs gives 
us confidence that players were making their decisions based upon their own experiences 
with each group and were interpreting the target concepts in the intended manner. 
Moreover, the negative association of the rich wealth category, and positive association of 
primary education, with game cooperation should be interpreted carefully due to the wide 
confidence intervals of their estimated effects, however similar demographic effects have 
been found elsewhere to shape trust-base responses to resource managers (Shirley and 
Gore, 2019).  
 
Our findings have several important implications for conservation policy and practice. First, 
we show that perceptions of intervener’s trustworthiness may mediate differential levels of 
support for conflict interventions. This finding adds to previous work identifying how 
responses to conservation interventions are shaped by the relationships between 
interveners and recipients of interventions (Rizzolo et al., 2017; Sjölander-Lindqvist et al., 
2015), including levels of stakeholder trust (Davenport et al., 2007; Riley et al., 2018; Smith 
et al., 2013). Those designing conservation conflict interventions should therefore closely 
consider the importance of the intervener – including the messenger (Dolan et al., 2012). 
Specifically, particular individuals, third parties or local institutions might be more effective 
in delivering interventions than others if they are trusted more or more highly trained in 
stakeholder engagement (Riley et al., 2018; Sommerville et al., 2010; Young et al., 2016a).  
 
Second, our findings that beliefs about an intervener’s integrity and benevolence were 
stronger predictors of cooperation than beliefs about their ability suggest that technical 
interventions or enforcement (such as efforts to reduce crop-raiding or illegal killing) might 
benefit from accompanying efforts to improve perceptions of trustworthiness and build 
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greater affinitive-based trust between resource-users and resource-managers (Rudolph and 
Riley, 2017; Stern and Coleman, 2015). Whilst these findings need to be tested across 
genders, in numerous other conservation conflict contexts, levels of protest, illegal harvest, 
and active opposition to conservation have been found to be associated with perceptions 
of managers’ honesty and fairness (linked to integrity) (Shirley and Gore, 2019; Stern, 
2008b), perceptions of care and community-mindedness (linked to benevolence) (Hamm et 
al., 2016) and general levels of affinitive trust (Stern and Baird, 2015). Moreover, higher 
perceptions of the competence, benevolence and integrity of conservation organisation 
staff also lead to higher trust in the organisation itself, but not in all cases (Sharp and Curtis, 
2014). 
 
Improving perceptions of trustworthiness and building affinitive-based trust in conservation 
conflict contexts is challenging (Davenport et al., 2007; Young et al., 2016a), but may be 
realised in several ways. Firstly, to increase trustworthiness specifically, managers could 
give greater, and more clear, justifications for how they reached decisions and chose 
certain options over alternatives (Rudolph and Riley, 2017). Increasing communication, 
more reliably keeping to promises (such as those around compensation), and avoiding the 
use of force and coercion will also be beneficial (Mabele, 2017). Secondly, to build 
affinitive-based trust and increase perceived procedural fairness more generally, 
conservation organisations might do well to appreciate that they themselves are 
stakeholders in a conflict (Young et al., 2016a). They could then consider mediation 
(Madden and McQuinn, 2015), more collaborative decision-making (Mishra et al., 2017; 
Young et al., 2016a) and encourage ways for communities members to share their voice 
(Shirley and Gore, 2019). Simply being more visibly active in communities, transparent and 
personally engaging with stakeholders more effectively (Davenport et al., 2007; Riley et al., 
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2018) can reduce social distance and increase trust, as can being more forthright with one’s 
intentions or failures (Stern, 2008a). However, other factors such as the extent to which 
stakeholders share similar values can constrain trust-building (Manfredo et al., 2017; Riley 
et al., 2018; Rizzolo et al., 2017), and in some cases levels of trust in non-local actors or 
institutions (such as national wildlife bodies) may be more influential and are harder to 
address at the local level (Schroeder et al., 2017). Lastly, conservationists should also be 
aware that wildlife impacts (Cusack et al., 2018) and trust (Stern, 2008a) can shift over time, 
and that continued engagement and responsive approaches may be required for long-term 
conservation success (Butler et al., 2015). Future work could explore the relative 
importance of other types of trust, such as negative trust and systems-based trust (Stern 
and Baird, 2015), uncertainty (Pollard et al., 2019), how perceptions of trustworthiness are 
shaped by gender, cultural affiliations and norms (Rizzolo et al., 2017), and how insights 
from experimental games correspond to those derived from other methods. 
 
7.6 Recommendations 
- Researchers should further explore how different interveners produce different 
behavioural responses in conflicts. 
- Practitioners should consider which groups or individuals may be best-placed to 
intervene in conflicts. 
- Researchers and practitioners should further explore ways to build stakeholder 
trust. 
- Researchers should further explore how the results from games differ to those 









Conservation practice and policy can be polarising, leading to conflict which impinges upon 
human well-being and biodiversity. Unpicking the roots and nature of polarisation is 
important in better understanding and managing such conflicts. But, whilst polarisation has 
been studied with regards to broad environment topics such as climate change, it remains 
less explored within conservation. Here we consider a polarising conservation topic – the 
trophy hunting of African megafauna – and explore how factors explaining polarisation in 
other environmental topics such as political ideology, environmental values, and networks, 
might also apply to this context. We collect a sample of United States (US) based users 
posting about trophy hunting on the social media platform Twitter (n=3,254), and test 
whether pro, neutral and anti-trophy hunting positions are predicted by their estimated 
political ideology along a one-dimensional liberal-conservation axis – derived using a 
previously calibrated method based on user-follower networks. We find that positions 
associate with political ideology: pro-trophy hunting users are over seven times more likely 
be of conservative than liberal orientation (Odds Ratio (OR) 7.41, p<0.01), and users more 
commonly interact with others of similar political ideology than would be predicted by 
random interactions. Those espousing anti-trophy hunting positions were also more 
commonly hostile and used more moralistic language than pro-trophy hunting users, who 
used more utilitarian language focused on the economic and social benefits of hunting. 
These results suggest that political orientation can predict positions in conservation 
conflicts and that the role of polarisation in influencing behaviours and driving conflicts 




Individuals and organisations frequently clash over conservation policy and practice, and 
where one party is perceived to exert their position over others, conflict can develop 
(Redpath et al., 2013). Whilst all conflicts involve opposing positions, the more that such 
different positions on an issue diverge or are unyielding, the more polarised an issue is said 
to be (Coffey and Joseph, 2013; Guber, 2013). For example, little middle ground exists 
between those who see recreational hunting as an essential, culturally-important wildlife 
management tool, and those who see hunting as a morally objectionable, culturally-
exclusive practice with no conservation value (Hodgson et al., 2018; Manfredo et al., 2017; 
Veríssimo et al., 2015). Importantly, not only can the extent of polarisation dictate the 
intensity of a conflict itself (Dimaggio et al., 1996; Mollinga, 2010), but it can constrain the 
effectiveness of management interventions and behaviour change. For example, increasing 
polarisation can increase hostility between groups (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015) and limit 
dialogue and management options (Redpath et al., 2013), making harder for conflicts to be 
deescalated or resolved (Hutton and Leader-Williams, 2003; Mollinga, 2010). The 
appearance of new evidence (Hodgson et al., 2019) or counter-arguments (Meadow et al., 
2005) often act to reinforce existing positions, and an individuals’ receptiveness to 
interventions may be predicted by, not only the group that they identity with (St John et al., 
2018), but also by the group that they associate the intervener or messenger with (Hafner 
et al., 2017; Young et al., 2016a). Hence, identifying the extent and source of polarisation in 
conflicts is therefore important in informing conservation conflict management and more 
effectively changing behaviour. 
 
Typically, polarisation occurs when prevailing positions on an issue disperse and cluster 
around different modes, or when they become associated with other positions, issues, or 
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identities (Dimaggio et al., 1996). For example, public attitudes in the United States (US) 
towards governmental spending on environmental protection have become increasing 
divergent over recent decades (McCright et al., 2014), and institutions and actors engaged 
in conflict over recreational hunting can often be categorised into discrete identity-based 
clusters (Hodgson et al., 2018; Veríssimo et al., 2015). Moreover, contrasting positions in 
some conservation conflicts have been thought to act as proxies for wider social conflicts, 
such as those revolving around colonial legacies in East Africa (Fox, 2018; Mkono, 2019) or 
the backlash to cultural modernisation in the US (Manfredo et al., 2017). Indeed, one 
important source of polarisation is the existence of competing value systems. For instance, 
differences in environmental value-orientations, such as between mutualism (which 
promotes coexistence and the intrinsic rights of wildlife) and utilitarianism (which promotes 
the management wildlife for human benefits), often predict contrasting positions in 
debates over recreation hunting and sustainable use (Jacobs et al., 2014b; Manfredo et al., 
2016; St John et al., 2018). Where such hunting debates become associated with animal 
welfare discourse for instance, polarisation can increase (Campbell and Veríssimo, 2015).  
 
Polarisation can also be shaped by how information is distributed across populations. Due 
to the combination or socio-geographical separation and self-selected homophily (self-
selected association with like-minded others) individuals may share, and receive 
information within their networks (particularly online) which is often more confirmatory 
than contradictory of prevailing within-group beliefs (Barberá et al., 2015; Evans and Fu, 
2018). Whist this apparent online ‘echo-chamber’ effect has been challenged (Bruns, 2017), 
in wildlife-specific contexts, both levels of exposure to information and levels of trust in 
particular messengers, appear to mediate positions on conservation issues (Arbieu et al., 
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2019). Furthermore, within groups the desire to conform and prove group-allegiance can 
lead to the proliferation of more extreme positions (Furth-Matzkin and Sunstein, 2016). 
 
Another confounding source of polarisation is politicisation –  the process by which an issue 
becomes associated with a particular political party or ideology (Dimaggio et al., 1996). 
Numerous analyses, particularly in the US, have shown how positions on environmental 
issues such as climate change have become more polarised in recent decades, with 
increasing positional divergence between those with opposing political ideologies (on a 
liberal-conservative axis) (Coffey and Joseph, 2013; Corner et al., 2012; Guber, 2013; 
McCright et al., 2014). In part, these trends are explained by the ‘party sorting theory’, 
which contends that political activists drive a process of ideological separation among 
political elites, which filters down to electorates through elite cues and the media coverage 
(Guber, 2013; McCright et al., 2014). For instance, behaviours such as recycling or energy 
conservation, are associated with particular political identities, and influenced by news 
exposure (Coffey and Joseph, 2013). However, whilst politicisation has been used to 
account for polarisation in some environmental domains, it remains underexplored within 
the context of wildlife-specific conflicts.  
 
The purpose of this study is to further explore whether the factors thought to explain 
polarisation generally, may also help account for the apparent polarisation in conservation 
conflicts. Specifically, we consider the possible associations between positions on an issue, 
political ideology, environmental value-types, and interactions within social networks. We 
analyse posts from the social media platform Twitter because it provides publicly 
accessible, relatively naturalistic data about how people interact on given issues (Arlt et al., 
2018) including those relating to conservation (Hawkins and Silver, 2017; Lunstrum, 2017; 
Toivonen et al., 2019). Specifically, we focus on US public engagement with the debate over 
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the recreational ‘trophy’ hunting of African megafauna – carnivores that weigh over 15 kg 
and omnivores and herbivores that weigh over 100 kg) (Lindsey et al., 2017). Building upon 
recent work on the polarised domestic hunting debate in the US (Manfredo et al., 2017), 
we explore this international issue because it appears to be similarly highly polarised 
conflict (Hutton and Leader-Williams, 2003) with important implications for the viability of 
many endangered species and conservation areas (Bunnefeld et al., 2013; Lindsey et al., 
2007). Indeed, there is fierce debate both within and outside of the conservation 
community with regards to the morality, efficacy, and appropriateness of conservation 
organisations supporting or engaging with trophy hunting (Batavia et al., 2018; Nelson et 
al., 2013). Furthermore, at the time of study, the issue was receiving high levels of 
engagement on social media  – both in the US and in East Africa (Mkono, 2019) – following 
the 2018 US policy reversal in the import of elephant trophies from certain countries 
(Batavia et al., 2018) and the highly publicised illegal hunt of Cecil the Lion by US national in 
Zimbabwe in 2015 (Macdonald et al., 2016). Lastly, by using Twitter data we were able to 
use an established method to predict user’s political ideology (along a liberal-conservative 
axis) from their follower networks (Barberá, 2015). 
 
We first collect a sample of posts about trophy hunting, from which we infer user positions 
on the issue, before testing these against users’ predicted political ideologies. We also test 
whether interactions are more common between actors of closer political ideological 
alignment, whether greater political ideological distance predicts hostility, and whether 
different positions on the issue are supported by different value-based reasoning types – 
which previously have been linked to attitudes towards other forms of hunting (St John et 
al., 2018). Lastly, we consider the implications of polarisation for conflict management, as 






To collect a sample of individuals’ positions on trophy hunting, we used an online data-
trawling package to collect freely and publicly available posts (tweets) made on the social 
media platform Twitter. For this, we used the ‘twitteR’ package in the ‘R’ statistical 
programming software (R Development Core Team, 2014) to conduct a series of key-word 
searches with the Twitter application programming interface (API). We searched for 
“trophy hunting” only, and filtered the search to include only US-based tweets and original 
posts (rather than those re-posted by other users). We restricted our analysis to US-based 
users because the tool we use to estimate political ideology (from Twitter follower 
networks) had been calibrated for US-based users of Twitter (Barberá et al., 2015). To 
capture responses to the proposed US policy change on elephant trophy imports, we 
collected the sample between January and March 2018, when the policy was receiving 
widespread media coverage. In total, we ran three searches, which collected a sample of 
5,263 tweets from 30 out of 50 days in the sampling period.   
 
We manually filtered the sample to include only tweets relevant to the hunting of 
terrestrial, African megafauna species. Any media, imagery or emoticons accompanying 
each tweet were also considered to contextualise the tweet, as were posts that the user 
was responding to, and other related tweets posted by the user (such as threads or replies). 
The filtered sample size of users (n=3,254) was deemed sufficient as it exceeded the 
estimated sample size that a power calculation predicted was required to detect the 





To categorize the different positions taken on trophy hunting, we used directed content 
analysis (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005) and assigned tweets to one of three pre-determined 
categories: ‘pro-’, ‘neutral-’ or ‘anti-’trophy hunting. ‘Pro’ tweets were those that were 
unequivocally positive, supportive in principle, or those that highlighted the utility of trophy 
hunting despite other concerns. ‘Neutral’ tweets were those that were purely descriptive 
(e.g., statements about policy changes), or those that offered no discernible opinions or 
apparent ambivalence. ‘Anti’ tweets were those that outlined unambiguously negative 
opinions towards trophy hunting, overall negative assessments of trophy hunting, or those 
advocating the prohibition of trophy hunting. Only one position was recorded per unique 
user in the final sample. Where multiple tweets from the same user appeared in the sample 
and reflected different or ambiguous positions, either the most common position was taken 
or other tweets from the user were consulted to determine their most consistent position. 
The few remaining ambiguous cases were omitted from analysis.   
 
To estimate the political ideology of each user, we used the ‘tweetscores’ package in ‘R’, 
which estimates political ideology based on Twitter follower networks under the 
assumption of  political homophily – that users are more likely to follow other users who 
share similar views and ideologies to themselves (Barberá, 2015; Barberá et al., 2015). By 
creating matrixes of users who follow a set of known politically-active accounts (such as 
politicians), this method produces a one-dimensional political latent space, upon which 
each unique user is mapped with a score from -4 (more liberal) to +4 (more conservative). 
We used this method to estimate the political ideology of the authors of the tweets in our 
sample, as well as the political ideology of any other user they were replying to. Following 
Barberá et al., (2015) we also separated users into ideology groups (liberals < -0.5, 
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moderates -0.5-0.5, conservatives > 0.5). We confirmed that this method produces a 
normal distribution for the general US Twitter population (as intended), by applying the 
method to a snap-shot subset of US Twitter population (n=8,323) (Appendix 5, Figure A5.1).  
 
We also manually categorised tweets as ‘hostile’ if they included aggressive or offensive 
content, and we used text-mining package ‘tm’ in ‘R’ to identify tweets using profanities 
included in a corpus of profane English-language words 
(https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~biglou/resources/bad-words.txt). We also recorded tweets that 
encouraged or celebrated violence towards people. To test whether political ideology, 
trophy hunting position or political distance predicts hostility in tweets, we used 
generalised linear mixed effects models with binomial errors. Unique identifiers for repliers 
(n=1,219) and tweet authors (n=621) were modelled with independent random intercepts 
to account for user-level variation, and the follower count of the tweet author was included 
in models to account for user visibility. Lastly, we used the package ‘tm’ to identify the 100 
most commonly used words by those for and against trophy hunting, and recorded (based 
upon our interpretation) whether the words in each list corresponded to the any of 
different human values for nature outlined by Kellert, (1993) and used by (Estévez et al., 








Table 8.1. Typology of human values of nature, from Estévez et al. (2015), based on Kellert 
(1993). 
Value Definition 
Aesthetic Physical attraction and appeal of nature 
Dominionistic Mastery and control over nature 
Humanistic Emotional, spiritual, or symbolic affection for nature 
Moralistic Moral concern about the right and treatment of nature 
Naturalistic Exploration of nature and outdoor recreation 
Negativistic Fear or aversion toward nature 
Scientific Systematic and empirical study of nature 




Our sample captured a broad range of views about trophy hunting, covering a spectrum 
from strongly against, to strongly in favour, but it was heavily skewed towards anti-hunting 
views. Of the 3,354 users in our sample, 75% were classified as anti-trophy hunting, 16% as 
neutral, and 9% as pro-trophy hunting. Political ideology estimates were bimodal, with a 
larger proportion of study subjects towards the liberal (left-wing) of the spectrum (average 
ideology estimate -0.25, range -2.46, 2.44) (Figure 8.1), which compares to the more 
normally distributed general twitter population (Figure A5.1). 
 
In total, 49% of users in the sample were classed as liberals, 18% moderates, and 35% 
conservatives. Of the pro-trophy hunting users, 78% were classed as conservative 
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compared to 8% as liberal. In contrast, 57% of anti-trophy hunting users were liberals and 
25% were conservatives. In chi-squared tests of independence, positions on trophy hunting 
were found to be significantly associated with political ideology. Pro-trophy hunting users 
were over seven times more likely to be conservative than liberal (Odds Ratio (OR) 7.41, 
p<0.01) and over six times more likely to be conservative than moderate (OR 6.77, p<0.01). 
On average, the political ideology estimates of those expressing positive positions on 
trophy hunting (mean, 1.07, SD, 0.99) were more conservative than of those expressing 
neutral positions (mean, 0.27, SD, 1.21), and those expressing anti positions (mean, -0.53, 
SD, 1.24) (Figure 8.2). A three-way ANOVA, followed by the Tukey post-hoc test, found 
significant differences in mean ideological estimates between each group pairing (pro-anti, 
1.6 0.95 CI: 1.42, 1.77; pro-neutral 0.81 0.95 CI: 0.61, 1.02), neutral-anti 0.79 0.95 CI: 0.65, 
0.93) (Appendix 5, Figure A5.2). 
 
Interactions between users about trophy hunting were found to be associated with political 
ideologies; with more interactions between users with closer political alignments (shorter 
distance between estimated ideologies) than would be predicted if pairwise user-replier 
interactions were randomly distributed (null model) (Figure 8.4). Results from a 
bootstrapped two-tailed t-test found that the ideological distance between users was 





Figure 8.1: Area plot of the estimated political ideology of users by positions on 
trophy hunting. Positive estimates indicate more conservative ideology. 
 
Figure 8.2: Histogram (bars) and density plot (black line) showing the estimated 
political ideology distance between users interacting (replying) about trophy 
hunting on Twitter, the distribution of hostile interactions and also the 95% 
confidence intervals of the estimated distribution of random encounters between 
users and repliers (red dashed lines).   
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Of the 1,237 observed interactions between original tweet authors and repliers, 46% 
occurred between users from the same political ideology group (17% liberal-liberal, 3% 
moderate-moderate, 27% conservative-conservative) (Figure 8.3). This amounts to 
significantly more within-group interactions than would be expected if interactions were 
distributed randomly across users with different political ideologies (Appendix 5, Figure 
A5.4). A large proportion of replies from liberals were to conservatives (53%), but fewer of 
conservatives’ replies were to liberals (19%).  
 
Of the same 1,237 observed interactions, 27% of replies were recorded as hostile, of which 
29% were directed at the specific author of a tweet (as opposed to something, or someone 
else). Of the 1,237 observed replies, 27% used profane language and 3% of users advocated 
for, or celebrated, the death of trophy hunters. In generalised linear mixed effects models, 
the hostility of interactions was not predicted by political distance, the political ideology of 
the replier, or the follower count of the author, but was predicted by the replier’s stance on 
trophy hunting – with those pro-trophy hunting  (p < 0.01, odds ratio 0.07, 0.95 CI: 0.07-
0.19) and those neutral (p < 0.01, odds ratio 0.21, 0.95 CI: 0.14-0.40) being significantly less 
likely to reply with a hostile tweet than anti-trophy hunting users (Appendix 5, Figure A5.3). 
Similarly, those adopting pro (p<0.01, OR, 0.47, 0.95 CI, 0.19-0.75), or neutral (p<0.01, OR, 
0.52, 0.95 CI, 0.19-0.81) positions on trophy hunting, were significantly less likely to use 






Figure 8.3: Heatmaps showing the relationship between the estimated political 
ideology of the replier and the author they are replying to, with tweet density 
indicated by colour, for users categorised as taking anti, neutral and pro trophy 
hunting positions. Positive ideology estimates indicate more conservative ideology, 




Figure 8.4: The proportion of the 100 most commonly used words in pro- and anti-
trophy hunting tweets which related to each of the eight different human values 




The focus of tweets, and the value judgments made within them, differed substantially 
between users taking different positions. Those supporting trophy hunting used a higher 
proportion of utilitarian, dominionistic and scientific language to justify their positions, 
whereas those against used more moralistic and aesthetic language (Figure 8.4). Those 
against trophy hunting were largely advocating a ban on the practice, or reacting to a 
proposed policy related to trophy hunting (Appendix 5, Figure A5.3). Many users against 
trophy hunting focused their attention on either the characteristics of the people doing the 
hunting (such as their race, gender, nationality or perceived level of wealth) or the 
characteristics of the animals being hunted (such as their aesthetic beauty, innocence, 
rarity or ‘wildness’). In contrast, those in favour of hunting often focused on the population-
level or economic outcomes. 
 
8.6 Discussion 
This study finds that a large majority of US Twitter users engaging with the debate of 
African trophy-hunting express anti-trophy hunting positions, but that pro-trophy hunting 
tweets are strongly associated with conservative ideology and are usually justified by 
utilitarian and dominionstic reasoning. In contrast, anti-trophy hunting tweets are 
associated more with liberal ideology, moralistic reasoning and are more likely to be hostile 
in nature. Furthermore, it finds that interactions were more common among those of closer 
political ideology.  
 
Although we do not attempt to assess the extent of polarisation, we identify large variation 
in the prevalence of opposing positions and the value-based reasoning underpinning them, 
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and a high level of hostile interactions. Hence, this study offers some, but limited, evidence 
to support the notion that this is a highly polarised conservation debate (Hutton and 
Leader-Williams, 2003; Lindsey et al., 2007), which complements the more well-established 
accounts of high polarisation within the US domestic hunting debate (Manfredo et al., 
2017). Indeed, that most Twitter users in our sample expressed negative sentiments 
towards trophy hunting, is consistent with recent polling data which finds that 75% of 
Americans are against the trophy hunting of elephants (Remington, 2018). Our findings are 
also consistent with other studies that have shown how large online reactions against 
trophy hunting have occurred in recent years – particularly the online outrage that 
emerged following the illegal hunting of Cecil the lion in 2015 (Macdonald et al., 2016). 
However, it is our exploration of the factors associating with the possible nature of 
polarisation which offers the more important contribution towards better understanding 
conflicts. 
 
The association found between positions on trophy hunting and political ideology suggests 
that this particular conservation conflict is polarised along political lines, much like other 
environmental issues (Guber, 2013; Kahan et al., 2012). There are several interconnected 
processes which may account for this observed association, and each of these may 
influence the process of polarisation. Under ‘party sorting theory’, political activists can 
drive a process of ideological separation among political elites, which filters down to 
electorates through elite cues and exposure to different information from sources (Guber, 
2013; McCright et al., 2014). We don’t have the historical data required to determine if 
positions on trophy hunting have diverged among both party elites and the public over 
time. However, a large proportion of tweets specifically referenced the Republican 
President Donald Trump – a highly polarising figure (Barber and Pope, 2018) – whose 
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proposed elephant-trophy import policy change may have acted as an elite cue. Moreover, 
individuals’ propensity to seek and reward in-group social conformity can encourage 
opinion sharing based upon identity-signalling and can increase polarisation in any topic 
which becomes associated with political identities or elites (Evans and Fu, 2018; Strandberg 
et al., 2018). It is also possible that the greater support for trophy hunting among 
conservatives may reflect the cultural backlash to modernisation (and metropolitan 
progressive liberalism) observed among many conservatives in the US (Inglehart et al., 
2016), which has been proposed as accounting for the polarised debate around domestic 
hunting (Manfredo et al., 2017). 
 
Polarisation can also be driven by differences in values, and here we find some evidence to 
suggest that the opposing positions in this conflict are supported by different 
environmental value types. Indeed, contrasting value types can act as barriers for 
individuals with opposing positions or to understand each other or reach a compromised 
position (Estévez et al., 2015; Mattson et al., 2006). However, issue positions, political 
ideology, and underlying value-systems often align (Carvalho, 2007). Indeed, both 
dominionistic and utilitarian reasoning has been found to be associated more with 
conservative ideology (Hannikainen et al., 2017) and attitudes to recreational hunting (St 
John et al., 2018). Here we find that such reasoning types were also more common among 
those supporting trophy hunting – who tended to also be conservative. Such values are in 
direct contrast with the rights or interests of specific individual animals advocated by those 
against trophy hunting, both in our sample and in the literature (e.g., Batavia et al., 2018). 
Hence, delineating the individual role of values in driving position formation on this issue 




Issue position formation is also linked to information and experience, and although we do 
not test these factors specifically, we do find that most interactions were between users of 
similar political ideology. This is important because any interacting effects between political 
ideology and values on of trophy hunting position formation may be compounded by 
differential exposure to information. For instance, attitudes to hunting are linked to 
proximity to hunters and rural areas (Heberlein et al., 2005; Karns et al., 2015) – where 
conservative representation in the US is also higher (McKee, 2008) – and differ according to 
how hunting messages are framed (Blascovich and Metcalf, 2019). Hence, consistent with 
the echo-chamber hypothesis (Bruns, 2017), if conservatives are more likely to be pro-
trophy hunting, and conservatives are more likely to interact with other conservatives 
(Barberá et al., 2015), then a conservative Twitter user is likely to see a higher proportion of 
pro-trophy hunting messages than a liberal user (and vice versa). However, the evidence for 
such echo-chambers and their effect on opinion formation is limited (Barberá et al., 2015; 
Bruns, 2017; Shin et al., 2017). Indeed, one experimental study found that exposure to 
opposing political views online may actually increase polarisation (Bail et al., 2018). Hence, 
without also analysing which tweets users were exposed to but did not reply to, we cannot 
scrutinise this relationship further. Moreover, whilst hostility on Twitter is commonly 
directed towards political outgroups (Oc et al., 2018), we do not have further evidence to 
explain why hostility was not predicted by political distance, but was predicted by trophy 
hunting position. However, we suggest the possible links between moralistic reasoning, 
opposition to a policy or practice and hostility should be explored.  
 
This study has numerous limitations, many of which are inherent in using social media data 
to draw general conclusions. For instance, Twitter users tend to be younger, more highly 
educated and more liberal than the general population, although users from particular 
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demographic do reflect the same political leanings of those not on Twitter (Mellon and 
Prosser, 2017). Furthermore, whilst social media posts can be good predictors of real-world 
behaviour, such as voting patterns (Tumasjan et al., 2011), and participation in violence 
(Won et al., 2017), the increased anonymity of online networks may also increase hostility 
(Bollinger, 2016) and, and more emotive messages tend to proliferate on social media 
(Brady et al., 2017). This could result in the over-representation of more extreme, or 
polarising, messages in our sample, as well as the prevalence of anti-trophy hunting users 
(who may be more motivated to post). Further research is required to establish whether 
the lack of pro-trophy hunting liberal tweeters in our sample reflected the lack of actual 
pro-trophy hunting liberals, or whether such individuals do exist but instead choose not to 
reveal their positions online, or are not represented on Twitter. We also do not include 
demographic information, such as age, ethnicity, religion or gender, which are known shape 
positions on other partisan issues, such as climate change (McCright and Dunlap, 2011) and 
which may also interact with both political ideology and positions on trophy hunting. Our 
study is also limited to a snap-shot in time with US-based users, but it could be replicated 
consistently over time and with different sub-sets of users. Lastly, the only interactions we 
consider are public replies, which overlook other forms of offline and online interaction 
(e.g., private messages) and relevant behaviours. 
 
Our study has numerous implications for understanding and managing conservation 
conflicts. Firstly, polarisation in this conflict appears to be at least in part shaped by 
underlying environmental values, which change slowly (Manfredo et al., 2016), and which 
when clashing, can make effective dialogue hard to reach (Mason et al., 2018; St John et al., 
2018). Secondly, if this, or other conservation conflicts, are polarised along political lines, 
then they will also be influenced by wider in trends in political polarisation (Inglehart et al., 
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2016; McCright et al., 2014), such as those thought to be shaping the debate over climate 
change and domestic hunting in the US (Guber, 2013; Manfredo et al., 2017). Furthermore, 
our findings suggest that, as elsewhere (Batavia et al., 2018; Mkono, 2019), who is doing 
the trophy hunting (and their socio-demographic characteristics), why they are hunting 
(perceived as for recreation, prestige or domination), and what is being hunted (charismatic 
megafauna) appear all to be key factors in shaping positions on this issue, rather than 
simply the conservation outcomes. Hence, better understanding such socio-political drivers 
of any conflict will likely help inform conflict management (Hodgson et al., 2018; Pooley et 
al., 2016; St John et al., 2018). For instance, those trying to influence positions on trophy 
hunting might benefit from tailoring messaging to different audiences (Maibach et al., 
2011). Conflict researchers could also consider forecasting how conservation values may 
shift within populations over time, particular with regards to trends in urbanisation and 
modernisation (Bruskotter et al., 2017; Manfredo et al., 2017). Lastly, social media analyses 
might also be used measure such shifts in sentiment and the changing intensity of 
conservation conflicts. For instance, automated sentiment analysis tools are being 
developed which might be able to track shifting perceptions and discourses within conflicts 
(Ladle et al., 2016; Toivonen et al., 2019). However, the relationship between online 
conservation activity and offline behaviours needs further investigation (Büscher et al., 
2017; Hawkins and Silver, 2017; Macdonald et al., 2016). Further work is also needed to 
explore whether the aspects of social media known to be shaping other social conflicts 
(Dwyer and Molony, 2019) are also shaping conservation debates, such as increased 
connectivity, anonymization and disinformation (Brady et al., 2017; Lazer et al., 2018; 
Zeitzoff, 2017). Hence, conflicts over conservation now certainly represented online, but 
the extent to which such clashes provide useful sources of information for researchers, and 




- Researchers should further explore the interactions between positions in 
conservation conflicts, values, politics and related behaviours. 
- Researchers could explore how messages could be framed in different ways to be 
tailored towards different audiences in conflicts.  
- Researchers should try to devise new ways to measure and track levels of 
polarization, possibly using social-media data. 














Chapter 9: Discussion 
 
9.1 Background 
As the Swahili proverb quoted at the beginning of this thesis states: when elephants fight, it 
is the grass that suffers. Likewise, where people clash over conservation, it is often the well-
being of surrounding people and wildlife which suffers. Indeed, behaviours associated with 
conflicts negatively impact some of the world’s most impoverished people (Adams and 
Hutton, 2007; Barua et al., 2013) as well as the viability of some of the world’s most 
endangered species (Woodroffe et al., 2005a). Due to such negative outcomes of 
conservation conflict, in Enduimet WMA (Chapters 5-7) and globally (Chapter 3), 
conservation researchers and practitioners are highly concerned with designing and 
implementing more effective conflict interventions (Pooley et al., 2016; van Eeden et al., 
2017), which often aim to manage or mitigate conflicts by trying to change human 
behaviour (Redpath et al., 2013).  
 
Conservation interventions are thought to be more effective when they are designed and 
implemented according to robust theory and evidence (Sutherland and Wordley, 2017). 
Yet, although particular conflict interventions, or particular contexts, have been well-
studied, there remains a dearth of general conservation theory and evidence to inform 
conflict interventions across contexts (Eklund et al., 2017; van Eeden et al., 2018). 
Moreover, research on both the roots of conflict, and the effectiveness of interventions, 
has historically focused mainly on human-wildlife interactions and attitudes (Peterson et 
al., 2010) and less on behaviour change (Nilsson et al., 2019). Recently, the need to better 
understand the complex social roots of conflict over conservation, and the ways in which 
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these can be managed, has also been identified (Madden and McQuinn, 2014; Pooley et al., 
2016). Likewise, within specific contexts, different conflict interventions are prioritised by 
different actors (Lute et al., 2018; Rastogi et al., 2013), but the reasons for the differences, 
and their predicted outcomes (Redpath et al., 2017), remain underexplored. Better 
understanding this variation, and the factors which influence conservation decision-making 
more broadly (Papworth, 2017), is important in informing evidence-based interventions 
(Bunnefeld et al., 2017; Sutherland and Wordley, 2017). Accordingly, this thesis 
incorporates a range of studies and research approaches, which together aim to inform 
more effective conflict interventions by trying to better understand both the roots of 













9.2.1 Unpicking the roots of conflict 
The first contribution this thesis makes to our understanding of the roots of conservation 
conflict comes from broadening the scope of conflict, considering previously disparate 
literatures together, and highlighting the different proximate human behaviours which 
drive conflicts. Drawing upon a review of the conflict literature, Chapter 3 demonstrates 
how the umbrella of conservation conflict extends far beyond human-wildlife interactions, 
to include clashes over resources, culture, land, ethics, and regulations. Chapter 3 argues 
that individuals or groups who actively participate in conservation rule-breaking, such as 
protected area infringement (De Pourcq et al., 2015), may as much be in conflict with 
conservation as those who poison livestock-raiding predators (Marquez et al., 2013), or 
those who lobby against hunting policies online (Hodgson et al., 2018). In this way, Chapter 
3 suggests analysing and comparing a range of different conflict contexts and associated 
behaviours together, particularly when exploring interventions. 
 
The next contribution this thesis makes to our understanding of the roots of conflict is in 
further highlighting how conflict and related behaviours can be produced at many 
interacting levels.  Drawing upon academic and grey literature, and qualitative fieldwork in 
Tanzania, Chapter 6 identifies the various interacting levels producing conflict over 
elephants in Enduimet WMA. Chapter 6 shows how, like elsewhere (Young et al., 2010), 
conflict at the local level is produced through negative human-wildlife interactions, 
characterised by widespread elephant crop-raiding, human injury, and retaliatory killings 
(Mariki et al., 2015; Moyo et al., 2016). However, Chapter 6 also build on previous findings 
locally (Homewood, 2017; Mariki et al., 2015; Moyo et al., 2016; Wright, 2016) and 
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elsewhere (Redpath et al., 2013; Veríssimo et al., 2015), by showing how this conflict is also 
produced by negative interactions at the stakeholder level, largely characterised by 
conflicting interests, unmet promises, breakdowns in trust, hostile enforcement, 
resentment towards resource and land restrictions, and non-participatory decision-making 
(findings which are also supported by Chapter 7). Adding to existing literature (Bluwstein 
and Lund, 2018; Newig and Fritsch, 2009; Wright, 2017), Chapter 6 then documents how 
these clashes are themselves produced by wider governance structures, such as involving 
national-level conservation policy, particular conservation narratives (related to ‘win-wins’ 
and ‘wilderness’), and the related objectives of NGOs. In doing so, Chapter 6 further 
highlights how stakeholders from beyond the local context can act to mediate local human-
wildlife impacts, local stakeholder relations, and policy (Adams, 2015; Colvin et al., 2015; 
Sterling et al., 2017), and hence the dynamics of conservation conflicts.    
 
Thirdly, this thesis also contributes to our understanding of how political ideology, 
environmental values and networks contribute towards polarisation in conservation 
conflicts. Chapter 8 draws upon polarisation theory (Coffey and Joseph, 2013; Guber, 2013) 
to highlight how factors which have been shown to drive polarisation in other 
environmental topics – including political ideology, environmental values and networks – 
apply to the online conflict over the trophy hunting of African megafauna (Lindsey et al., 
2016; Macdonald et al., 2016). Chapter 8 finds that US pro-trophy hunting Twitter users are 
more likely to be of conservative than liberal orientation, and use more utilitarian and 
dominionistic language compared to those that espouse anti-trophy hunting positions, who 
use more moralistic and aesthetic language. Hence, Chapter 8 suggests that like other 
environmental issues (Guber, 2013; Kahan et al., 2012), conservation conflicts may be 
polarised along political lines and are likely shaped by contrasting environmental values 
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(Estévez et al., 2015; Manfredo et al., 2017; St John et al., 2018). It also builds upon 
previous work to further highlight how clashes over conservation now occur online 
(Büscher, 2014; Hawkins and Silver, 2017; Macdonald et al., 2016), which may also be 
shaped by changing experiences of nature (Lorimer, 2015).  
 
9.2.2 Constraints on intervention decisions 
The first contribution this thesis makes to our understanding of conflict intervention 
decision-making is in identifying the different types of interventions and the assumptions 
underpinning them. The literature review in Chapter 3 builds-upon the environmental 
behaviour change (Heberlein, 2012b) and conflict intervention literature (Agrawal et al., 
2014; Nyhus, 2016; Treves et al., 2006), to identify five conservation conflict intervention 
types. It finds that technical interventions attempt to reduce retaliatory killings and 
alleviate conflicts by targeting wildlife impacts such as crop-raiding and livestock 
depredation, typically through barriers, deterrents, or diversionary feeding (Nyhus, 2016; 
Osipova et al., 2018), whereas cognitive interventions attempt to change conflict-related 
behaviours through information dissemination, including livelihood education and 
conservation awareness campaigns (Baruch-Mordo et al., 2011; Holmes, 2003). In contrast, 
it highlights that economic interventions – including incentives, compensation or 
alternative livelihoods – aim to alleviate the costs incurred by wildlife or resource 
restrictions, or to shift resource use (Kremen et al., 2000; Ravenelle and Nyhus, 2017), and 
enforcement interventions aim to increase compliance or discourage certain behaviours 
such as illegal resource use (Agrawal et al., 2014; Keane et al., 2008). Lastly, stakeholder 
engagement interventions, such as mediation programmes and participatory decision-
making, are identified as aiming to alleviate the social roots of conflicts and transform 
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conflicts through co-management, mediation, and consultations (Madden and McQuinn, 
2014; Redpath et al., 2017).  
 
Next, this thesis contributes to our understanding of conflict intervention decision-making 
by demonstrating the extent to which the geographical context of a conflict, the kinds of 
human behaviours described, and conflict framing, shapes intervention priorities. In 
particular, Chapter 3 finds that technical interventions tend to be prioritised more by 
authors adopting the human-wildlife conflict frame and by those describing retaliatory 
killing, whereas stakeholder interventions are recommended more by those using the 
human-human conflict frame and those describing acts of active opposition to 
conservation. In contrast, enforcement tends to be suggested more by authors focussing on 
less highly developed countries – supporting another finding for protected area conflict 
management (Soliku & Schraml 2018) – and where illegal conservation-related behaviours 
are reported. However, in contrast to the review (Chapter 3), the experimental study of 
conservation professionals (Chapter 4) finds that enforcement is prioritised over 
stakeholder engagement more (rather than less) in more highly developed countries, that 
economic interventions (but not enforcement) associate with illegal behaviours and no 
effect of conflict framing on intervention priorities. These discrepancies might reflect the 
observational nature of Chapter 3 in contrast to the experimental nature of Chapter 4, but 
also suggest the need to further explore the context-specific drivers of intervention 
priorities. 
 
This thesis also contributes experimental evidence to demonstrate how the personal 
characteristics and experiences of decision-makers predicts their intervention priorities. 
Chapter 4 finds that enforcement and awareness are prioritised over stakeholder more by 
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younger respondents, as well as those with more scientific backgrounds, those with less 
experience of conflicts, and those from less highly developed countries. These results 
accompany previous findings that respondent’s personal, geographical, and professional 
backgrounds shape perceptions of conflict intervention solutions (Lute et al., 2018) and 
conservation priorities more generally (Sandbrook et al., 2019). These findings also support 
the need to further explore the possible roles of heuristics (Papworth, 2017), 
predispositions (Sheil and Meijaard, 2010), disciplinary silos (Pooley et al., 2014), personal 
experiences (Pullin et al., 2004; Walsh et al., 2015) and group affiliation (St John et al., 
2018; Furth-Matzkin and Sunstein, 2016),  in shaping conservation decision-making. 
Chapter 3 also identifies the (low) extent to which intervention recommendations in the 
published literature are rarely supported by scientific evidence or Theories of Change 
(Margoluis et al., 2013), hence better understanding the possible barriers to evidence-use 
(Addison et al., 2016) in conflict management is therefore also important. Lastly, the 
findings of Chapter 5 indicate how resource and governance constraints are also likely to 
influence local management options, which is an area also highlighted in the feedback from 
survey respondents (Chapter 4), and which could be also considered further.  
 
9.2.3 Constraints on intervention effectiveness  
This thesis provides experimental evidence to demonstrate how perceptions of interveners 
– specifically of their benevolence and integrity – are important in shaping support for 
conflict interventions. Using an experimental game in Enduimet WMA, Chapter 7 finds that 
participants cooperate more with interveners they perceive to be more trustworthy, and 
that perceptions of interveners’ integrity and benevolence are more important in eliciting 
cooperation than perceptions of their ability. This finding corroborates previous studies 
which have shown that stakeholders respond differently to different actors and interveners 
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within conservation conflicts (Davies and White, 2012; Marshall et al., 2007; Mishra et al., 
2017), and that levels of stakeholder trust may govern conflict-related interactions – from 
compliance or cooperation (Gray et al., 2012; Hamm et al., 2016; Stern, 2008a), to support 
for interventions and resolution (Estévez et al., 2015; Sjölander-Lindqvist et al., 2015; Young 
et al., 2016a). This finding also highlights the importance of affinitive forms of trust, such as 
perceptions of benevolence and integrity (Stern and Coleman, 2015), which have been 
previously highlighted as mediating responses to conservation interventions (Riley et al., 
2018; Shirley and Gore, 2019).  
 
This thesis also provides evidence to suggest that the efficacy of conflict interventions, in 
particular stakeholder engagement, may be constrained by conflicts with multi-level 
dynamics. Chapter 6 identifies how variation in national policy and conservation markets 
may constrain local management strategies, and how conflict management through 
stakeholder engagement may prove more difficult where the conservation objective is 
perceived as non-negotiable, or pursued by influential non-local actors. These findings build 
on previous work which suggests that the effectiveness of co-management and 
participatory decision-making is constrained by the ability for conservation objectives to be 
flexible and determined collaboratively (Butler et al., 2011; Pooley and Redpath, 2018), that 
economic interventions may be constrained by levels of effective governance and 
corruption (Hansson-Forman et al., 2018; Smith et al., 2015), and that wildlife impact 
interventions can be constrained by agrarian and livestock markets (Masse, 2016). 
Furthermore, as Chapter 8 highlights, shifts in public sentiment, even internationally, may 
act to shape conservation policy locally (Carpenter and Konisky, 2017; Lindsey et al., 2016), 
but, how such processes may constrain the effectiveness of conflict interventions (such as 




Better understanding the variation in intervention priorities is important in helping to 
establish how, and why, different decisions are made, and to inform more effective 
management (Lute et al., 2018; Papworth, 2017). This thesis identifies that conservation 
conflict intervention priorities are not only predicted by the geographical and behavioural 
characteristics of a conflict, but by the characteristics of decision-makers (Chapter 4). 
Hence, it is possible that effective interventions are overlooked perhaps because managers 
are not aware of them, because of their predispositions, or possibly due to barriers to using 
evidence (Addison et al., 2016). Increasing the diversity of voices involved in the decision-
making process and promoting multi-disciplinarity (Pooley et al., 2014) might increase the 
range, and quality of intervention suggestions, and also provide a more inclusive process 
(Foster et al., 2014; Vercammen and Burgman, 2019). Likewise, including stakeholders 
more in the decision-making process, might not only improve stakeholder relations and 
build trust (Redpath et al., 2017; Young et al., 2016a), but may facilitate knowledge-sharing 
and more effective interventions as a result (Butler et al., 2015). However, by including 
more voices in the decision-making process the potential for conflict over decisions and 
disagreement over sources of evidence may increase (von Essen and Hansen, 2015). 
Moreover, as highlighted in Chapter 3, is a lack of evidence-based conflict intervention 
recommendations, particularly around education and awareness programs. Consequently, 
drawing upon Theories of Change (Biggs et al., 2017), and behavioural science frameworks 
(Staddon et al., 2016; Veríssimo et al., 2019), will likely improve the effectiveness of conflict 
interventions.  
 
Furthermore, given perceptions of an intervener’s integrity and benevolence may be more 
important than beliefs about their ability in predicting cooperation with interventions 
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(Chapter 7), consideration should be given as to who are the most suitable interveners, and 
how greater trust may be fostered. Indeed, demonstrating effectiveness alone (e.g., success 
in reducing crop-raiding) will not necessarily lead to greater support for conservation. 
Instead, improving stakeholder relationships and establishing greater affinitive trust is likely 
to be important in fostering collaboration (Stern and Coleman, 2015). Indeed, building trust 
and dialogue between all parties is likely key to effectively managing conflicts (Schroeder et 
al., 2017; Young et al., 2016a). This can include creating space to make small positive 
decisions that both sides can agree on, and potentially using impartial mediators to co-
ordinate consultations and decision-making (Marshall et al., 2007; Rudolph and Riley, 
2014). Likewise, making good on promises of compensation for wildlife damage, and 
increasing the transparency of decision making, might increase trust and reduce hostility 
towards conservation activities and organisations (Mabele, 2017; Young et al., 2016a). 
Similarly, being perceived to place a higher focus on protecting people from wildlife, not 
just wildlife from people, might help alleviate tensions between stakeholders and 
conservation organisations (ESPA, 2017). Furthermore, given the importance of interveners, 
it may also be profitable to map out and scrutinize the precise roles of different interveners 
(including organisations) during the intervention planning process (Barnes and van 
Laerhoven, 2015). 
 
As shown throughout this thesis, effective stakeholder engagement is considered key to 
managing conflicts and changing behaviours. Yet as Chapter 6, and other analyses identify 
(Colvin et al., 2015; Sterling et al., 2017), the capacity for stakeholder approaches is context 
dependent. Specifically, the efficacy of local stakeholder engagement approaches may be 
constrained by multi-level factors including uneven power dynamics, markets and non-local 
conservation objectives. This is in addition to the importance of which actors initiate the 
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stakeholder-engagement process and the ways in which it is conducted (Reed and Ceno, 
2015; Sterling et al., 2017). However, despite these constraining factors, it may be possible 
to pursue collaborative approaches within pre-determined boundaries (Redpath et al., 
2017) and through the utilisation of adaptive management (Bunnefeld et al., 2017). 
Nonetheless, conflicts may well endure. This may particularly be the case where the costs 
and benefits of conservation are unequally distributed (DeMotts and Hoon, 2012), where 
objectives are non-negotiable (Pooley and Redpath, 2018), and where stakeholders’ beliefs, 
identities and ways of seeing the world are challenged (St John et al., 2018) – such as in the 
case of trophy hunting (Chapter 8). It may therefore be beneficial to try and identify the 
extent to which stakeholders perceive a conflict to be one of intractable, mutually exclusive 
positions, or instead one of problems which can be overcome to the benefit of all.  
 
Lastly, the findings presented in this thesis suggest that it would be useful to incorporate 
the multi-level drivers of conflict (Chapter 6) and the dimensions of polarization (Chapter 8) 
into conceptual frameworks of conservation conflicts and their management (Dickman, 
2010; Madden and McQuinn, 2014; Rechciński et al., 2019). This would require further 
interrogation into the nature of polarisation across these different levels – such as the 
extent to which the objectives of specific groups and organisations diverge and the 
likelihood that they can reach consensus (Veríssimo et al., 2015), or the extent to which 
policy positions, values, or attitudes towards an issue diverge across citizens within wider 







9.4 Limitations and further research 
One general limitation to the findings presented in this thesis, is the broad and varied scope 
of analysis. For instance, Chapter 3 expands the lens of conservation conflict to include a 
variety of contexts (such as illegal resource use) which previously have not been considered 
within conflict frameworks. Chapter 6 is similarly wide-reaching in considering how conflict 
is produced at a variety of different scales. Moreover, throughout this thesis, a range of 
different intervention types are considered alongside each other, rather than individually, 
as seen in other analyses (Osipova et al., 2018; Ravenelle and Nyhus, 2017; Sterling et al., 
2017). This broad approach has clear benefits in terms of considering conflict more 
holistically (Mason et al., 2018), bringing together insights from across disciplines (Pooley et 
al., 2014), and contributing to much needed general theory on human behaviour and 
decision-making in conservation (Papworth, 2017; Schultz, 2011; Sutherland and Wordley, 
2017). However, the consequential reduced level of detail and depth into a specific 
intervention or behaviour may limit the immediate applicability of these findings to 
practitioners working on the ground. Similarly, whilst the broad scope taken in this thesis 
has provided insights into a range of different aspects shaping conflicts and their 
interventions, these individual insights may have been richer if any one of them had the 
sole focus of this thesis. Moreover, this thesis applies a number of emerging research 
methods to the study of conservation conflict, which brings the challenge of 
interdisciplinarity. I have had to learn and apply a range of research techniques which 
means that for any given technique, I likely had reduced expertise compared to if I had 
specialised only in that technique. Interdisciplinarity also involves grappling with various 
different literatures, theories and ways of producing and presenting knowledge, which can 
make it challenging to situate a given piece of research within a particular literature. 
Furthermore, as shown by the somewhat contrasting results of the literature review 
175 
 
(Chapter 3) and framing experiment Chapter 4), as well as the differences found between 
game behaviours and stated preferences in Chapter 7, different research approaches can 
produce varying insights, which presents an additional interpretation challenge. 
 
Specifically, a key area that has received insufficient attention in this thesis, but which 
requires greater consideration, is the application of behavioural insights to conflict 
intervention design (Veríssimo et al., 2019). For instance, the extent to which decision-
makers take into account the different psychological levers of behaviour (Papworth, 2017; 
Schultz, 2011) is likely to influence the options which are deemed as suitable, as well as 
their effectiveness. Future studies could apply behaviour change frameworks to conflict 
interventions. These include the behaviour change wheel (Staddon et al., 2016), 
‘MINDSPACE’ (Dolan et al., 2012) and ‘EAST’ (Valatin et al., 2016) – which promote 
interventions which make target behaviours easier, more attractive, more social and which 
are more timely (Rare and The Behavioural Insights Team, 2019). Indeed, behavioural 
‘nudges’ – small variations in the way choices are presented or framed (Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2008) – have been applied to successfully change various forms of conservation-
relevant behaviours (Reddy et al., 2017), from reducing food-waste (Kallbekken and Sælen, 
2013) to introducing bird-friendly fishing gear (Santangeli et al., 2016), and should be 
applied to conflict contexts. For instance, the ‘intervener’ effects demonstrated in Chapter 
7 may be comparable to the ‘messenger effects’ observed for conservation fundraising 
(Duthie et al., 2017) or awareness campaigns (Hafner et al., 2017; Mackeracher et al., 
2018), and these could therefore be tested for awareness-based conflict interventions. 
Other behavioural insights, such as how trust in authority figures is shaped by the uniforms 
that their wear (Albert et al., 2008) and economic decisions are shaped by framing of losses 
or gains (Kahneman et al., 1991) could also be tested with regards to conflict interventions. 
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Similarly, social marketing approaches (Salazar et al., 2018; Veríssimo, 2019), including the 
use of audience segmentation (Jones et al., 2019; Maibach et al., 2011) and network 
analysis (De Lange et al., 2019), are considered more effective approaches than traditional 
information provision (Smith et al., 2010; Wright et al., 2015), and require further attention 
in conflict research.  
 
With behaviour change in mind, whilst the effectiveness of conflict interventions is a major 
area of focus, this thesis also does not explore the ways in which the effectiveness of 
interventions, is being, or could be, assessed. This is also a limitation across the conflict 
literature. For instance, it is commonly asserted that conflicts are increasing (Laverty et al., 
2019; Treves and Karanth, 2003). However, such statements usually reflect measures of 
impacts (Teixeira et al., 2015), land-use changes (Balmford et al., 2001), or the number of 
conflict-related studies (Anand and Radhakrishna, 2017), and rarely the social nature of 
conflict. These measures also often fail to account for the importance of other factors 
shaping conflicts, such as whether species are expanding in range (Arbieu et al., 2019) or 
receiving tighter protection (Bluwstein, 2018), variation in the capacity for democratic 
protest (Holmes, 2007; Kashwan, 2017), trends in urbanisation (Sanderson et al., 2018), and 
the changing ways people experience nature (Büscher et al., 2017; Lorimer, 2015). Hence, 
there is clearly a need to develop a better set of measurements and understanding of how 
exactly conflicts – and related behaviours – are changing in frequency and intensity over 
time. Drawing inspiration from the fields of armed conflict studies (Hegre et al., 2016) and 
natural resource management (Yasmi et al., 2006), one framework (which colleagues and I 
have been developing) identifies multiple levels of increasing conflict intensity, from pre-
conflict disagreements, to breakdowns in dialogue, to purposeful actions, to aggression. 
Other methods include measuring issue polarisation (McCright et al., 2014) or assessing the 
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likelihood that different groups can form a consensus on management options (St John et 
al., 2018; Veríssimo et al., 2015). Nonetheless a big challenge is in accounting for the 
multiple-levels (Chapter 6) and complex networks of actors in conflicts (Colvin et al., 2015; 
Yasmi et al., 2006).  
 
Lastly, by conceptualising conflict through an ostensibly human behavioural lens, ‘more 
than human’ conflict dynamics are possibly overlooked. Although useful for exploring 
human-human conflict dynamics, focusing solely on human antagonists neglects the 
potential importance of individual animals as actors in conflicts. Indeed, the role of animal 
agency in producing conflict has been identified (Evans and Adams, 2018) and as 
highlighted in Chapter 6, people attribute varying levels of agency and consciousness to 
particular animals. The intense and varied public reaction to the illegal hunt of Cecil the lion 
in Zimbabwe in 2015, in both the Global North (Lindsey et al., 2016; Pooley et al., 2016) 
 and East Africa (Mkono, 2019), reflected the cultural relevance of the event and narratives 
of human-wildlife interactions more than the conservation outcome. Hence, better 
understanding human-animal relations and narratives (Dhee et al., 2019) is likely important 
in better understanding conservation conflicts and the factors which constrain 
interventions. To this end, conservation conflict researchers might benefit from engaging 
with the human geographical, ethological and anthropological explorations of ‘more-than-
human’ relations (Garlick, 2018; Srinivasan, 2017), which comprise the emerging fields of 
‘multispecies studies’ (van Dooren et al., 2016) and ‘extinction studies’ (van Dooren et al., 
2017). However, one challenge with embracing broader concepts of conflict, will be the 
added difficulty of assessing the intensity of different conflicts, and determining 
intervention priorities, particularly when the ‘interest’ of individual animals may conflict 




Conservation conflicts are wicked problems in which clashes over conservation objectives 
are reflected through particular human behaviours. Whilst in some instances conflicts 
represent healthy democratic processes, more commonly they are products of social 
dysfunction. Conflicts are often managed via interventions seeking to achieve better 
outcomes for people and wildlife by changing people’s behaviour. Accordingly, this thesis 
aims to help better inform interventions and promote positive behaviour change. It finds 
that the effectiveness of conflict interventions may be hampered by untested assumptions 
and the underuse of scientific evidence and Theories of Change. It also finds that 
intervention decision-making is likely influenced by particular geographical features of 
conflicts and the characteristics of decision-makers. Testing the assumptions underpinning 
different intervention priorities, and further interrogating the factors shaping priorities, will 
be therefore key to achieving evidence-informed interventions. The findings presented in 
this thesis also suggest that conflict-related behaviour change will stem from not only 
reducing wildlife impacts, but from widening participation in decision-making, and better 
addressing the social roots conflict, including those related to stakeholder distrust, values 
and politics. However, this thesis also shows how the effectiveness of local management 
approaches will be constrained by both the characteristics of those doing the intervening, 
and by the wider socio-political and governance structures shaping the conflict. In 
particular, it suggests that collaborative local decision-making may be prove illusionary 
where wildlife management decisions are seemingly non-negotiable and determined by 
non-local conservation objectives. In short, conflicts over conservation are socially created 
and socially resolved: both the choice of interventions and their effectiveness at changing 





- Researchers should consider conflict and interventions more through the lens of 
human behaviour. 
- Decision-makers should be aware that their backgrounds and biases may shape 
their assumptions and intervention decisions. 
- Practitioners should consider that behavioural responses to interventions will be 
influenced by who is doing the intervening. 
- Researchers should further explore how local interventions and collaborative 
management may be constrained by the multi-level dynamics of conflicts. 
- Researchers should further explore the dimensions of polarisation in conflicts, 
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Search 1 (preliminary search): 
ISI Web of Science search December 2015 
Results: 431 
(from Web of Science Core Collection) 
You searched for: TS=(("human-wildlife conflict” OR “human-animal conflict” OR “conservation conflict” OR “biodiversity conflict”) 
AND [excluding] DOCUMENT TYPES: ( REVIEW OR BOOK CHAPTER ) 
Timespan: 2005-2015. Indexes: SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, A&HCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH, BKCI-S, BKCI-SSH, ESCI, CCR-EXPANDED, IC. 
 
Search 2 (final search): 
ISI Web of Science search October 2016 
Results: 897 
(from Web of Science Core Collection) 
You searched for: TS=(("conservation conflict*") OR ("conservation" AND "illegal") OR ("conservation" AND "conflict" AND ("stakeholder*" OR 
"human-wildlife"))) 
Refined by: TOPIC: (("prevent*" OR "mitigat*" OR "reduc*" OR "resolv*" OR "resolution*" OR "solv*" OR "solution*" OR "manag*" OR "interven*" OR 
"improv*")) AND [excluding] DOCUMENT TYPES: ( REVIEW OR BOOK CHAPTER ) 





We only searched in the English language as this was the only language the author collecting the data was fluent in. Following the preliminary search, 
we adapted our search terms to more accurately capture the variation in conflict contexts we were looking for. We dropped the search terms 
‘human-animal conflict’ and ‘biodiversity conflict’ as these produced only a small number of results (less than 20 each). We added search terms 
related to illegal behaviours and stakeholders to capture a wider range of contexts, such as those covering natural-resource use. We did not include 
search terms related to ‘natural resource’ conflict because although these terms produced many relevant results specific to conservation, they also 
produced a high proportion of results not specific to nature conservation – such as those over rare earth mining, or taxonomy. Similarly, we avoided 
using more context-specific search terms such as ‘fisheries’, ‘agriculture’, or ‘human-elephant conflict’. This was to avoid generating bias to particular 
contexts and to keep the search process simple and broad. Given each search produced hundreds of results (e.g. “natural resource” AND “conflict” 
produced over 300 results), we deemed it too time intensive to identify all individual papers which described conflicts related to nature conservation, 
but did not use the term ‘conservation’. Hence we kept the term ‘conservation’ in our final search. We also wanted to include literature from across a 
range of journals, hence we did not specify journal type.  
 
Sample selection: 
To produce a representative random sample for analysis, we used a random list generator (www.random.org/lists/ accessed 07/03/2018) to sort an 
alphabetically-ordered list of articles into a randomly ordered list. We then analysed articles in turn from the beginning of this random list.  The 
randomness comes from atmospheric noise and uses the same mechanism as the R package ‘random’. We deemed our random sample size 
representative of the full sample. Table A1.1 (below) outlines the breakdown of a key word search (in article titles, abstracts and keywords) for both 
the not-analysed sample, and the analysed sample. Note that there are no significant differences between the proportions of key words between 
samples. We excluded papers from analysis is they were deemed to be either a) a review paper, b) conservation conflict not the focus of the study c) 










Region: As categorized by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN). http://www.iucnredlist.org/technical-documents/data-
organization/countries-by-regions (accessed 11/02/2018)  
Conservation status: The conservation status of any species specifically mentioned in articles, as categorised by the IUCN Red-List 
http://www.iucnredlist.org/ (accessed 11/03/2018). ‘Listed’ included articles in which at least one species mentioned is included on the Red-List 
(critically endangered, endangered, threatened, vulnerable, near threatened). ‘Non-listed’ included articles in which no species mentioned were 
included on Red-List (least concern, data deficient). If no specific species were mentioned, the paper was also designated as ‘non-listed’. 
Development status: As categorised by the Human Development Index (HDI) (2016) http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi 
(accessed 11/03/2018). Following the HDI, countries were categorised as ‘very high development’ (n=40), ‘High development’ (n=20), ‘Medium 
development’ (n=31) and ‘Low development’ (n=9). Each category was assessed independently, but due to the unequal representation of each 
category and given that the ‘Very high development’ category seemed to differentiate most from the other categories with respect of our conflict 
variables (Table A1.8), we collapsed the three other categories in the rest of our analysis to compare ‘Very high development’ against ‘High, Mid and 
Low development’.  
Key word Not-analysed 
(n=740) 
Analysed (n=157) Significant difference using 
tailed Z test (P value) 
“human-wildlife” 187 (25%) 33 (21%) No (0.26) 
“stakeholder” 164 (22%) 38 (24%) No (0.57) 
“resource” 202 (27%) 45 (29%) No (0.73) 
“illegal” 393 (53%) 95 (61%) No (0.09) 
“conflict” 334 (45%) 76 (48%) No (0.45) 
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Protected Area: Our variable ‘Protected Area’ include all articles which described a protected area (IUCN categories I-V) within the article, as being 
either the site of, or adjacent to, a study area. https://www.iucn.org/theme/protected-areas/our-work/world-database-protected-areas (access 
11/03/2018) 
Illegal: Our variable ‘illegal’ included all articles in which the authors described any activity as being explicitly illegal, or described the breaking of the 
law, Papers which described no illegal activities, or did not explicitly identify them as such, were recorded as ‘non-illegal’. 
 
Journals and affiliations: 
We recorded the geographical region (following Estévez et al., (2015)) corresponding to the first author’s affiliation given in each paper. We also 
recorded the affiliation name (such as research department or institution). From the total list of affiliations, we attempted to devise categorise (such 
as ‘conservation science’, ‘social science’ or ‘natural resource management’. However, due to the often broad, and interdisciplinary nature of 
institutions we abandoned this approach.  Likewise, we also attempted to categorise journals by their disciplinary focus and scope. To do this, we first 
used the Web of Knowledge categorisation system to separate journals (in our sample) into ‘Sciences’ (n=86), ‘Social Sciences’ (n=19), and ‘Arts and 
Humanities’ (n=0). Due to the bias towards ‘Sciences’ we also attempted to develop a categorisation system to more accurately distinguish between 
disciplines represented in our sample (e.g., ecology, policy and management, or anthropology), by drawing upon the ‘scope and aims’ of each journal, 
as published on their online website. However, after collecting the data and trying to devise categories, we found this approach unsatisfactory due to 
the highly interdisciplinary nature of conservation and environmentally-focussed journals - so we did not take it forward. However, we do report the 








Table A1.2. Proportion of articles within each variable category which recommend each intervention type, PA = Protected Area 
Variable Articles(N) Technical Cognitive Economic Enforcement Stakeholder 
All 100 0.38 0.40 0.47 0.54 0.37 
Wildlife control 32 0.66 0.44 0.47 0.41 0.34 
Resource use 59 0.31 0.37 0.51 0.68 0.27 
Environment change 26 0.12 0.38 0.50 0.54 0.62 
Indirect damage 34 0.24 0.41 0.44 0.74 0.35 
Active opposition 33 0.36 0.36 0.39 0.24 0.67 
Human-wildlife conflict 30 0.67 0.47 0.60 0.40 0.30 
Illegal resource use 41 0.24 0.44 0.46 0.78 0.12 
Human-human conflict 29 0.28 0.28 0.34 0.34 0.79 
Illegal 66 0.30 0.39 0.48 0.70 0.30 
Non illegal 34 0.53 0.41 0.44 0.24 0.50 
Very high development 40 0.48 0.40 0.30 0.38 0.58 
High, Mid & Low development 60 0.32 0.40 0.58 0.65 0.23 
Listed 48 0.44 0.44 0.54 0.60 0.17 
Non-listed 52 0.33 0.37 0.40 0.48 0.56 
PA 61 0.36 0.43 0.52 0.54 0.33 






Table A1.3. Results of Pearson’s Chi-squared tests of independence between intervention types and conflict variables, with odds ratios presented 
with P-values in parenthesis and only statistically significant associations displayed. HWC = Human-wildlife conflict, IRU = Illegal resource use, HHC = 






























0.24 (0.001**) 0.52 
(0.032*) 
 













        
















































Table A1.4: Frequency of articles in each conflict variable category, by framing category. HWC = Human-wildlife conflict, IRU = Illegal resource use, 
HHC = Human-human conflict 
 
 
Table A1.5: Results of Pearson’s Chi-squared tests of independence between intervention type and Theories of Change (ToC), evidence and journal 
type, with odds ratios presented with P-values in parenthesis and only statistically significant associations displayed. ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 




Resource use Environment 
change 
Indirect damage Active opposition Wildlife impacts Groups identified Illegal activity 
HWC (30) 24 11 4 6 10 30 2 13 
IRU (41) 4 37 9 20 1 7 2 41 













NA   
Economic 1.94 (0.006**) 2.13 (0.004**)  0.46 (0.008**) 
Enforcement 
  
 1.58 (0.037*) 
Stakeholder 
  





Table A1.6: Results of Pearson’s Chi-squared tests of independence between conflict variables, with significant P-values presented, and colour-coded 







0.033 (-) 0.035 (-)   <0.001 (+) <0.001 (-) 0.013 (-)   0.004 (+)   




    0.006 (+)      
   
Indirect 
damage 
  0009 (+)      0.042 (+) 
    
Active 
opposition 
 <0.001 (-) <0.001 (+) <0.001 (+) <0.001 (-) <0.001 (-)  <0.001 (-) 
     HWC     0.015 (+)  0.002 (-) 
      IRU  <0.001 (-) <0.001 (+)   <0.001 (+) 
       HHC <0.001 (+) <0.001 (-) <0.001 (-)  <0.001 (-) 
        
Very high 
development 
 <0.001 (-) <0.001 (-) <0.001 (-) 
         
High, Mid & 
Low 
development 
<0.001 (+) <0.001 (+) <0.001 (+) 
          Listed 0.002 (+) 0.025 (+) 
           PA  




Table A1.7: Results of Pearson’s Chi-squared tests of independence between intervention types, with odds ratios presented with P-values in 










Technical Cognitive Economic Enforcement Stakeholder 
Technical 
  
   
Cognitive      
Economic      
Enforcement     OR: 0.54 (0.004**) 






Figure A1.1: Chord diagram showing the relationship between author affiliation region (outside rim) and study regions (inner flows). The width of each outer rim 
depicts the proportion of total articles with first-author affiliation in each region. The direction and width of the inner flows show the proportion of articles 




Table A1.8: Proportion of articles in each development category, which were also categorised into other conflict variables. HWC = Human-wildlife 
conflict’, IRU = Illegal resource use, HHC = Human-human conflict, and PA = Protected Area.  
Human 
Development 





Very high 40 0.33 0.18 0.50 0.33 0.15 0.43 
High  20 0.25 0.45 0.30 0.75 0.60 0.85 
Mid  31 0.36 0.58 0.07 0.81 074 0.74 
Low  9 0.11 0.78 0.11 0.89 0.78 1.00 
 
Intervention types 
Table A1.9: Frequency of intervention types recommended by articles categorised by evidence strength  
  Intervention types  
Evidence  (N) 1 2 3 4 5 Mean (0.95, CI) 
Weak 25 7 14 4 0 0 2..23 (2.00, 2.46) 
Partial 65 14 29 15 7 0 2..4 (1.80, 3.00) 










Table A1.10: Frequency of journals represented, by region, and by scope 
Region (N) Scope (N) 
Global 88 Global 79 
Tropical 4 Marine 8 
Africa 3 Fish 2 
Europe 3 Herpetology 2 
Asia 1 Birds 1 
Polar 1 Coastal 1 
  Commons 1 
  Pastoral 1 
  Polar 1 
  Rural 1 
  Tropical 1 
  Ursus 1 










We did not collect meta-data associated with the survey web-links to ensure that respondent anonymity was preserved. Nonetheless, given the high 
proportion of (seemingly legitimate and non-duplicate) emails provided (78%), and the demographic data provided, we have confidence that our 
sample reflected our target audience – conservation researchers and practitioners of various backgrounds with some experience of conflicts in theory 
or in practise. From our question ‘do you work in conservation’ we were also able to exclude any respondents who did not self-identify as working in 
conservation. Of our final analysed sample (n=411), 273 respondents followed the link given in emails and on paper flyers at the European Congress 
for Conservation Biology (ECCB) 2018 and 138 followed the link via Twitter. Of those who followed the link by Twitter, we expect a large proportion of 
which were either at the ECCB conference themselves – as the papers flyers pointed participants towards the authors’ Twitter account for the survey 
link. In total 136 Twitter accounts retweeted (shared) the original survey link – the vast majority of which describe links to conservation practise or 
research in their Twitter user biography.  Of the 411 respondents in the final analysed sample, 400 revealed their nationality and 52 different 
nationalities were represented. However, the respondents were largely Anglo-centric, with a low representation from Latin America and East Asia in 
particular. Nonetheless, this clearly biased sample does reflect the Anglo-European bias of authors in conservation conflict research (Chapter 3) and 
conflict study-locations (van Eeden et al., 2018). 
 
ISI web of science search:  
Date: 01/07/2018 Results: 453 
 You searched for: TOPIC: ("human-wildlife conflict" OR "conservation conflict" OR "biodiversity conflict") (from Web of Science Core Collection)  
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Timespan: 2015-2018. Indexes: SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, A&HCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH, BKCI-S, BKCI-SSH, ESCI, CCR-EXPANDED, IC. 
Of the 453 results we were able to email 336 lead authors individually using their correspondence email provided with the paper. The only results omitted were 
those in which the lead author was repeated, or those which did not have a listed, or viable, email address.  
 
Table A2.1: Nationality of respondents 
Nationality Count Nationality Count Nationality Count 
UK 78 Switzerland 3 Botswana 1 
South Africa 56 Kenya 3 Japan 1 
US 47 Nepal 3 Namibia 1 
Australia 23 Ireland 3 Uganda 1 
Canada 21 New Zealand 3 Sri Lanka 1 
Spain 18 Greece 2 Poland 1 
Germany 16 Serbia 2 Argentina 1 
Italy 15 Chile 2 Denmark 1 
Finland 12 Indonesia 2 Norway 1 
France 12 Belgium 2 Croatia 1 
India 11 Mozambique 2 Czech 1 
Sweden 10 Turkey 2 Luxemburg 1 
Brazil 8 Ethiopia 1 Madagascar 1 
Zimbabwe 6 Singapore 1 Mauritius 1 
Portugal 5 Russia 1 Romania 1 
Netherlands 5 Bulgaria 1 Nigeria 1 
Mexico 3 Estonia 1   





Table A2.2: Results from multinomial logit regression models (Model Set 1), showing the estimated conditional effects of each predictor variable on 
likelihood of choosing each intervention type compared to the reference level in each model. Effects are presented as odds ratios (OR), showing the 
expected change in likelihood of choosing different interventions when each continuous variable increases by a unit of 1 or when each factor variable 
changes level from a baseline. The values in parentheses are 95% CI. The larger the OR the greater the predicted strength of association. Only 
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Table A2.3: Results from multinomial logit regression models (model set 2) (Table 4.2) of estimated conditional effects of different predictor 
variables (related to the description of conflict scenarios and respondents’ characteristics) on the likelihood of respondents’ prioritising different 
conflict intervention types, compared with other choices (in brackets), across the conflict scenarios presented. Effects are presented as odds ratios 
(OR), showing the expected change in likelihood of choosing different interventions when each continuous variable increases by a unit of 1 or when 
each factor variable changes level from a baseline. The values in parentheses are 95% CI. The larger the OR the greater the predicted strength of 
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Literature    OR 0.74*** 
(0.62-0.88) 
     OR 1.21* 
(1.01-1.45) 
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Table A2.4: Standard deviation of the intercept for each intervention type from multinomial mixed logit models (Model Set 2). The model reference 
intervention type is included (columns) and the amount of variation explained by each model is given by R2. 
 [Awareness] [Economic] [Enforcement] [Impacts] [Stakeholder] 
Awareness - 0.39 0.51 0.31 0.31 
Enforcement 0.54 0.56 - 0.54 0.53 
Impacts 0.30 0.34 0.50 - 0.27 
Economic 0.39 - 0.55 0.35 0.37 
Stakeholder 0.32 0.36 0.51 0.28 - 





Figure A2.1: Results from a multinomial mixed logit regression model (Model Set 2, reference level ‘stakeholder’), showing the predicted 
probability of choosing each intervention type (colour) with changes in each numerical predictor variable (regression lines with 95% CI). ‘HDI’ 
= Human Development Index. ‘Discipline’ = self-reported disciplinary background (0=Social Science/Humanities only, 100 = Natural 





Figure A2.2: Word cloud generated from survey respondents (n=166) who provided written feedback (in the open-ended question), with 







The survey (Appendix 4) included questions to determine levels of elephant-related damage and four measures of elephant tolerance (spatial, 


































Google Scholar search: Keywords: “Enduimet” 
Results 64.  
Book chapters: 6, Conferences papers: 3, Reports: 12, Published papers: 27, Thesis and dissertations: 16 
 
Website sources: 
Honeyguide: https://www.honeyguide.org/news/saving-elephants-simple-solutions/ (accessed 10/10/2018) 
The Nature Conservancy (TNC): https://www.nature.org/en-us/about-us/where-we-work/africa/stories-in-africa/keeping-wide-open-spaces-for-elephants/ 
(accessed 10/10/2018) 
Enduimet Tourism: http://enduimet.org/kilimanjaro-amboseli/ and http://enduimet.org/ (accessed 09/10/18), 
African Wildlife Foundation (AWF): https://www.awf.org/news/introducing-african-heartlands (accessed 10/10/2018).  
Tanzanian Tourist board (http://www.tanzaniatourism.go.tz/destination/enduimet-wma (accessed 09/10/18)  






At the start of each game the information sheet was read out to the group of four participants in both English and Swahili (and Maa if necessary). 
Then, each round, players were endowed with five plastic tokens to represent five bags of crop on their ‘farm’ on the board. Three elephant figurines 
were placed on the board to represent the local elephant population. Depending on the treatment, four pawns (green for WMA, red for Moran) were 
also placed on the board to represent the elephant guarding group (Figure A3.1). Players made their cooperation decisions anonymously and in 
private by each placing a token into one of two concealed cups. We did not use written decision sheets due widespread illiteracy, and the desire to 
maximise the speed, simplicity and engagement of the game. The cup representing contributions to the guarding group changed in colour by 
treatment (green for WMA, red for Moran). Players were allowed to talk to each other during the game, but not with regards to their decisions and 
not during decision making. After all the decisions were made, the total amount of guarding contribution was made known to the group and 
represented by the number of guarding pawns moved onto the board. If only one player contributed a token towards the guarding effort, only one 
guarding pawn would then be moved onto the board. If two players contributed, then two pawns would be moved onto the board and so on.  
 
To determine whether they individually incurred crop-raiding damage, each player then rolled a six-sided dice. This approach follows previous games 
(e.g., Hasson et al. 2010) in incorporating risk uncertainty into the public good dilemma. A roll of four, five or six incurred no damage, and a roll of 
one, two, or three incurred damage. The level of damage in terms of lost tokens, was proportional to the total guarding contribution of each round. If 
no players contributed to the guarding pot (public good), then any player who incurred crop-raiding, would lose five tokens. If one player had 
contributed to the guarding pot, then any player incurring crop-raiding would lose four tokens. If two players contributed, crop-raiding damage would 
be three tokens, with three contributors two tokens and if all four players contributed, each would be at risk of losing only one token. Each game was 
played for five rounds so that cooperation could be compared across rounds, and to see if it responded to crop-loss or the decisions of other players. 
Group composition was thus known to all players and kept constant. At the end of each round a player could discern how many players in the group 
cooperated, but at no stage would they know who made which decisions. Players’ individual decisions were not disclosed to other participants at an
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stage. Participants were paid 5,000Tsh for participating. To include real monetary incentives, participants were also paid an additional amount (max, 6000Tsh) 
which was linearly proportional to the number of tokens they individually amassed. On average participants left with 8-9000Tsh (3.5-4 USD) which was deemed in 
consultation with village leaders a suitable amount to compensate for any loss of earnings and time at the market rate – average income per adult in the district is 
estimated at just 0.16 USD per day (Homewood et al., 2012). Each player played both treatments with a short break in between, and the order of treatments was 
rotated between groups. The game instructions were kept the same each game except for which organisation was described as carrying out the guarding. The 
game instructions regarding public-good contribution used a positive externality framing, which focuses on the benefits of cooperating for others rather than the 
costs of not cooperating for others. In utilizing a framing experiment, our study also builds on previous studies which use framing experiments to explore sensitive 
support for different groups involved in armed conflict (Blair et al., 2014). 
 




To minimise variation across sites in the WMA, we chose three, predominantly Maasai villages which display a similar mix of pastoralism and 
agriculture. The three villages selected were chosen on the basis that they each included both pastoralists and agriculturalist, had suitable facilities in 
which to play the game, and well represented the range of environments in the region. Time and resources in the field limited the total number of 
villages and participants. Participants were selected from a village list of inhabitants (n=80-100) known to be present at the time of the study, using a 
random sequence generator (https://www.random.org/sequences/) to dictate the order of participants. This list was created in consultation with the 
chairperson and assistant chairperson of each sub-village. Included within each list were people from the full range of age categories and from 
different families. Whilst participants came from multiple sub-villages, some would have inevitably known each other. Where participants failed to 
respond or arrive, the next or closest available individual on the list was recruited in their place. In one village participants could only be reached via 
the village chairperson making randomization harder to achieve, so we relied on the chairperson to ensure that participants were recruited from 
across the various sub-villages, and from different homesteads.     
 
Data collection 
Each participant was surveyed using a structured interview before each game (see Survey Sheet), and we also conducted group and individual debrief 
interviews after game. The survey included a range of sociodemographic questions including age, education, wealth and occupation, as well as other 
questions asked background information and to inform other research questions. The three categories of trustworthiness – ability, benevolence and 
integrity - were each measured using a four-point Likert type questions (following World Values Survey 2008) and these were also aggregated to get 
an aggregate trustworthiness score. Dispositional trust and perceptions of the WMA legitimacy were also measured in separate questions. All trust-
related questions were adapted from the World Values Survey (World Values Survey, 2008) and reflected aspects of positive trust (Stern and Baird, 
2015). The survey also included questions to determine levels of elephant-related damage and four measures of elephant tolerance (spatial, damage, 
killing and population) adapted from Kansky et al. (2016). To ensure that the trust-related questions were consistent across translations (into Maa and 
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Swahili) the research team (led by a native English speaker with moderate Swahili and two local research assistants fluent in English, Maa and Swahili) used a 
process of back-translation, deliberation and refinement during the final survey-design process to determine the appropriate wording in each language. During 
pilot-testing, respondents were asked to elaborate upon how they interpreted the questions (as well as the game instructions) to ensure their appropriateness. 
The surveys were then administered orally with consistent translations using the same research team throughout. Where respondents asked for clarifications, 
consistent explanations were used throughout. During both the pre-game survey and post-game interviews, responses were translated orally back into English and 
recorded by the lead researcher. This meant that any extra detail given by respondents during the survey was captured, which helped contextualise answers and 
confirm that respondents were addressing the intended concepts (particularly regarding the specific components of trustworthiness). Initially we only carried 
post-game group interviews with the intention of facilitating discussion of both the realism of the game, the conflict in general, and the different reasons why 
participants supported guarding from each group. Although these interviews did reveal relevant insights (e.g., Figure A3.8), we found that some individuals 
dominated discussions and were concerned that some respondents may have been agreeing with the general sentiment of the group rather than sharing their 
own opinions. Hence, after collecting a sufficient sample of group interviews (n= 20, 80 participants), we switched to carrying out individual post-game interviews 
(132 participants), which focused on individuals’ motivations for their game behaviour. 
 
Data analysis 
To analyse game behaviour, we used generalised linear mixed effects models. These estimate the independent effects of each predictor variable (such as 
treatment, trustworthiness, wealth and age) on the response variable (an individual’s summed cooperation over five rounds). Mixed-effects models can also 
account for the variation expected between different individuals, and between different groups. By including ‘group’ as a random effect in the models, we can 
account for the possible effect that, within any one group, the cooperation behaviour of other group members is likely to influence any given participant. The 
order of treatment and timing of the game were controlled for, and variable covariance was checked. All explanatory variable scores were generated from the 
survey. 
 
Ability, benevolence and integrity are considered three components of the underling concept of trustworthiness (Stern and Coleman, 2015). Hence, during analysis 
we aimed to test each both component separately, and test a general trustworthiness score. Pearson’s correlation coefficients between each of the three 
variables (Ability-Benevolence 0.57, Ability-Integrity 0.49, Benevolence-Integrity 0.50) indicate that they are partly, but not 
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so highly correlated as to prevent inclusion in multiple regression analyses. However, to determine whether the three components also reflected one 
underlying latent ‘trustworthiness’ variable, we estimated their internal consistency by calculating Cronbach’s alpha (Tavakol & Dennick 2011) (with 
the R package “ltm”) and conducting factor analysis (with the R package ‘nFactors’). The Cronbach’s alpha found for the three components of 
trustworthiness (0.77, 0.95 CI: 0.73-0.80) indicates an acceptable level of internal consistency for aggregation, and the results of factor analysis 
suggest the presence of one underlying latent factor (Figure A3.2). To generate the aggregate score, we first standardised the three individual 
components (to create ‘Z’ scores) using the ‘scale’ function in ‘R’. We then ‘weighted’ each of the three components using the ‘loadings’ generated for 
the primary factor during factor analysis (Table A3.1) and then summed these weighted ‘factor scores’ together.  
 
As the four measures of elephant tolerance were intended to form an index (Kansky et al., 2016) we carried out the same process as above to 
generate a aggregated tolerance score. The more moderate Cronbach’s alpha for tolerance (0.65, 0.95 CI: 0.57-0.71) suggests a lower level of internal 
consistently but like for trustworthiness, the results from factor analysis (Figure A3.2) suggest the presence of one underling latent factor. Hence, we 
used the aggregate tolerance score in our analysis, which again was generated from the weighted ‘factor scores’. Despite the Cronbach’s alpha for 
tolerance being low, we included tolerance in our models because this score is within the range deemed acceptable by some (Taber 2018) and 
because the tolerance measures were taken from a previously validated tolerance framework (Kansky et al. 2016). For the purposes of regression 
analysis, the variable ‘crop-loss’ reflected the annual number of crop bags lost to elephants plus one (to avoid zero values in predictor variables). 
There were a few (n= 6) missing response for crop-loss and we deemed this measure a more reliable and useful indicator of crop loss than the 
question which asked participants to estimate what proportion of their annual crop they lose to elephants. Hence, in Models 3, 4 and 5 the sample 
size was slightly reduced (n=206) due to these missing responses for crop loss. In all models (Figures A3.4-A3.7), the timing of the game was not 
significant, but cooperation was significantly lower in games in which the WMA treatment came first (p < 0.01, odds ratio 0.32, 0.95 CI: 0.14-0.69) 
(Model 1). 
 The scores for dispositional trust and perceptions of the legitimacy of the WMA (an intended proxy for procedural trust) were also included in 
additional models. However, they were not found to be significant, which may have reflected a low degree of variability in responses to these 
questions (82% of respondents categorised themselves as generally not trustful of others, and 71% of respondents perceived the WMA as ‘very 
legitimate’). For these reasons and because, upon reflection, we did not have strong confidence that these two simple questions were good measures 
of either dispositional or procedural trust, we did not include them in our final models. Debriefs were analysed using directed content analysis. New 
reasoning categories were added until we could no longer add new categories (n=18). We then collapsed this larger list into a small number of 
234 
 
reasoning themes (n=5) which included the three components of trustworthiness (ability, benevolence and integrity). The results of the group-
debriefs (Figure A3.8), correspond closely to those of the individual-debriefs (Figure x.2) and pre-game survey which found greater perceptions of the 
ability, benevolence and integrity of Moran over the WMA (Table x.2). 
 
 








Crop loss  
























Figure A4.2: Scree test results from Factor Analyses on the three components of trustworthiness, indicating the prevalence of one key underlying 







Figure A4.3: Estimated cooperation per player in the public goods game, by treatment (colour, shape) and by round, with shading indicating 95% Confidence 




Figure A4.4: Results from a generalised linear mixed effects model, showing the estimated conditional effects of each predictor variable on cooperation 
within games (Model 1). Filled dots represent model coefficient estimates converted to odds ratios, which show the expected change in likelihood of 
cooperation when each continuous variable increases by a unit of one, or when each factor variable changes level from a baseline (unfilled dots). 
Whiskers represent standard errors (95% CI), and variables with whiskers that do not cross zero are those predicted by the model to associate with 





Figure A4.5: Results from a generalised linear mixed effects model, showing the estimated conditional effects of each predictor variable on 
cooperation within games, with trustworthiness included (Model 2). Filled dots represent model coefficient estimates converted to odds ratios, which 
show the expected change in likelihood of cooperation when each continuous variable increases by a unit of one, or when each factor variable 
changes level from a baseline (unfilled dots). Whiskers represent standard errors (95% CI), and variables with whiskers that do not cross zero are 
those predicted by the model to associate with cooperation (effect size is distinguishable from zero). Larger odds ratios indicate greater predicted 




Figure A4.6: Results from a generalised linear mixed effects model, showing the estimated conditional effects of each predictor variable on 
cooperation within games, with the different components of trustworthiness included (Model 3). Filled dots represent model coefficient estimates 
converted to odds ratios, which show the expected change in likelihood of cooperation when each continuous variable increases by a unit of one, or 
when each factor variable changes level from a baseline (unfilled dots). Whiskers represent standard errors (95% CI), and variables with whiskers that 
do not cross zero are those predicted by the model to associate with cooperation (effect size is distinguishable from zero). Larger odds ratios indicate 




Figure A4.7: Results from a generalised linear mixed effects model, showing the estimated conditional effects of each predictor variable on cooperation within 
games, with the different components of trustworthiness and a priori predictors of cooperation included (Model 4). Filled dots represent model coefficient 
estimates converted to odds ratios, which show the expected change in likelihood of cooperation when each continuous variable increases by a unit of one, or 
when each factor variable changes level from a baseline (unfilled dots). Whiskers represent standard errors (95% CI), and variables with whiskers that do not cross 
zero are those predicted by the model to associate with cooperation (effect size is distinguishable from zero). Larger odds ratios indicate greater predicted 




Figure A4.8: The frequency of different reasoning types given during post-game group debriefs (n=20) when discussing the merits of different 
guarding groups and cooperation with them, related to: the ability, benevolence or integrity of participants or the intervening groups (bar colour), the 






Survey sheet  
 
Demographic 





2. Age set  
Moran (18-25) 
Junior Elders (25-35) 
Middle Elders (35-55)  
Senior 55+  




University or college 
4. Livelihood 
Pastoralist only 
Pastoralist mainly, some crops 
Half livestock, half crops 





5. Head of household?  
Yes 
No 
6. Do you use MPESA (or equivalent)? 
Yes 
No 
7. Do you have a social media account (like Facebook or WhatsApp?)  
Yes 
No 
8. Community leadership position? (village chairman, sub-village chairman, AA/CBO council members) 
Yes 
No 









What proportion is this?  
None  
1/4 
1/2 or less 
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3/4 or less 
3/4 or more 
 





12. Have you or your family ever been injured by elephants? 
No 
Yes 
13. Did your household received any help from the WMA to protect you and your livelihoods from elephants in the last 12 months? 



















Trust and Trustworthiness:  
14. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? 
Most people can be trusted 
Need to be very careful 
15. Ability: “Generally, how effective are each group at protecting you and your village against elephant damage?” 
 Highly effective Effective Ineffective Very 
ineffective 
WMA     
Moran     
 
16. Benevolence: “How much do you think the following groups care about protecting you from elephants?” 
 High care Some care Little care Very little care 
WMA     
Moran     
17.  Integrity: “When each group says they will help you, how much do you believe what they say?” 
 High belief Some belief Little belief Very little belief 
WMA     
Moran     
 
18.  Legitimacy: “How legitimate is the WMA?” 
 Highly legitimate Legitimate Illegitimate Very illegitimate  




Wildlife Tolerance  









20. Damage – How many bags of your annual crop would you find acceptable to lose to elephants? 
None 
No. bags = 
 
21. Killing – Do you think an elephant should be killed (by the WMA/government) if? 
 
1.….it is seen in the bush far away from any village or houses or livestock or agricultural crops.  
2…...it is seen in the vicinity of where agricultural crops are growing. 
3.…..it has injured or killed a domestic animal or has raided some houses or agricultural crops for the first time. 
4……it causes repeated problems for you and your community but has never harmed a person. 
5…..it has threatened a child or adult human.  
6…..it has injured a child or adult human.  
7….it has killed a child or adult human  
 







More than current 
 
Interventions 

























26. How much do you think people in your village cooperate with each other to guard each other’s crops? 
Very often 
Often
Not very often 
Never 
27. How willing are you to cooperate with the WMA to help reduce elephant damage and conserve elephants? 









29. Are you aware of Honeyguide? (the local operating wildlife NGO) 
Yes 
No











Thank you for giving up your time today to participate in this research. As mentioned, this group has been randomly chosen from a list of available 
participants in the village (provided by the village Chairman) and so there is no significance as to who else you are here with.  Before we start, we 
would like to explain the game. We will then play a short practise and we will answer any questions you might have. In total we will play for about one 
hour. You do not have to play the game and you are free to leave at any time if you wish. You will receive a payment (5,000Tsh) at the end of the 
game to compensate you for your time. We will also be playing games for cash and so any money that you receive in the game is yours to take home. 
The extra amount you take home will be up to 6,000Tsh and will be dependent on how many tokens you have left at the end of the game. One token= 
100Tsh, thirty tokens = 3,000Tsh. The money for these games has been supplied to undertake scientific research. Now we will explain the rules of the 
game. If you have heard from others who have already played the game, do not listen to what they have told you as this may not be correct, and the 
games may be different this time.  
 
Explanation (insert WMA/Moran depending upon treatment order) 
As you can see you are in a group of four players. This board <point to board> represents the area around your village <point to each corner>.  Each 
corner in green represents your individual farm of crops <Point to elephant figurines in the middle>. These figurines represent elephants <point to 
elephants>. These five tokens <point to tokens> each represent one bag of crop. This additional one token <point to separate token> represents an 
additional sum of resources. These figures <point to either WMA or Moran figures> represent <insert WMA or Moran> who help guard your crops 
from the elephants.You will play the game for five seasons. Each season there is a 50:50 chance that the elephants will raid your crops. To determine 
whether they do, you each will roll this dice <point to six-sided dice> and if it lands on a one, two or three, <point to numbers> the elephants will 
come and raid your crops. If it lands on four, five or six <point to numbers>, you will be safe and the elephants will not come <demonstrate dice roll>. 
Each season you can make a private and anonymous decision to keep the additional one token of resource for yourself <demonstrate placing token 
into private pot> or to contribute the resource to the <WMA/Moran> <demonstrate placing token into public pot>. The number of <WMA/Moran> is 
dependent upon how many tokens in total this group gives to the <WMA/Moran>. One token= one <WMA/Moran>, two tokens = two 
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<WMA/Moran>, three tokens = three <WMA/Moran> and four tokens = four <WMA/Moran>. The amount of bags of crops that the elephants eat is 
dependent on how many guarders there are. If there are no <WMA/Moran>, you will lose all 5 bags if the elephant crop-raid. If there is one 
<WMA/Moran> you will lose four bags. If there are two <WMA/Moran> you will lose three bags. If there are 3 <WMA/Moran> you will lose two bags 
and if there are four <WMA/Moran> you will lose one bag. 
 
Therefore, each round if you keep the resource for yourself, you will receive the value of it at the end of the game. But, if you contribute it to the 
<WMA/Moran> you will not keep it, but the damage caused by elephants will be reduced for yourself and each other player due to your contribution. 
You will make your decision in private, by placing your token in either your private pot or the <WMA/Moran> pot when others cannot see you. Each 
player will take it in turn to do this, but will not know what the other players have decided to do. We will record your decisions privately and will not 
reveal them at any stage. The total number of <WMA/Moran> will then be determined according to the total number of contributed tokens. Each 
player will then roll the dice to see whether elephants come to their farm. If they do, the amount of bags lost will be dependent on how many 
<WMA/Moran> there are that season. After each player has rolled (and crop-raided tokens removed) each player can harvest their crops and put 
them into their private pot. We will record how many tokens you harvest, so that we know how much to pay you at the end of the game. But you can 
also keep the tokens in your private pot so that you can count them privately at the end if you wish to confirm. You are free to talk to each other 
during the games but please do not talk about your decisions. We will play this game for five seasons. We will then have a short break and then play a 
different game. We will now practise the process of making your private decision. In the first practise everyone will put in to the <WMA/Moran> pot 
and in the second everyone will put into their private pots.  
 
[carry out practise] 




Thank you for playing this first game. Now you can take a quick break. Please refrain from discussing your decisions with each other or talking about 






I hope you had a nice break. We will now play the second game. This game is like the first game, but this time you have the choice of either keeping 
the resource for yourself or contributing it to <WMA/Moran> who are the ones carrying out the guarding from elephants. 





Thank you very much for playing both of these games. Before we give you your individual payment we would like to have a short discussion with you 




Please wait outside and we will call you in individually to pay you according to how many tokens you accumulated in the game. Please do not share 
this value with the other players or anyone else and please refrain from telling other people how you played in the game, or how other players should 
play in the game, as this may compromise our research. Thank you very much again for coming today and if you have any questions please get in 





We conducted three key-word searches between January and March 2018. This timing aimed to capture reaction to the changing US policy regarding 
the import of elephant parts from certain African countries to the US (Batavia et al., 2018). Three searches were conducted in the sampling period, 
chosen at times to capture reaction to news and media items, rather than conducted randomly. Each search collected tweets from the preceding 10 
days. To restrict our sample to just US-based users, we included a location-based filter during the search, and also manually removed any users in the 
sample who stated their location as non-US based. As the method to estimate political ideology requires each user to follow at least one known US 
‘political account’, users who did not follow at least one such account were removed from the sample.Relevant tweets were classified as those 
explicitly or contextually referring to the recreational hunting of terrestrial African mega-fauna, or those responding to other tweets, media or 
petitions, policies covering this topic. ‘Non-relevant’ tweets included those with a focus that was too ambiguous to decipher, those referring to the 
hunting of other (e.g. non-African or marine) species and those referring to other topics (e.g., computer gaming). 
 
To calculate the estimated sample size needed to identify the predicted order of effect size, under suitable power, we conducted a power calculation 
using the ‘R’ package ‘pwr’. Our initial estimation found that we would need to sample at least 322 individuals in each of the three groups, to have at 
least an 80% probability of finding an effect size of 0.1 (a difference in political ideology estimate means of 0.5). Having found during preliminary 
analysis that ‘anti’ tweets appeared approximately at a frequency 10 times greater than ‘pro’ tweets (and five times greater than ‘neutral’ tweets) we 
predicted we would need to analyse a sample in the order of 3,000 individual users. As our final sample of unique users with relevant tweets came to 
4,241, we deemed this sample size appropriate.  
 
Searches: 
1st search = 30/12/17 – 09/01/18, 1,475 tweets (587 replies) 
2nd search = 25/01/18- 15/01/18, 672 tweets (240 replies) 





We individually analysed the content and context of each tweet by reading the text and following the hyperlink to the original tweet – which shows 
any images, links, or images (including emoticons) associated with the tweet, the user profile, and the thread of tweets that the tweet may be 
included (e.g, replies to other users). We coded tweets firstly as being relevant to the trophy hunting of terrestrial African megafauna (to include in 
the sample). We then categorised each tweet according to a pre-developed coding system – which we developed using directed content analysis 
(Hsieh and Shannon, 2005) through analysing the first 300 tweets of the sample (sorted temporally).  
 
Political Ideology Estimation 
The general population of Twitter users is normally distributed along the middle of the axis (ideology estimate of zero), and triangulation with known 
real-world political ideologies, from voting and party record, finds this method is effective at identifying between US-based liberals (more negative 
scores) and conservatives (more positive scores) for both politically active users and politicians (Barberá et al., 2015). We checked this for ourselves by 
applying the method to a randomly selected sample of US-bases Twitter users (n=8,323) and found the result to be consistent (Figure A5.1). To 
generate this sample we used the tweet collector function in the package ‘StreamR’, filtering all tweets posted at that time for only tweets from the 
US, and the ‘timeout’ function so as to collect approximately 10,000 tweets (which we deemed a sufficient sample size for analysis due to the 
computation demand of analysis). In total we collected 11,432 tweets, of which we were able generate ideology estimates for 8,323 users. We ran the 
search once during the data analysis phase of the research project, in December 2018 at noon, US Central Time on a weekday – which we have no 





Figure A5.1: Density plot showing the estimated political ideology scores of a randomly selected sample of Twitter users (n=8,323), with average score 






Figure A5.2: Results from Tukey's Honest Significant Difference test indicating the difference in mean political ideology estimates between users 






Figure A5.3: Results from a generalised linear mixed effects model, showing the estimated conditional effects of each predictor variable on tweet 
hostility. Filled dots represent model coefficient estimates converted to odds ratios, which show the expected change in likelihood of a tweet being 
hostile when each continuous variable increases by a unit of one, or when each factor variable changes level from a baseline (unfilled dots). Whiskers 
represent standard errors (95% CI), and variables with whiskers that do not cross zero are those predicted by the model to associate with tweet 




Figure A5.4: A mosaic plot depicting the association between the estimate political ideology (liberal, moderate, conservative) of tweet authors, and 
repliers colour-coded by Pearson’s residual values. Blue cells indicating significantly more observations than would be expected under independence 
(positive association), red cells indicating fewer observations than would be expected (negative association). Box size is proportional to the observed 





Figure A5.5: Word cloud demonstrating the most popular words used to support tweets in favour of trophy hunting (bottom) and against (top), with 
word frequency proportional to word size. 
